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Abstract. 
The intentional properties and subjective qualities of conscious states pose 
special problems for physicalism. Yet 'consciousness' is a term of the vernacular 
that picks out such a heterogeneous group of phenomena that it will not be a 
good explanandum for science. This thesis adopted the position that we are 
licensed to theorize about the phenomena of consciousness, provided we are 
careful to dump all excess folk-psychological baggage surrounding the term. It 
was argued that the purposes and goals of folk psychology differ considerably 
from those of scientific psychology, for folk psychology is first and foremost a 
craft. 
Cognitive psychology is bound to the analytical strategy by way of 
functionalism. Various forms of functionalism were investigated, and two non-
mutually exclusive versions were favoured: homuncular functionalism and 
microfunctionalism. This led to the view that nature is multi-levelled, and 
therefore that functionalism may be better known as structural-functional theory. 
S-F theory should seek to explain the processes and structures of the mind-
brain, rather than attempt to find the states posited by folk psychology within 
the cognitive system. 
Traditional cognitive models view the mind as a highly structured system 
of semi-autonomous processors under the monitoring and guidance of a central 
executive. But this thesis argued that to postulate a 'consciousness module', 
while a natural extension of functionalist 'boxology', is merely to pander to our 
folk-psychological intuitions of the will or 'inner self'. Some of the 'new wave' 
of cognitive models - those that do not posit an executive - were reviewed. 
Phenomenal consciousness is the one major stumbling block for 
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physicalist theories. Although this thesis agreed that qualia do not exist, it was 
evident that no theory has yet provided a bridge across the explanatory gap 
between third-person science and first-person phenomenology over which 
sceptics feel safe to cross. Nevertheless, it was argued that Dennett's (1991a) 
latest theory, with its intelligent use of metaphors and analogies, is one of the 
most promising steps in the right direction. 
Finally, it was argued throughout that an interdisciplinary approach is 
crucial if science is to uncover the mysteries of consciousness. 
CHAPTER 1. 
PHYSICALISM, FOLK vs. SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY, 
AND CONSCIOUSNESS. 
Part I. Introduction. 
1. Science today: physicalism. 
Physicalism is the general doctrine underlying science today, and may best 
be viewed as relative to the physics of the day (Armstrong, 1987); that is, as 
providing the fundamental assumptions upon which our theories of nature are 
based. Physicalism admits of a wide range of different stances on the nature of 
the world, and particularly on the mind-body relationship. Generally 
physicalism is taken to be the position that mental states, processes, and the like 
are the same as (just are) physical states and processes. 
Thus the primary concern of physicalism is the use of the language and 
theories of the physical sciences in the description, explanation, and prediction 
of the purposeful behaviour of humans and animals, and as such poses the 
question of whether "we need to make ineliminable reference to [mental 
phenomena] when explaining behaviour." (Wilkes, 1978, p.10). Or more 
explicitly, physicalism for the brain and behavioural sciences can be described 
as: "the attempt to correlate explanations of actions couched in psychological 
terms with descriptions and explanations of cerebral states, events, and 
processes couched in neurophysiological terms." (Wilkes, 1978, p.29). There are 
two points to note about this statement: (i) as Wilkes readily admits, the terms 
'correlate' and 'explain' are still quite vague, but that is not such a bad thing, for 
(ii), as Wilkes goes on to suggest, this vagueness can be put to advantage, 
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because it does not commit us to reductionism. 
Generally speaking, then, physicalism is the conception of the world as a 
physically closed system, i.e., every event is explicable in purely physical terms; 
there is nothing but the physical world. Just what this claim amounts to for the 
nature and progress of science is a matter of considerable debate. In the eyes of 
a stereotypical reductionist, for instance, physicalism involves two types of 
theories: psychology and neurophysiology. On this view, neurophysiology is 
regarded as the more basic or fundamental science "because it explains why 
the laws of psychology hold to the extent they do, something that psychology 
itself cannot explain; and because it is believed to be reducible to the science we 
consider the most fundamental: physics." (Wilkes, 1978, p.30). Reductionism is 
the perfect bedfellow for monistic physicalism. A reductionist stance is not the 
only position open to the physicalist, however. Indeed, if nature is viewed as 
multi-levelled (as I discuss in chapter 2), then our theories of nature are also 
likely to be multi-levelled (chapter 5). 
2. Physicalism and explanations of the mental. 
All conscious mental states are generally considered to exhibit one or 
other, or both, of two characteristics (e.g., Rosenthal, 1986): intrinsic properties 
- what the sensations, emotions, etc., feel like to the person who is 
experiencing them; and the meaning or content of those experiences - what 
they are about or represent. The conscious mental states picked out by their 
phenomenal characteristics are typically "the sensation-type mental 
phenomena: pains, itches, tingles, twitches, images, after-images, sense 
impressions." (Wilkes, 1978, p.11). The conscious mental states picked out by 
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their representational content are typically the propositional attitudes: beliefs, 
desires, memories, thoughts, and the like. 
The physicalist strategy is to seek explanations of the mental in terms of 
the physics and chemistry of the brain; to find the neurobiological substrate of 
consciousness and other mental phenomena. If the above characterization of 
conscious mental states is more or less correct, then a major challenge for the 
physicalist is to explain, in purely physical terms, the meaningful content of our 
thoughts, beliefs, and desires, and the apparent intrinsic qualities of our sensory 
experience. But how is this even conceivable? Physicalism seems to run counter 
to our everyday, common-sense view of our mental life, for the latter "is pretty 
much Cartesian-dualist through and through" (Dennett, 1991c, p.137). Science 
thus confronts a paradox: from our own perspective at least, our conscious 
mental states appear to be so far removed or so utterly different from anything 
else in the physical world (from 'movements of atoms in the void') that we are 
pushed to the intuition that indeed they are like nothing else in the physical 
world, and even if they are part of that physical world, then they will certainly 
not yield to any physical explanation (see discussion of McGinn, 1989, 1991, in 
section 2.2 of part II, below). From the perspective of the person on the street, 
mental life is the last bastion of human uniqueness, safe in its inner sanctum 
from the ever advancing physical sciences. This is how Dennett (1991a) 
illustrates the problem: 
"How could any combination of electrochemical happenings in 
my brain somehow add up to the delightful way those hundreds of 
twigs geneflucted in time with the music? How could some 
information-processing event in my brain be the delicate warmth of 
the sunlight I felt falling on me? For that matter, how could an event 
in my brain be my sketchily visualized mental image of ... some other 
information-processing event in my brain? It does seem impossible." 
(pp.26-27). 
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The concept of consciousness is one aspect of mind that poses special 
problems for physicalism: it appears to elude or defy adequate scientific 
explanation, remaining even more mystifying than probably any other 
mentalistic concept. Yet most of us would regard conscious experience as the 
essence of what it is to be human. Most would agree, for example, that in our 
usual waking state we are in some way subjectively aware of our physical and 
social environment and our interaction with it, that our sensory experience of 
the physical world is imbued with all manner of intricate and colourful 
qualities, that we have a sense of self, and that we have a variety of thoughts 
(seemingly linguistic, visual, or auditory), beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, 
etc. Furthermore, it is commonly held that these mental states have special 
characteristics or qualities, and that these qualities can be described, although 
often with some difficulty (what Dennett, 1988, calls the apparently "ineffable, 
intrinsic, private, directly or immediately apprehensible" quality of our 
experience). Nagel (1974/ 1979, 1986), characterizes this special quality of 
mental experience as the 'what it is like to be X' (see chapter 4). A frequently 
and sometimes vehemently held corollary of this account of the special nature 
of human consciousness is that it appears that it cannot be captured in the 
language of the physical sciences. 
How then is the physicalist to reconcile the everyday intuitions about our 
mental life with her commitment to explaining the entire physical world, of 
which conscious mental states are presumed to be a part, in solely physical 
terms? When the physicalist steps back from the task at hand she is faced with 
two overriding general questions: What is it about these apparently essential 
characteristics of human nature that makes it so hard for science to get a handle 
on them?; and: How do we best view the mental realm, and hence how do we 
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best approach the scientific study and explanation of consciousness? These are 
the motivating questions for the present thesis. By concentrating my efforts on 
the latter question, I also hope to shed some light on the former. 
A key problem for any scientific description and explanation of 
consciousness is how it is possible to reconcile the subjective nature of 
experience with physicalist theories of mind. Some argue (e.g., Nagel, 1974, 
1979, 1986) that the subjective character of conscious experience will forever lie 
outside the boundaries of objective science. However (as I will attempt to show 
in chapter 4) the arguments advanced in support of such claims are either faulty 
or not as significant as they initially appear. Nevertheless, the subjective nature 
of experience, the "phenomenal mind" (Jackendoff, 1987), still presents the 
biggest stumbling-block for functionalist and physicalist theories of mind-brain 
and behaviour. The other major stumbling-block concerns the status of 
intensional language in scientific - physicalist or functionalist - descriptions 
and explanations of human action and behaviour. This issue, which is bound up 
with the notion of 'intentionality' as a mark of the mental, is a topic of 
considerable unresolved debate amongst philosophers of mind (see Part II of 
the present chapter). 
Despite these objections, there is a growing body of assorted scientists and 
philosophers who are making significant inroads into the scientific explanation 
and understanding of consciousness and conscious phenomena. While 
neuroscience is undoubtedly a crucial part of this scientific push into explaining 
all we mean when we speak of consciousness (see e.g., P. S. Churchland, 1983, 
1988), there are many (including myself) who believe that it is not the only part. 
This thesis will examine some other major contenders for that elusive prize: our 
best explanation of the mental. 
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There are a number of opinions, arguments, and theses as to why 
consciousness should and needs to come under the legitimate realm of scientific 
inquiry. The predominant thesis underpinning these views, at least from the 
point of view of psychology, is a functionalist view of the mind-brain (chapter 
2). It is the cognitive sciences that have taken the functionalist perspective to 
heart, and developed it into detailed theses of mind (chapter 3). Despite the 
promise of some computational cognitive theories, however, it is not apparent 
that they deal adequately with the problems posed by the subjective nature of 
conscious experience (chapter 4). But what may amount to a deeper concern 
with such functionalist theories of consciousness is that, when taken to their 
logical end points, they tend to postulate entities and functions that appeal to a 
ubiquitous, yet outmoded and seriously mistaken view of the mind: "Cartesian 
materialism" (Dennett, 1991a; Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992; see chapters 3, 4, 5). 
Finally it will be seen that functionalist theories, while remaining "respectable, 
useful and probably necessary", to borrow a phrase from Mandler (1975), 
cannot be the one and only vehicles for our best explanations of all that falls 
under the rubric 'consciousness' (chapter 5). 
Part II: Folk craft and scientific explanation. 
1. Folk psychology, scientific psychology, and consciousness. 
1.1 The status of folk psychology. 
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Folk psychology is literally what it says it is: the everyday psychology of 
folk; the common-sense practice of describing, explaining and predicting our 
own and other persons' everyday behaviours and mental states in terms of 
beliefs, desires, thoughts, intentions, emotions, and the like. In a nutshell, folk 
psychology encompasses all commonsense concepts of our mental life; and 
'consciousness' is a concept of folk psychology par excellence. 
One central question in the philosophy of mind - indeed, it is also a 
central question for any science of the mind- concerns how this everyday 
competence squares with our general physicalist view of the world. This debate 
is concerned with the concept of intentionality and the status of folk psychology 
- what place, if any, does it have in a mature science; a debate which is too 
involved and lengthy for extended treatment in the present paper. (The 
literature here is extensive; for good overviews of the issues, see e.g., P. M. 
Churchland, 1981; Clark, 1989; Dennett, 1987; Fodor, 1985; Lyons, 1990, 1991; 
Sterelny, 1990; Stich, 1983; Wilkes, 1978.) Nevertheless, my views on the debate 
will emerge in what follows, for a discussion of the nature of folk psychology 
and its relationship with scientific psychology is central to my thesis. 
One major group of players in this debate are the eliminativists, who hold 
that the advance of the physical sciences will eventually eliminate all folk-
psychological talk. Paul M. Churchland (e.g., 1981, 1988), for example, takes 
neuroscience to be the supplanting doctrine, whereas Stich (1983) takes it to be 
some form of computational psychology. According to these arguments, folk 
psychology- that is, any scientific practice openly embracing folk-
8 
psychological talk - is a degenerative research program. This rests partly on 
the claim that folk psychology is 'theoretical', in some systematic or scientific 
sense; i.e., it is causal explanatory theory. However, as a number have argued 
(e.g.; Clark, 1987, 1989; Dennett, 1987, 1991c; Horgan and Woodward, 1985; 
Sterelny, 1990; Wilkes, 1981), the way in which 'theory' is applied to the two 
cases - the everyday practice of folk psychology on the one hand, and science 
on the other - is quite different. Indeed, pace Churchland, everyday 
psychological explanations do not count as scientific theories in any useful 
sense of the term. Folk psychology can certainly be regarded as theory (as e.g., 
Greenwood, 1991b, insists) albeit not theory with scientific explanatory virtues. 
Dennett (1991c) puts it this way: folk psychology should not be regarded as 
scientific causal explanatory theory, for "it does not consist of any explicit 
theorems or laws" (p.135). The explicit theorems and laws of nature demarcate 
the joints at which the world can be carved, and if folk psychology does not 
consist of any of them, then there is no guarantee that the kinds of folk 
psychology will correspond to natural kinds. 
Dennett's point does not necessarily imply eliminativism, however. For 
even propositional attitude realism, as Fodor (1987) says, does not entail the 
requirement "that the folk-psychological inventory of propositional attitudes 
should turn out to exhaust a natural kind" (p.26). That is, some folk-
psychological kinds may not pick out any (physical) natural kinds. 
Like folk-psychological 'theory', many of the so-called scientific theories in 
psychology do not consist of explicit theorems or laws. It might be argued that 
these non-causal explanatory theories are therefore have no place in a 
developed science. I do not take this view, however; I do not wish to totally 
exclude these 'weaker', non-causal explanatory theories from the realm of 
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science (see chapter 5). Similarly, I believe that folk-psychological 'theories' 
need not be totally excluded from science. Indeed, if some form of the 
"Representational Theory of Mind" (RTM- see e.g., Fodor, 1975, 1987; 
Sterelny, 1990) is true, then as Fodor says, common sense is vindicated, for RTM 
shows how intentional states can have causal powers. 
All this, however, is not meant to imply that the bold claims of the 
eliminativists are entirely mistaken (at least on Clark's, Dennett's, Wilkes', and 
my own view). As will become evident in latter sections of this thesis, we may 
have to submit to the eliminativist push more than many would intuitively 
wish to allow. ("What do you mean we don't really have beliefs and desires? 
How utterly preposterous!") Nevertheless, I take it that some species of 
intentionally characterized explanatory theories -possibly akin to folk 
psychology, but no doubt "cleaned up and made precise in various ways" 
(Sterelny, 1990, p.150)- are likely to survive and prosper within the scientific 
endeavour, for their heuristic value, if no other. If neuroscience (or, for that 
matter, computational psychology) provides accounts of what is actually going 
on in the head which contradict the intuitions of folk psychology, it is no good 
reason to throw the practice of folk psychology, tout court, out the window 
(chapter 5). For many of the terms of folk psychology may nevertheless remain 
extremely useful causal explanatory concepts in everyday social interaction (i.e., 
this suggests some form of instrumentalism - see Dennett, e.g., 1978a, 1987). 
Moreover, these terms are used to refer to the behaviours and presumed states 
of whole persons (or other organisms), and did not originate or develop as a 
means of identifying discrete, quantifiable states of the brain. As Sterelny (1990) 
correctly reasons, "even if Churchland is right in thinking that intentional 
psychology is badly flawed, the eliminativist moral does not follow." (p.148). 
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Rather than being regarded as a systematic theory of behaviour and 
mental life, folk psychology should be viewed primarily as a craft (Dennett, 
1991c); "the theory of folk psychology is the ideology about the craft" (p.135). 
Folk psychology is more a form of "bedrock theorizing" (Clark, 1987, p.146) 
than a primitive speculative theory of mind. Support for this view is presented 
by both Clark (1987, 1989) and Dennett (1991c) when they compare folk 
psychology to naive or folk physics (Hayes, 1979). On this view, just as we are 
born with the propensity to develop abilities to assess and predict some gross 
behaviours of the natural world, so too are we born with the propensity to 
develop abilities to assess and predict some aspects of our social world. Clark 
(1987), for instance, argues that "just as a roughly accurate grasp of some basic 
physical principles is vital to a mobile organism, so too will some roughly 
accurate grasp of basic psychological principles be vital to a social organism" 
(p.140). By "vital" he means essential for survival, i.e., "evolutionary necessity" 
(p.140). (This view of folk psychology dovetails rather nicely with some theories 
of the evolutionary development of consciousness, which will be discussed in 
chapter 5). 
It is important to remember that the everyday mental terms (EMTs) of folk 
psychology are used in social contexts to describe and explain to others (and, 
perhaps derivatively, ourselves) the behaviours and supposed mental states of 
people. As such, their full meaning can only be gleaned by studying their use in 
these social contexts; we must look to the social milieu to explain the nature and 
use of the everyday mental terms. Social constructionism (e.g., Harre, 1986) and 
much of recent social psychology (e.g., Fletcher, 1984, forthcoming) trade 
exclusively in the realms of the social milieu and the EMTs. Unfortunately an 
adequate examination of these theories is far beyond the scope of this thesis; 
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nevertheless, an argument for the inclusion of an examination of the social 
milieu in explaining the 'human condition', including consciousness, will 
emerge in the following pages. Anything approaching a full explanation of all 
that is entailed by 'consciousness' will require consideration of the social realm 
(see especially chapter 5). 
That is the wide use of the term 'folk psychology'. The narrow use of the 
term equates it to belief-desire or intentional psychology: the explanation of a 
person's behaviour or mental states by appeal to the beliefs and desires of that 
person (agent). The distinction between the narrow and wide uses of the term is 
not hard and fast: essentially the narrow construal is an idealized form of folk 
psychology. 
Beliefs and desires are taken to be states which have mental content: they 
refer to things apart from themselves - either imaginary or real world objects 
or events. So, for example, it is said that one can believe that it is snowing in the 
mountains during a storm, believe that there are spiders on Mars, desire a large 
piece of blueberry cheesecake, and believe that kiwis can fly. Thus beliefs and 
desires are 'intentional': they refer to or are about possible things in the world. 
Notice how the content of a belief or desire - in the case of beliefs, the 
proposition following 'that' in the clause - may be true or false independent of 
the truth of the statement attributing belief or desire (the propositional attitude). 
Kiwis cannot fly, yet one may have the belief that they can. 
It is this intentional or representational aspect of the propositional 
attitudes, and mental states in general, which is seen as a serious obstacle to 
physicalism, for human action and experience is described and explained in 
everyday language by the use of 'intensional' terms, whereas the languages of 
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the physical sciences are wholly 'extensional'. It appears impossible to describe 
and explain human action without recourse to intensional language, yet the 
demands of physical science require intensional terms to be "eliminated at some 
stage: reduced to, or explained or paraphrased by, extensional sentences. And 
this is impossible: no extensional sentence, or set of such sentences, ever has the 
same truth-conditions as an intensional sentence" (Wilkes, 1978, p.16). While I 
do not claim to offer a sufficient solution to this problem here, the discussion in 
this and the following chapters will point the reader in the direction which I 
believe shows most promise: namely, that a scientific understanding of the 
everyday ascription of mental terms is possible, but that a reduction or 
elimination of these concepts by some more 'basic' science is likely to be 
unjustified, if not impossible. The purposes and goals of sub-personal scientific 
psychology differ from those of personal scientific psychology, and the 
purposes and goals of folk psychology differ from both 1 (as I shall make clear 
below). 
1.2 Purposes and goals of scientific psychology. 
It is of critical importance to distinguish the purposes and goals of 
scientific psychology from those of everyday or common-sense psychology 
(Wilkes, 1981). For whereas the latter is primarily concerned with the 
explanation, description and prediction of specific actions in particular contexts 
and circumstances, the former seeks "to identify and explain the pervasive, 
fundamental capacities that underlie the purposive behavior of humans and 
animals." (Wilkes, 1981, p.150). 
1 The dist1nct1ons made here owe much to Dennett's (e.g., 1978a, 1987) 
d1st1nct1ons between sub-personal and personal psychology, and between the "design 
stance" and the "intentional stance". 
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Consequently, scientific explananda (the phenomena requiring 
explanation) may not correspond exactly with those states or properties 
identified by folk psychology, and the explanans (the terms doing the 
explaining) of the two enterprises will differ considerably. (The explanans of 
folk psychology are the propositional attitudes -beliefs, desires, thoughts, and 
the like - and other EMTs; they are used to describe and explain the properties 
and actions of ourselves and other people.) There are at least two reasons for 
this: Firstly, the EMTs lack the explanatory depth, precision, and consistency 
required of good scientific explanans (Wilkes, 1981, 1988a, 1988b). Secondly, 
propositional attitude talk (and, presumably, most other EMT talk) is essentially 
"a holistic net thrown across a body of the behavior of an embodied being 
acting in the world" (Clark, 1989, p.5), and hence is likely to refer to a variety of 
types and degrees of physiological and structural-functional states. In short, 
mental state kinds may not correspond to natural kinds. The tools of folk 
psychology are not likely to carve the psychological beast at its natural joints; 
the proper tools for the job are the sharp knives of good scientific theory. 
(Nevertheless, as Clark, 1989, points out, the terms of folk psychology do 
provide good starting points for scientific investigation - otherwise we would 
have a hard job finding much to investigate!). Granted, some folk-psychological 
terms are adopted by science, but if they are then they will be considerably 
'tightened up' or 'adapted' (Wilkes, 1988a). What gives us reason to suppose 
that 'consciousness' is not a suitable term for adoption and adaption by science? 
An answer to this question will emerge from the discussion in sections 1.3 and 
1.4, below (see also Wilkes, 1984, 1988a). 
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1.3 The everyday folk meanings of 'consciousness'. 
The term 'consciousness' has had a relatively short and eventful life so far 
- in everyday, philosophical, and psychological usage. It first appeared in 
English and some other European languages in a few writings of the 17th 
century (Wilkes, 1988a). Not even in ancient Greek is there anything 
appropriately translatable as 'consciousness', or even 'mind'. Wilkes (1988a) 
suggests that 'consciousness' may also be somewhat idiosyncratic to post-16th 
century European languages. In Chinese, for example, there are no terms that 
adequately capture the English 'conscious(ness)'. Yet throughout this time there 
has been no singular, all-encompassing, universally accepted (or even widely 
accepted) definition or meaning given to the term. It can mean many things to 
many people - layperson, philosopher, and scientist alike. 
Natsoulas (1978), following the Oxford English Dictionary (1933), discusses 
seven concepts of consciousness contained in everyday usage. They are 
consciousness as: (1) "joint or mutual knowledge"; (2) "internal knowledge or 
conviction": a basic knowledge of oneself and one's actions; (3) "awareness": in 
the general sense of being aware - of external facts and objects, that one is 
having a certain thought, etc; (4) "direct awareness": the ability or state of being 
"non-inferentially" aware of ones own thoughts and perceptions; (5) "personal 
unity": the up-to-date, complete set of mental episodes of a person; (6) "the 
normal waking state"; and (7) "double consciousness", which refers to the 
phenomenon evident with double or multiple personalities, where the trains of 
thought or mental capabilities can be viewed as independent to some degree 
(Natsoulas, 1978, pp.909-913). 
Psychological research on folk conceptions of consciousness is scarce. One 
recent preliminary study by Kemp and Strongman (unpublished), however, 
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provides a number of interesting results concerning the definitions people give 
of consciousness, and how they view marginal cases (children, animals, and the 
retarded). Five general categories were extracted from the brief definitions of 
consciousness provided by the respondents in the study: sensory awareness or 
awareness of the environment; awareness of one's place in the environment; self 
awareness; awareness of the existence of others; thought, imagination, or some 
other cognitive ability. Thus, for the most part, consciousness is seen as 
synonymous with awareness. Moreover, the study found sensory awareness to 
be the most frequently cited definition of consciousness. Overall, however, the 
evidence suggests little consensus in peoples' definitions of consciousness; they 
did not share a coherent conception of consciousness suitable for applying to 
young children, animals, and the retarded (hence there was little agreement on 
these marginal cases). 
Kemp and Strongman's study gives some support to the view that the folk 
notion of consciousness is varied and sometimes incoherent; people tend to be 
imprecise in their definitions of consciousness, and inconsistent in applying the 
term. If this brief study is suggestive of a general pattern amongst a larger 
population, then it certainly gives credence to the view that 'consciousness' is 
not a good explanandum for science. 
Thus, in agreement with Allport (1988), Patricia S. Churchland (1988), 
Sloman (1991), and Wilkes (1984, 1988a), it is my contention that consciousness, 
at least as it is conceived in folk-psychological talk, is not a good explanandum 
for science because the everyday language in which it is embedded is often too 
vague, incoherent, and just plain mistaken about the exact nature of the 
physical world. It is looking increasingly likely that 'consciousness' does not 
denote a single entity or property unifying all the cases referred to by different 
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usages of the term. "[T]here is no unitary entity of 'phenomenal awareness' -
no unique process or state, no one, coherently conceptualizable phenomenon 
for which there can be a single, conceptually coherent theory" (Allport, 1988, 
p.161). Rather, 'consciousness' denotes a complex heterogenous set of 
properties, events, or states; and thus it may be like the notion of 
understanding, which "denotes a complex set of prototypical capabilities or 
conditions" (Allport, 1988, p.162). Indeed, Wilkes (1978, 1984) suggests that 
consciousness, like intelligence (and, I would say, understanding), should be 
regarded as a 'second-order concept'; that is, ascriptions of consciousness will 
depend on the prior ascription of a range of more 'basic' first-order mental or 
other psychological concepts. "In other words, we presuppose a whole slew of 
psychological ascriptions - to do with perception, motivation, belief and 
desire, misperception, illusion, recognition, etc. -when an ascription of 
consciousness makes sense; conversely, where some set of first-order mental 
statements are appropriate, then the 'fact' of consciousness follows 
automatically." (Wilkes, 1984, p.238). However, there may be a crucial 
difference between the notions of consciousness and intelligence as second-
order concepts, according to Wilkes (1984): consciousness cannot be adopted by 
science as an analysandum, for unlike intelligence, it is too imprecise and 
heterogeneous a term; it does not cover a tidy or systematically-related set of 
behaviours suitable for analysis. (The analytical strategy in science is discussed 
in more detail in section 2.3, part II of the present chapter.) 
Despite the findings from the cognitive and brain sciences that suggest 
otherwise, I think it is still too early to say once and for all that there is really no 
such 'thing' as consciousness, no property or set of properties common to our 
multifarious subjective experience. Indeed, as will be mentioned in chapter 5, 
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following Dennett and Kinsbourne (1992), some form of realism about 
consciousness may be warranted. Nevertheless, if we are still to use the term 
'conscious(ness)', and to theorize about it, we must bear in mind the points 
made here and elsewhere (Allport, 1988; Wilkes, 1978, 1984; and others), for not 
doing so will often lead us astray, creating problems where none may exist (the 
'qualia' problem may well be one such case: see chapter 4). In other words, 
when theorizing about consciousness we must unburden ourselves from the 
shackles of folk-psychological intuitions and assumptions about its nature, 
function, and mystery. 'Consciousness' must be baked in a very hot theoretical 
kiln before it can become a legitimate scientific construct. 
1.4 Scientific and philosophical uses of 'consciousness'. 
The following sketch of a taxonomy (from Copeland, unpublished) 
provides a useful starting point for a discussion of the psychological and 
philosophical uses of consciousness. This taxonomy considers consciousness as : 
(i) the capacity to perform a set of baseline functions; (ii) a type of internal 
monitoring; and (iii) as sensory episodes accompanied by qualia. 
(i). The baseline sense of consciousness. 
This specifies perception of the world via sense organs, and the ability to 
perform such inner processes as reasoning, planning, deliberating, judging, etc. 
Although as Jaynes (1976, p.47) suggests, it is conceivable that there might have 
been a race of beings who satisfy these baseline conditions and yet we might 
still regard them as not having been conscious (in some further sense). 
Humphrey (1986) makes a similar point when he talks of "perception sans 
sensation" (p.57). 
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Even if such a race of beings did not exist, it is nevertheless apparent from 
numerous psychological studies that much of human functioning occurs 
without requiring conscious experience. This raises the point of whether 
consciousness is necessary for cognition and behaviour. Is consciousness of any 
use, or is it just a relatively unimportant and impotent by-product of the 
complex functioning of our brains? I suspect that many people would be 
horrified at such a proposal. Surely it must have some significance? Indeed, 
conscious experience is, to many people, the essence of what it is to be a normal, 
functioning, experiencing, and cognizing human being. The following two 
categories in Copeland's taxonomy of 'consciousness' should shed some more 
light on this issue. 
(ii). Consciousness as a type of internal monitoring. 
This proposed internal monitor (or monitoring system) allows us to be 
aware of some of the perceptual, cognitive, and bodily action processes, and not 
aware of others. A commonly given example of a process that cannot be 
monitored is the pupillary response. There are also processes which can be 
monitored, but are not monitored all the time. This internally-directed attention 
or awareness aspect of consciousness is limited in its processing capacity. 
So we get internal monitoring theories like that of Armstrong (1968), in 
which consciousness is hypothesized to be "a process in which one part of the 
brain scans another part of the brain." (p.94). Or that proposed by Humphrey 
(1986), in which consciousness is viewed as a metaphorical "inner eye". 
Internal monitoring models of consciousness are widespread within 
cognitive theories of mind. Johnson-Laird (1983, 1988a, 1988b), for example, 
outlines a theory of the conscious and unconscious mind based on a 
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computational framework. This theory postulates that 'simple consciousness' 
(bare awareness) can be explained by way of a high-level monitor that arises 
from the complex parallel processing of the brain. (Chapter 3 considers 
computational models of consciousness in more detail, including the 
modularity theses.) 
All this talk of a monitoring system seems plausible, one might argue, but 
surely it leaves something out? The visually aesthetic pleasure of a spectacular 
sunset, the searing pain of an acute burn, or the sweet, rich taste of a blueberry 
cheesecake are sensations which appear to have special qualities that internal 
monitor theories cannot explain. There seems to be more to awareness than is 
captured in the computational-functional notions of a monitoring system. Thus 
we turn to the third broad construal of 'consciousness' in philosophy: 
(iii). Consciousness as sensory episodes accompanied by qualia. 
This interpretation of conscious experience is what Copeland 
(unpublished) calls "[t]he ineffable feel of it all" (p.252). Not only can we 
perceive objects and their sensory qualities, and be aware of them, but there is 
also some sort of "feel", or "subjective character", or "immediate 
phenomenological quality" (p.253) to this experience. 'Qualia' (singular 'quale') 
is the collective term some people prefer to give to such special properties of 
conscious experience. There is something uniquely puzzling with the notion of 
qualia; the concept appears to defy convincing explanation. There is something 
it is like for a conscious entity to experience X (Nagel, 1974/1979), yet no 
amount of (current or future) third-person science seems capable of capturing 
these phenomenal qualities of experience. (There will be more about this 
baffling enigma in chapter 4.) 
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There have been numerous other attempts at individuating or classifying 
the various meanings of consciousness, some more successful than others. This 
in itself serves well to illustrate the looseness and generality of the term. Not 
only is our everyday conception of consciousness not a suitable explanandum 
for science, but many philosophical and scientific construals of the concept are 
still notoriously vague and imprecise. There is some general consensus on the 
broadly specified phenomena to which we normally attach the name 
'conscious(ness)', for example: the awareness of sensations; the ability to plan, 
deliberate, judge, and the like; short-term memory; awareness of the self; and 
even more broadly, the different states of awareness between the waking and 
sleep states (see e.g., P. S. Churchland, 1988; Wilkes, 1984, 1988b). Yet there is 
little agreement on just how of these phenomena are to be explained, and even 
on whether they can be explained at all. 
2. Scientific realism and explanations of consciousness. 
2.1 Introduction. 
"In recent decades a virtual Copernican Revolution has taken place in the 
philosophy of science, a radical change that has profound implications for the 
human sciences." (Manicas & Secord, 1983, p.399). This radical change is the 
realist view of science (e.g., Bhaskar, 1975; Keat and Urry, 1975; Manicas and 
Secord, 1983). Scientific realism is an alternative to the empiricist and 
paradigmatic views of science, and is now the dominant force in philosophy of 
science. 
The task of realist science is to formulate and develop theories that in some 
way represent and explain the world. Hypotheses are formulated about some 
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possible causal mechanism(s) of structures and events in the world, usually 
from some patterns of experience. This leads to the construction and 
development of theories that detail the existence and operation of those causal 
mechanisms which are proposed to explain the structure or event in question. 
Frequently these causal mechanisms will be sets of variables or 'hidden 
structures' that underlie our observations of the event. Thus we get the 
postulation of atoms and their subatomic constituents in physics, the molecular 
structure of DNA in biology, black holes and cosmic strings in cosmology. 
These hidden variables afford our theories greater explanatory power by going 
beyond the observable. "We pay the epistemological price of unobservability 
because we value the intellectual benefits it brings us, and rightly so. We depart 
from strict empiricism because it leaves the world unexplained." (McGinn, 1991, 
p.89). 
Nevertheless, unobservability is not the be-all-and-end-all of realism; nor 
is it likely to be a necessary central virtue of a theory. For a realist, truth is the 
principal virtue of a theory; the structures posited by realist theories are 
considered to actually exist. Although as Weston (1992) summarizes, truth for 
scientific realism may best be considered as "approximate or near truth"; truth, 
in this sense, is a 'horizon concept'. 
A question worth asking at this point is whether consciousness - or at 
least some of those phenomena or properties ordinarily grouped under the term 
- is amenable to realist explanation in terms of some 'hidden structure(s)'. 
McGinn (1991) believes so: "Consciousness does have natural depth, a 
concealed underside. We need to extend the strategy that has worked so well in 
other areas to this case too: the demands of theory make the attribution of 
hidden structure to consciousness unavoidable." (p.91). I think this is a 
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reasonable claim even if we regard consciousness in the way I have been 
emphasizing: as a multifarious folk-psychological concept, not readily 
adoptable by science as a neat explanandum or explanans. However, I differ 
from McGinn in one important respect: he believes that consciousness has a 
hidden structure that will forever lie outside our explanatory grasp. McGinn 
thus joins Nagel (1974, 1979, 1986) as one of the "new mysterians", in 
Flanagan's (1990) nomenclature. I believe the new mysterians to be mistaken, 
however; the following section explains why. 
2.2 Are explanations of consciousness beyond our ken? 
From the point of view of our own introspection - i.e., the 'subjective 
feel' or 'phenomenological quality' of our conscious states ("consciousnessp", in 
Block's, 1991, terminology) - it may appear that that is all there can be to 
consciousness; what you see is what you get- what more could there be? But 
on closer examination, it is apparent that we are duped into accepting this by 
the vagaries and limitations of our own conscious experience, as McGinn (1989, 
1991) points out. If we are naturalists about consciousnessp, then there must be 
some mechanisms and properties that explain its existence and nature (call 
them P), and these mechanisms and properties can be said to underlie 
consciousnessp, for they are inaccessible to it; we are not aware of the physical 
(or computational, or ... ?) goings-on that underpin our experience. 
However, McGinn makes the further (somewhat extreme, but nevertheless 
plausible) claim that even though there is certain to exist some full explanation 
of consciousness (including consciousnessp), we humans are entirely incapable 
of coming to conceive or understand it. Most uncontroversially, introspection is 
inadequate for revealing the where and what of P; introspection reveals 
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nothing about the properties of the brain. But neither will the third-person 
perspective of science render P intelligible, as our concept-forming systems are 
inadequate for the job. According to McGinn (1989, 1991) we are "cognitively 
closed" to the explanatory concepts required by a naturalistic account of 
consciousness. 
Certainly McGinnis likely to be correct about there being some limitations 
on our concept-forming capacities and other cognitive apparatus. Cherniak 
(1986) and Fodor (1983), amongst others, argue along similar lines. It is highly 
likely that there are limits for knowledge - that the mind is "epistemically 
bounded", in Fodor's (1983, p.120) words - for a number of conceivable 
reasons. There are likely to be various quantitative limitations on the 
information processing capacities of our brains, for instance. Both Fodor and 
Cherniak pursue this point; "we are in the finitary predicament of having fixed 
finite limits on our cognitive resources" (Cherniak, 1986, p.6). Moreover, if 
some form of modularity is accepted, then "modular systems may be supposed 
to be constrained in respect of the class of hypotheses to which they have access, 
and in respect of the body of data that can be consulted in the evaluation of any 
given hypothesis" (Fodor, 1983, p.122). (Note that even if one rejects modularity 
for some general intelligence, it does not follow that our cognitive system is 
epistemically unbounded, as Fodor rightly argues.) 
Cherniak (1986) provides a further argument for the limits for knowledge 
claim. This argument hinges on the theory of natural selection: natural selection 
'pre-tunes' a system specifically to the given terrestrial environment, and in so 
doing makes trade-offs for maximum efficiency in that environment. Thus even 
if a system could be attuned to the vast (conceivably, unlimited) complexity and 
diversity of the universe - and there is little reason to suppose that this is even 
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a possibility - it would certainly not be good, efficient design on the part of 
Mother Nature to build a system that operates in this way. Indeed, I hasten to 
add, such a system, even if it were possible, would be such a disaster that it 
would hardly get off the ground, let alone have the opportunity to strive for 
survival; it would simply not be able to operate in the real world. 
Why does McGinn believe we are cognitively closed with respect to 
consciousness? Briefly, it is because he believes there to be "no form of inference 
to the best explanation that could draw an intelligible link between any set of 
brain properties and consciousness" (Flanagan, 1990, p. 336). The reasoning 
behind this claim is that any inference to the best explanation of P will need to 
be grounded in some perceptual brain facts, and the postulation of some 
perceptual brain facts can entail only further brain facts, and not facts about 
subjective consciousness. Consciousness is not perceived by looking at the 
brain; nor can consciousness be explained by the postulation of perceptible 
brain facts, for physical concepts cannot capture subjective psychological 
concepts: they express completely different kinds of properties. However, as 
Flanagan (1990) makes clear, this "homogeneity constraint" is overly restrictive, 
and McGinn's argument for it "involves a relatively flat-footed trick" (p.338). 
We are permitted to draw explanatory links (inferences) between subjective 
reports of conscious experience (viz. sensory awareness) and brain properties, 
when we can establish they are reliably linked, because in such cases we have a 
prior commitment to the existence of conscious experience (the subject has 
reported it). The object of our explanatory quest is not physical phenomena 
alone, as McGinn would have it, but rather the reliable link between the 
postulated brain events and the subjective reports of experience. The former are 
put forward to explain the latter. (More needs to be said about the subjectivity 
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of conscious experience, but that awaits the discussion in chapter 4.) 
Despite these persuasive arguments, I remain sceptical of any a priori 
limits on our ability to gain knowledge of specific features of the universe, and 
on our ability to understand these phenomena (and Fodor's and Cherniak's 
arguments do not suggest that there are such specifiable limits). I believe that 
McGinn is speaking too soon by setting a definite limit on the scope of scientific 
theorizing and our ability to understand it (the limit being consciousness); who 
knows what the science of some distant era might bring, let alone to what extent 
our concept-forming capacities might develop, and our means of expressing 
ideas might change. Thus we can reject McGinn' s premature pessimism about 
the limits of our scientific understanding of consciousness without claiming that 
his conclusion is false; yet no amount of purely a priori reasoning can show that 
his conclusion is correct. Just because the 'problem of consciousness' appears, at 
present, to be so difficult, ineffable, and beyond our explanatory grasp, it is no 
good reason to claim that it will forever remain so. As Paul M. Churchland 
(1988) says, "our current bafflement does not of itself show that no 
neurobiological [read: scientific] understanding is forthcoming" (p.279). 
McGinn appears to have fallen into the trap occupied by a number of other 
pessimistic new mysterians (e.g., Nagel, 1974, 1979, 1986; Jackson, 1986): they 
view the world through 'qualia spectacles', resulting in a myopic view of 
physical science (I discuss the 'problem of qualia' for science in chapter 4). 
2.3 Realism and the analytical strategy. 
The central tenet of the analytical strategy is that the best explanations of 
psychological phenomena are typically those where the phenomena in question 
are treated "as manifestations of capacities that are explained by analysis" 
(Cummins, 1983, p.1). More generally, as Cummins (1975, 1983) persuasively 
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argues, and as is evidenced by its widespread use in various sciences, 
particularly biology, the analytical strategy is the most appropriate or correct 
method for explaining how dispositions are manifested in a system. 
Furthermore, the notion of explanatory analysis is the foundation of an 
important doctrine or explanatory strategy known as homuncular functionalism, 
which will be discussed in detail in ,the next chapter (see e.g., Lycan, 1981a, 
1987). 
Nomic subsumption in psychology - subsumption of psychological 
phenomena under causal laws - is the Received Doctrine about psychological 
explanation. However, nomic subsumption typically does not constitute 
satisfactory explanation. (Cummins, 1983.) A realist philosophy of science 
rejects the Humean view of causation, offering instead an account of causal 
explanation that requires "the discovery both of regular relations between 
phenomena, and of some kind of mechanism that links them." (Keat & Urry, 
1975, p.30). Descriptions of the structure and operation of these underlying 
mechanisms are key to realist explanatory theories (see e.g., Keat & Urry, 1975; 
Manicas & Secord, 1983). Thus, on the realist view, the apparent regularities of 
events (and hence the scientific laws that we can sometimes postulate) result 
from the existence and operation of the causal mechanisms or properties of 
structures in the world, not just from the regular and contingent conjoining of 
these events. 
The realist philosophy of science also rejects the Received Doctrine's tenet 
that explanations of change - the changes of state in a system - are of primary 
concern for psychology. The most important scientific questions are typically 
those concerning properties, not changes (Cummins, 1983). Research aimed at 
identifying the causal factors responsible for a system S acquiring a property P 
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will not provide substantial explanations of those properties. Rather, what is 
required is an account of how Pis instantiated in S; i.e., " 'In virtue of what does 
Shave P?'" (Cummins, 1983, p.15). Such an account is best achieved by an 
analysis of S. An analysis of Swill postulate or identify S's components and 
their organization (and hence interaction). Further, the analysis must- at least 
eventually- appeal to the properties of those components. 
Given the multifarious nature of all that comes under 'consciousness', and 
hence the inappropriateness of adopting 'it' as an explanandum, there seems 
little sense in talking of consciousness as a single property to be analyzed. 
Certainly the system that is held to instantiate conscious states and processes 
can be analyzed; and at a number of different levels, from the more-or-less 
purely computational to the more-or-less purely brute physical (see chapter 2); 
the result of this analysis being the specification of the mechanisms and 
processes that are proposed as being, or being responsible for, the observed 
conscious behaviours or the inferred conscious states and processes. But some 
argue that there is a further aspect of consciousness - phenomenal experience, 
or consciousnessp- that is not amenable to third-person analysis (e.g., Nagel, 
1974/1979). This matter will be taken up in chapter 4, and chapter 5 will 
consider the question of whether S-F theory is sufficient for full explanations of 
the phenomena of consciousness. 
3. Folk psychology, functionalism, and a compatibilist-cum-pluralist view of 
psychological explanation. 
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The story so far: Folk psychology is first and foremost a craft or form of 
'bedrock theorizing' about the behaviours and psychological states of our 
fellow beings, not a crude and outdated attempt at systematic, causal 
explanatory scientific theory. It is unlikely that many of the terms of this folk 
craft - the EMTs - are natural kinds: they tend not to accurately carve nature 
at its joints, hence they are not likely to feature as adequate or reliable 
explananda or explanans for science. This is no more so than for the EMT 
'consciousness'. 
One general and dominant strategy for explanation in science is analysis: 
analysis of the system in question into its constituent components, and the 
analysis of dispositional and non-dispositional properties of systems. The 
analytical strategy lies at the heart of functionalist, and particularly homuncular 
functionalist, theories of mind (see chapter 2). However, consciousness per se, 
understood even as a second-order concept, may not be a suitable candidate for 
analysis. 
Given these conclusions, we are faced with a number of important 
questions. For example: What are the adequate explananda for science which 
correspond to the everyday notions of consciousness? (Some likely, but broadly 
specified, candidates were mentioned in part II, section 1.4, above.) Of more 
relevance to the present thesis is the question: What systems of scientific 
research allow for the best explanations of the phenomena of consciousness? 
The next chapter deals with the doctrine that is often claimed to be the sine qua 
non of psychological investigation and explanation: functionalism. It is an 
approach to studying the mind which many have claimed, or at least implied, 
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has exclusive dominion over explanations of the mental. At the heart of the 
doctrine of functionalism is the underlying urge to find a purely formal, 
abstract description of mind that sufficiently captures the essence of the mental. 
A lot has been claimed of functionalism; some of it warranted and some of 
it not, for it very much depends on what version is put forward. Importantly, it 
has been claimed of some varieties of functionalism that they offer our best 
hopes of explaining the mental, including, in the more ambitious versions, 
overcoming the standard objections to any physicalist account of consciousness 
(particularly those that hinge on the 'qualia' aspect of conscious states; see 
chapter 4). Is some version of functionalism really our best means for explaining 
the mental, including that last bastion of human uniqueness, consciousness, or 
is functionalism a lost and dying cause? Or indeed, is some version of 
functionalism a necessary but not sufficient part of a general scientific approach 
to explaining the mental, perhaps setting us on the right track, but not in itself 
able to offer a complete account? The 'setting on the right track' that I refer to 
will become clear in the discussion of the more recent developments of 
functionalism, where a theoretical stance that is crucial to the present thesis will 
come to light- the multiple-level view of nature. 
To pre-empt part of my conclusion somewhat, I think there are a number 
of problems with some versions of functionalism. In particular, the earlier 
versions of the doctrine were seriously flawed, as is now widely acknowledged; 
and still other versions may well be mistaken in their attempts to seek formal, 
in-the-head accounts of the mental states as identified by folk-psychological 
talk. Moreover, I take it that purely formal, abstract accounts of mind are 
important but not sufficient for psychological explanation. As will become clear, 
I take a pluralist line on psychological explanation, and find favourable the 
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compatibilist leanings of Noble (1990), and Sterelny (1990), amongst others. Our 
explanatory theories will often be at best incomplete if we continually ignore or 
relegate environmental and social issues. We need to combine both micro- and 
macro-theories in our explanations of 'the human condition', e.g., the 
neurobiological with the social, the individualist functional-computational with 
the semantical. No one approach will be sufficient on its own to establish 
adequate - let alone anything approaching complete - explanations. Some 
consider the scientific and folk-psychological views to be incompatible (e.g., P. 
M. Churchland, 1981). Others (the present author included) consider a 
reconciliation between the two to be desirable; and if it is at all possible, then it 
may be that some version(s) of functionalism will offer our best hope (Sterelny, 
1990, pp.2-3). Hence the present interest in the status and nature of various 
versions of the doctrine. 
A central question of this thesis still requires an answer, however: Is 
functionalism the right program for scientific psychological explanations of 
consciousness? In order to provide an answer, we must first explicate in some 
detail what functionalism is all about, and what some functionalists have said 
about consciousness. This is the task of the next two chapters. 
Chapter summary: 
Physicalism is the dominant ontology of contemporary science - There 
are seemingly insurmountable problems for any physicalist explanations of the 
mental - Consciousness poses special problems for physicalism, namely the 
intentional properties and subjective qualities of conscious states. 
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Folk psychology is not scientific causal explanatory theory - Folk 
psychology is a folk craft, akin to folk physics, and as such has great heuristic 
value in everyday life and (at least in some form) in science - The purposes 
and goals of scientific psychology are considerably different from those of folk 
psychology- 'Consciousness' is a multi-faceted folk-psychological concept 
that will not serve as a good explanandum for science-Nevertheless, given 
the present neonate state of the cognitive sciences, we are licensed to use the 
term, provided that we are very careful to dump all excess folk-psychological 
baggage surrounding it. 
The realist philosophy of science is to be favoured over other 
interpretations of physicalism - Explanations of consciousness will not forever 
lie outside the bounds of scientific understanding - The analytical strategy is a 
widely used and productive means for providing good psychological 
explanation -The analytical strategy underlies our best versions of 





Functionalism: The wellspring of our best psychological 
explanation? 
1. Introducingfunctionalism. 
The doctrine of functionalism has been with us for over three decades 
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now . Briefly, functionalism characterizes psychological explanations of a 
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system in terms of abstract descriptions of the components and their role(s) in 
the working of the system. Moreover, such characterizations of roles or 
functions will specify some internal states of the system - the causal 
interactions that obtain between a system's inputs, outputs, and other internal 
states. Some functionalists (whom Block, 1980b, calls "metaphysical 
functionalists") regard these proposed internal states as mental states; on this 
view, mental states just are functional states. It is this latter, stronger type of 
functionalism (what Block and Fodor, 1972, and Block, 1980b, call the 
"functional state identity thesis") that has received the most theoretical and 
critical attention, and for good reason (see below). 
2 Putnam ( 1960) is generally regarded as being the first to give an explicit exposition 
of a functionalist thesis. Here, and in subsequent work (e.g., Putnam, 1967), Putnam 
suggested a theory of mind that linked the notion of cognition as a computational 
phenomenon with the notion of a Turing machine ('machine functionalism'; see below). 
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2. Functionalism, behaviourism, and the mind-brain identity theory. 
Functionalism was originally conceived in response to some critical 
problems with classical behaviourism and the 'physical state identity thesis' or 
'identity theory'. Behaviourism entailed the claim that 'mental states' simply 
consist in specifiable behavioural dispositions; each mental state was to be 
uniquely identified with a specific behavioural disposition. This seems plainly 
false, however, when one considers that mental states often interact with each 
other in the production of behaviour (e.g., McGinn, 1991). Thus an account of 
the mental states of organisms was required that admitted of the frequently 
complex mediation of 'inputs' and 'outputs' that are not "wholly definable in 
terms of observable stimulus-response sequences" (Greenwood, 1991a, p.2). 
The 'identity theory' is the thesis that individuated mental state types are 
to be identified with specific neurophysiological state types, i.e., the mind is the 
brain (see e.g., Armstrong, 1968; Place, 1962). On this view, mental state types 
are said to 'supervene' on physical state types; that is, to put it roughly, there 
can be no change in mental state without some corresponding change in 
physical state. However there are two major stumbling blocks for strict versions 
of the identity theory as a theory of mental types. 
Firstly, the identity theory is too chauvinistic in its ascription of mental 
states. On this view, a being or other system can be a legitimate member of the 
mental realm only if it has a neurophysiology just like ours. This is surely a 
rather presumptuous and unwarranted conclusion given that we cannot rule 
out for certain the possibility that some alien creature or future human artifact 
may be a suitable and legitimate candidate for the ascription of mental states. 
Secondly, there is the possibility that two people can be in the same mental 
state, as described by our everyday talk, and yet be in quite different physical 
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states. In other words, the worry is that if it is conceivable for a wide variety of 
physical states and processes to be identified with the same mental state for 
different people, then there may not be any unique neurophysiological 
correlates to individual mental states, thus disproving the claim that mental 
state M is identical with brain state B. 
Functionalism attempted to rectify these shortcomings by identifying 
mental states with abstract functional states. As Lycan (1981a) says: "We may 
hold onto our anti-Cartesian claim that mental state- and event-tokens are 
identical with organic state- and event-tokens in their owners, but we would be 
better to individuate mental types more abstractly, in terms (let us say) of the 
functional roles their tokens play in mediating between stimuli and responses" 
(p.26). 
3. The failings of early functionalism. 
In the early days of functionalism, the theory of computability had a great 
deal of influence on the functionalist thesis, and its implications for 
psychological explanation. A central concept of the theory of computability is 
the notion of an 'effective procedure' or 'simple machine' (Johnson-Laird, 1983). 
An effective procedure is a specification of a procedure to carry out the 
mapping specified by a computable function. The notion of an effective 
procedure becomes more precise when formulated in terms of a Turing 
machine (see e.g., Block, 1990; Johnson-Laird, 1983). Turing (1936, cited in 
Johnson-Laird, 1983) argued that his hypothetical machine could compute the 
result of any effective procedure (unfortunately this thesis cannot be proved). 
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The digital computer, being the paradigmatic case of a computational 
device, was the perfect crutch upon which computational theories of mind 
could rest. Functionalism's early maxim became: the mind is to the brain as a 
program is to the computer hardware. Just as computer programs could be 
formulated independently of the hardware upon which it ran, it was assumed 
that the mind could be studied independently of the brain. The belief was that if 
the mind is an information processor (which undoubtedly it is, at least in some 
sense), and hence a computational device, then it is a serious working 
hypothesis that psychological or mental states could be type-identified with 
Turing machine states, describable in terms of machine tables (see e.g., Putnam, 
1960, 1967). 
The view that formal accounts of mind could be given without recourse 
to matters of biology led to the 'multiple realizability' hypothesis: if a formal 
description of mind is possible, then the mental realm is not restricted to 
humans with brains. Potentially, alien creatures and robots could be mental 
beings, provided their internal states preserved the relations between inputs 
and outputs as specified by that formal description of mind. 
This charitable formulation of the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
mental states has been parodied by numerous examples: the flow of water 
through an interconnected set of pipes, the simple rule-following of a person 
translating one set of symbols into another, and even the molecular activity in a 
pail of water would qualify as instantiators of mental states on this early 
functionalist view, as long as they preserved the relevant input-output 
relations. These non-standard realizations were used in an attempt to 
demonstrate that one or other (or both) of the two presumed defining 
characteristics of mental states - intrinsic qualities and intentionality (chapter 
1) - could not be accounted for by computational functionalism. 
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One of these non-standard realization counter-examples to functionalism 
is known as "Hinckfuss' pail". This is how Lycan (1981a) describes this unusual 
case: 
"Suppose a transparent plastic pail of spring water is sitting in 
the sun. At the micro level, a vast seething complexity of things are 
going on: convection currents, frantic breeding of bacteria and other 
minuscule life forms, and so on. These things in turn require even 
more frantic activity at the molecular level to sustain them. Now is all 
this activity not complex enough that, simply by chance, it might 
realize a human program for a brief period (given suitable 
correlations between certain micro-events and the requisite input-
output-, and state-symbols of the program)? And if so, must the 
functionalist not conclude that the water in the pail briefly constitutes 
the body of a conscious being, and has thoughts and feelings and so 
on? " (p.39). 
An unusual case indeed, although it is by no means one that can be easily 
dismissed as too ridiculous to be worth worrying about. For it makes the point 
that virtually any physical system can be given a description, say at the 
molecular level, such that it can be said to instantiate one or more forms of 
human cognitive functioning as specified by formal functionalist theory, thus 
suggesting that functionalist theories of mind are vacuous. 
Another counter-example to functionalism is Block's (1978) "Chinese 
Nation". Block used this thought experiment to illustrate the apparent absence 
of 'qualia' (the intrinsic qualities of sensations) from any computational-
functional account of mind. Assuming the "Chinese Nation" setup is 
functionally isomorphic to a human, as described by the computational-
functional theory, then it seems intuitively 'obvious', according to Block, that it 
is missing a crucial element of mentality: namely, the phenomenal qualities of 
experience. The "Chinese Nation" would not feel anything, nor would it feel 
like anything to be that functional system. 
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The "Chinese Nation" and "Hinckfuss' pail" thought experiments have 
been used as examples of the general objection which claims functionalism 
describes only the relational properties of mental states, i.e., the relations 
between inputs, internal state transitions, and outputs, and cannot capture the 
intrinsic properties of mental states (viz. the qualities of conscious experience). 
Moreover, the objection runs, "a state's possessing those relational properties 
cannot be a logically sufficient condition for its possessing those intrinsic 
properties (though in our world, in our case, possessing the former may be 
contingently sufficient for possessing the latter)" (Thornton, 1989, p.10). 
Although this objection was originally aimed at Turing machine functionalism, 
some claim it is applicable to all versions of functionalism. (This broader 
concern will be taken up in chapter 4, along with a discussion of the efficacy 
and validity of thought experiments. In section 2.3, part II of the present chapter 
we shall see how a much revamped version of functionalism - "teleological 
homuncular functionalism" - deals with the non-standard realizations.) 
Block concluded that functionalism is too liberal in its ascription of mental 
states. If mentality depends only on a purely computational description, 
entirely abstracted from physical realization (e.g.,Turing machine states), then 
almost anything could count as a mental being. On the other hand, if only 
biological (neurological, neurochemical) accounts of mind are sought, then that 
surely unnecessarily restricts mental phenomena to the human species - i.e., 
mental chauvinism. Moreover, it soon became evident that the early 
functionalist theories fell into the same trap as the physical-state identity 
theories: two people could be in the same mental state and yet be in different 
computational states. (The converse of this - that two people could be in the 
same computational state and yet be in different mental states - forms the crux 
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of the 'inverted-qualia' objection to functionalism; see chapter 4.) 
If functionalism is to survive and prosper, its theories must strive for a 
balance such that our ascriptions of mental states will not be limited solely to 
humans, and yet not be so generous as to include such systems as the "Chinese 
Nation" or "Hinckfuss' pail". Nevertheless, since humans are the paradigmatic 
case of mental beings, maybe our theories of mind should take a closer look at 
the brain. When our goal is to seek the 'essence' of the mental (if indeed there is 
such a thing), then perhaps a study of the brain as a computational and 
representational device will reveal, or at least point to, the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for mental states. 
Part II of the present chapter goes on to review the newer versions of 
functionalism that supposedly overcome many of the above mentioned 
problems with earlier versions. It will be seen that early functionalism's 
separation of function from structure, based on the software-hardware 
distinction in computers, is seriously misleading. A strict dissociation of 
function from structure is not appropriate for theories of the mind-brain. 
(Indeed, the division between software and hardware is not always appropriate 
in the case of computers.) In particular, it will be seen that function and 
structure are inextricably linked. There are two main points to note here: (i) the 
notion of function in functionalist theory denotes more than simply an abstract 
mathematical formulation tied to the theory of computation; and (ii) the notion 
of structure need not (and indeed, in functionalist theory, does not) make 
specific reference to the actual physical stuff that constitutes the system under 
investigation. 




The idea that the human cognitive system could be modelled by a set of 
Turing machine states did not last long, for reasons such as those outlined 
above (see also e.g., Lycan, 1979, 1981a, 1987). Nevertheless, it is fair to say that 
the legacy of this approach - that the mind-brain is a computational device -
forms the backbone of the cognitive sciences today. The thesis that the human 
cognitive system is a computational device, at least in some sense of the term, 
lies at the heart of any version of functionalism (albeit sometimes implicitly). As 
Johnson-Laird (1983) puts it, "if both Turing's thesis and functionalism are 
correct, any future theory of the mind will be completely expressible within 
computational terms." (p.10). 
This part of the present chapter outlines what seem to be the best versions 
of the doctrine currently on offer - homuncular functionalism
3 
and 
microfunctionalism4 . A point in favour of homuncular functionalism and 
possibly microfunctionalism is the claim that they avoid many of the pitfalls of 
Turing machine functionalism, i.e., the standard functional-state identity thesis. 
3 Dennett (e.g.,1975, 1978a, 1978b) and Lycan (1981a, 1981b,1987, 1990) 
are the main advocates of homuncular functionalism, having both developed very 
similar theses, albeit apparently separately. However, Dennett doesn't use the term as 
often as Lycan; indeed Lycan appears to have coined the term 'homuncular 
functionalism' and its conglomerate, 'homunctionalism· (c.f Dennett's, 1978a, 
comment: "about such features I am a straightforward type-intentionalist or 
'homuncular functionalist', as Lycan calls me ", p.xx). 
4 Clark ( 1989) is responsible for the term "microfunctionalism ", which is used to 
refer to formal, abstract accounts of mind grounded in the neurally-inspired 
connectionist/ PDP theories, i.e., located at a finer-grained level (or better, levels) 
than traditional symbol-processing, sentential formulations of functionalism 
(traditional formulations that are concerned with the level of a "semantically 
transparent system"; Clark, 1989, p.35). 
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2. Homuncular Functionalism .. 
2.1 What is homuncular functionalism? 
Homuncular functionalism, according to Sterelny (1989, 1990), takes the 
key element of functionalism - a description of the functional role of the 
internal (mental) states of an intelligent system (the "what it does, not what it 
is", 1990, p.13)- and marries it with the view that the mind has a modular5 
architecture, then applies these two notions recursively. The crucial steps here 
are (1) the functional-role analysis of complex, intelligent systems into less 
complex, less intelligent, interacting subsystems or modules (homunculi); and 
(2) the recursive application of this analysis, such that the proposed homunculi 
are progressively more simple or 'stupid', to the point where their functional 
roles are so specialized and simple that they can be occupied by primitive, 
mechanistic processes (i.e., are "psychologically primitive"; Sterelny, 1990, 
p.13). Thus we see the analytical strategy (chapter 1) as the central theme 
underlying homunctionalism. 
Some ideas central to homuncular functionalism can be found in the work 
of writers not usually associated with the position. For example, Wilkes (1978) 
regards functionalism as resulting in "a descending series of functional analyses 
nestling into one another like Chinese boxes, breaking down the complex 
structures of the brain into smaller and more specialized functions and 
structures." (p.64). She thus favours a brand of functionalism that is somewhat 
closely tied to physical structure (a rather significant issue, to which I will 
return below). 
5 I am here using 'modular' to mean any functionally distinct cognitive component or 
'homunculus', not Fodor's ( 1983) more limited notion of modularity (see chapter 3). 
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Dennett (1975, 1978a) discusses the strategy in artificial intelligence (AI) 
which parallels that of homuncular functionalism (indeed, in Dennett's view, 
the strategy originated in AI research): 
"The AI researcher starts with an intentionally characterized 
problem (e.g., how can I get a computer to understand questions of 
English?), breaks it down into sub-problems that are also 
intentionally characterized (e.g., how do I get the computer to 
recognize questions, distinguish subjects from predicates, ignore 
irrelevant parsings?) and then breaks these problems down still 
further until finally he reaches problem or task descriptions that are 
obviously mechanistic" (1978a, p.80). 
Thus we see that this strategy is very much a 'top-down' approach, and that the 
characterizations of the functional parts ('black boxes') are inextricably 
intentional. 
Minsky (1985), a prominent AI researcher, develops his own 
homunctionalist perspective, in which he characterizes the mind as a "society" 
of mindless agents. "How can intelligence emerge from nonintelligence? To 
answer that, we'll show that you can build a mind from many little parts, each 
mindless by itself." (p. 17). 
All these writers recognize the dreaded problem that any theory of mind 
must eventually confront and solve: the problem of undischarged or intelligent 
homunculi. Our explanations of intelligence and other psychological 
phenomena must not reintroduce the very thing which they are intended to 
explain (the so-called 'Rylean regress', after Ryle, 1949). Homuncular 
functionalism can be shown to avoid this problem (see e.g., Lycan, 1987). 
On just this point, Fodor (1968), in one of the earliest explications of a 
homunctionalist perspective, has this to say: 
"We refine a psychological theory by replacing global little men 
by less global little men, each of whom has fewer unanalyzed 
behaviors to perform than did his predecessors. Though it may look 
as though proceeding in this way invites the proliferation of little 
men ad infinitum, this appearance is misleading. 
A completed psychological theory must provide systems of 
instruction to account for the forms of behavior available to the 
organism, and it must do so in a way that makes reference to no 
unanalyzed psychological processes. One way of clarifying the latter 
requirement is the following. Assume that there exists a class of 
elementary instructions which the nervous system is specifically 
wired to execute. Each elementary instruction specifies an elementary 
operation, and an elementary operation is one which the normal 
nervous system can perform but of which it cannot perform a proper 
part." (p.629). 
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Thus Fodor describes the connection between the analytical strategy and 
com pu ta tional-functional characterization. 
2.2 Homunctionalism' s promise. 
A pertinent question to ask at this point is: What is the motivation for a 
homunctionalist perspective; i.e., what are the reasons for pursuing a 
homunctionalist study of the mind? We have already unearthed the gross 
underlying motivations of functionalism as a whole (part I of the present 
chapter), and one of the central underlying aims of homunctionalism is to do 
justice to these motivations. I concentrate on the homunctionalist thesis here, for 
it is currently the most explicit and viable version of the doctrine. Nevertheless, 
most of what I have to say in the following sections is also relevant to the 
discussion of microfunctionalism. Microfunctionalism is less explicitly a 
functionalist thesis, in the traditional sense, i.e., amongst other things, it is not 
so directly tied to - indeed, need not be tied at all to - the 'Representational 
Theory of Mind', in its computational 'language of thought' forms (see e.g., 
Fodor, 1975; Sterelny, 1990). Indeed, Clark (1989) considers the possible 
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inappropriateness of including this type of account of the mind as a species of 
functionalism. However, on a wide interpretation of functionalism at least, 
microfunctionalism is an appropriate name, for it is a project that seeks the 
essence of the mental in terms of "patterns of nonphysically specified internal 
state transitions suitable for mediating an input-output profile in a certain 
general kind of way" and thus it "in effect identifies functionalism with the 
claim that structure, not the stuff, counts." (Clark, 1989, p.36). 
A lot is claimed of homuncular functionalism, especially its facility to 
avoid the major pitfalls of the earlier versions of functionalism, and in 
particular, of machine functionalism (see e.g., Lycan, 1979). For instance, Lycan 
(1981a, 1981b, 1987) claims homunctionalism to be the prime candidate to 
achieve a balance between Block's (1978) charges of excess liberalism or 
chauvinism (part I, above). Further, Lycan (1981a, 1987) claims that 
homunctionalism is capable of meeting the various counter-example objections 
to functionalism, including the qualia-based ones. 
Block's (1978) chauvinism/ liberalism criticisms were aimed specifically at 
the detail/ generality of functional characterizations of inputs, outputs, and 
internal states, and thus the serious functionalist owes Block a detailed account 
of functional characterizations that avoid or overcome those objections. There 
are two significant suggestions in the literature on this issue: a more general 
attack by Kitcher (1985), which will be discussed in section 3, and Lycan's 
(1981a, 1981b) in-depth reformulation of the functionalist thesis. 
Lycan's (1981a, 1981b) suggestion for where to look for a solution to this 
"problem of inputs and outputs" (Block, 1978) is a homuncular version of some 
sentential (language of thought) account of mental representation (hence of 
belief, thought, etc.) An explication and critique of Lycan's position here is 
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beyond the purview of this thesis; suffice it to say, however, that such claims 
are contentious. It may be that this type of solution is currently the best on offer, 
as Fodor (1975) contends. However, there are other accounts of cognitive 
functioning, and hence mental representation, that, some argue, offer 
advantages over, and are better approximations to the truth than, conventional 
symbol-processing, sentential accounts. Some form of microfunctionalism is the 
major contender here, i.e., the "brain's eye view" rather than the "mind's eye 
view'' (Clark, 1989; see section 4). Nevertheless, if Lycan (1981b, 1987), Sterelny 
(1990), and others are at least partially on the right track, some sentential 
homuncular account is likely to provide at least a major path through the 
quagmire of problems posed by the notion of mental representation, its 
intentional nature, and functional characterization. Indeed Clark (1989) himself 
admits that a microfunctional account need not exclude the possibility of some 
sentential-computational account also featuring in our best theories of the mind. 
It is also plausible to suppose that our best sentential homuncular accounts may 
be very different from the 'received view', i.e., the 'Field-Fodor-Lycan theory' 
(Sterelny, 1990), even though the received view has a lot going for it, including 
allowing "propositional attitude psychology to be integrated within theoretical 
cognitive psychology'' (Sterelny, 1990, p.142). 
To summarize thus far: Early and so-called standard versions of 
functionalism come up against a number of now standard objections 
(particularly those allied in Block and Fodor, 1972; Block, 1978). Can 
functionalism save itself from a premature demise by meeting or avoiding these 
objections? The brightest star so far to have appeared on the stage is 
homuncular functionalism - a case of the "analytical strategy" (Cummins, 
1975, 1983)- teleologically construed (Lycan, 1981a, 1981b, 1987). 
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2.3 Teleological functionalism and the multiple-level view of nature. 
Cummins' (1983) interpretation and use of the concept of function in 
functional analysis seems somewhat circumscribed or impoverished. Millikan 
(1989) hits the nail on the head when she says that Cummins, amongst others, 
construes function as referring "only to current properties, relations, 
dispositions or capacities of a thing" (p.292). What is important for Cummins is 
that an item has a function if it functions as something (e.g., as a face 
recognizer, a face feature detector, a zero-crossing detector). He ignores or 
waves aside all notions of historical purpose in his talk of function. 
Millikan (1989) describes an historical notion of "proper function", where 
function is inextricably linked to 'intentional use and design' construals of 
purpose, or at least as if the intentions and purposes of designers and users 
were operating (the prime candidate in this latter case being evolution via 
natural selection; see e.g., Lycan, 1987; Sober, 1990; and below). Moreover, she 
claims that explanatory theories will need to make productive use of the notion 
of "proper function". Teleological talk of purposes and "proper functions" of 
organisms and their subsystems is to be encouraged, when teleology is 
interpreted biologically, explicated in evolutionary terms. (Lycan, 1981a, 1987; 
however, he leaves the detailing of such an evolutionary construal of teleology 
to the biological philosophers - see his 1987, p.43. See also Millikan, 1989; 
Sterelny, 1990.) 
Some aspects of the process of natural selection are remarkably similar to 
the characteristics of conscious (purposeful or intentional) design. Complex 
organisms have the design and construction they do - that is, the intricately 
interrelated complex of organs, other subsystems, and their sub ... subsystems 
- because of the selection pressures created by the environment during the 
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evolutionary history of those organisms. The subsystems selected for, and their 
internal organization, are just so because they either have (or had) specific tasks 
to carry out in the promotion of survival of the individual, or 'rode in on the 
back of' another component or trait that was selected for. (The distinction here 
is between selection for and selection of a subsystem or trait: Sober, 1984, cited 
in Sterelny, 1990. See Sterelny, 1990, for mention of further stipulations on the 
acceptance of teleofunctionalism). 
Functional concepts are teleological concepts - a concept that is no less 
applicable to explanations of the mind-brain than it is to the liver or heart. How 
then, does homunctionalism fit into this picture of teleofunctionalism? Firstly, 
as Sterelny (1989, 1990) points out, the homunctionalist's modular view of 
mind-brain is certainly evolutionarily plausible. Intelligence did not suddenly 
emerge in a single step as some property or other of a simple unintelligent 
system; it is far too complex a set of phenomena for that. Nor can we suppose 
that increases in intelligence are just a matter of increases in the number of 
neurons - organization matters. For instance, without a modular architecture, 
it certainly would have been much more difficult for new capacities to have 
been added to systems, and old ones extended (Sterelny, 1990). 
Secondly, teleological homunctionalism must be developed within (and 
indeed it promotes) a multi-level view of nature (Lycan, 1987) - a view that 
implies the existence of multiple levels of psychological description and 
explanation. Wimsatt (1976), from whom Lycan appears to draw much of his 
inspiration, has this (amongst other things) to say about levels of nature: 
"I will assume that being at a given level is a property primarily 
of things in the world: phenomena, objects, properties, processes, 
causes and effects, etc., and derivatively of linguistic things relating 
to them: descriptions, law-statements, theories, predicates, etc. 
Intuitively, one thing is at a higher level than something else if things 
of the first type are composed of things of the second type, and at the 
same level with those things it interacts most strongly and frequently 
with or is capable of replacing in a variety of causal contexts." 
(p.215). 
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In giving an account of the multiple-level view, Wimsatt (1976) points to 
yet another hang-over from the empiricist-positivist tradition in psychology. 
There has been a distinct lack of recognition in much of psychology of the idea 
that neither function or structure take precedence in science; both are roughly 
equally important, and each affects the other. The failure to recognize this 
important feature of the scientific enterprise continues in many quarters of 
psychology, despite the now fairly widespread belief to the contrary in many 
other sciences, following the debate over this issue in 19th-century biology. 
As a consequence of the multiple-level view, functionalist theories are no 
longer to be fleshed out solely in terms of either formal descriptions, abstracted 
from specific cases of instantiation, or present dispositions or capacities of 
biological systems, but rather in terms of both. The function-structure (software-
hardware, role-occupant, etc.) dichotomy is a misnomer. Any function-versus-
structure distinction is very much a rule of thumb and heuristic distinction, 
rather than an ontological distinction. Functional and structural properties exist 
together at almost any level one cares to look at, e.g., from at least the level of 
individual cells, through the levels of whole organs and organisms, to possibly 
the levels of social organizations, and beyond. A better name for functionalism 
may be "structural-functional (S-F) theory" (Wilkes, 1981). 
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While on the issue of the nature of the terms 'function' and 'structure', it 
will be worthwhile to mention Ramsey's (1989) clarification of the meanings of 
them as used in science. For there seems to have been a great deal of confusion 
surrounding the use and construal of this distinction, particularly in relation to 
the computer model of the mind and its apparent corresponding distinction 
between software and hard ware. Software is generally used to refer to the 
program that a computer executes, but this term is ambiguous. A program can 
refer to either the causally inert, descriptive flowchart or algorithm, or "to a list 
of commands in a computer language which actually causes the machine to 
function in a certain fashion" (Ramsey, 1989, p.141). It is the latter sense of 
program that is referred to by the term software. The sense of program 
appealed to in functionalism - for example, in the claim that the mind is to the 
brain as a program is to a computer - is only that of the former interpretation. 
That is, if the mind can be likened to a program, then it will only be so in the 
sense of a program as a descriptive flowchart. Notice that this is a relatively 
weak and innocuous claim, but one that underlies virtually the whole of the 
functionalist methodology (except maybe some connectionist versions). 
What bearing does the ambiguity surrounding the notion of program in 
the software-hardware distinction have on the function-structure distinction? It 
is that the conventional software-hardware distinction does not correspond to 
the function-structure ('functional state-physical state') distinction. For "[t]he 
former is the distinction between a set of explicit procedural rules and the 
machine which follows these rules", whereas "[t]he latter is the distinction 
between different ways of describing and classifying various processes, by 
focusing either on physical properties or the more abstract functional 
properties." (Ramsey, 1989, p.141). 
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There is also a problem with interpretations of 'hardware': it can be used 
to refer to the actual stuff out of which the entity is constructed (the most 
common interpretation), or to the organization or configuration of the 
computational architecture. As will be obvious by now, the functionalist is 
generally not concerned with the specifics of physical implementation (indeed, 
it is this which is considered to be interchangeable, i.e., the thesis of multiple 
instantiability), and so it is the latter construal of hardware that corresponds to 
structure in the function-structure distinction. 
To repeat the point, S-F theory need not be tied solely to biological 
entities, nor does it need to specify particular physical organs or other systems. 
To speak of structure is to speak of the organization of the parts of the whole, 
their connections and interactions. It does not necessarily imply the inclusion of 
the details of the specific 'stuff' out of which it is constructed. Unless, that is, 
those descriptions specify properties of the stuff that are proposed to have 
bearing on the capacities of the system or other phenomena in question (e.g., as 
the connectionist or microfunctional theories contend; see section 4). However, 
even these accounts of the properties relevant to the phenomena in question are 
likely to be abstracted as much as possible from the physical stuff of 
implementation, even if it is only to avoid charges of excess chauvinism. 
2.4 Some consequences of homunctionalism and the multiple-level view. 
Nature is multi-levelled, and its explanations and descriptions will be 
correspondingly so; attempts to neatly carve up explanatory theories of the 
natural world into the purely abstract functional and the purely concrete 
structural are misguided (see especially Wilkes, e.g., 1978, 1981). This is not to 
say that neither approach is explanatorily useful; it's just that neither on its own 
will provide anything like full or 'complete' explanations (see Lycan's, 1987, 
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discussion of this point- i.e., "the teleologicalness of characterizations is a 
matter of degree", p.43). This is particularly the case with many psychological 
phenomena, especially those that carry the 'mental' tag (i.e., those folk 
psychological or EMT states for which identifications were sought by the 
neurological and functional identity theorists). 
Accepting the multiple-level view of nature forces some interesting and 
rather significant implications. For instance, it suggests reasons for the machine 
functionalists' misguided attempts to identify mental states with Turing 
machine states (i.e., identifications of the sort: 'to be in mental state Mis for 
one's cognitive system to realize the machine table state(s) T 1 (T 2, T 3, ... )' ). We 
can now say exactly what the major problems are with this and other similar 
attempts at type-identifying mental states: (1) The to-be-identified mental states 
are typically those of everyday or folk psychology - a higher-level, 
'intentionally infected' description, unconcerned with the more 'base level', 
underlying features of our mental lives. Thus, given the likely incompatibility of 
most folk-theoretical terms with scientific postulates (chapter 1): (2) Our best 
attempts at solely functionalist theorizing are unlikely to yield specific or strict 
isomorphisms between the mental states of folk psychology and the states 
posited by a mathematical theory that disregards any notion of structural 
organization, let alone the physical stuff. 
The problems here are with both aspects of the functional-state-identity 
project: (1) Certainly any cognitive system will be in the midst of highly 
complex and intricate, ongoing activity when we describe them as being in 
certain mental states, but this activity will need to be specified both functionally 
and structurally, at all manner of different levels. (2) While it may be legitimate 
practice to make use of the everyday mental state terms in some scientific 
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endeavours, there is no guarantee that they pick out just those capacities 
postulated and identified by the cognitive and neuro-sciences. "If all this is 
indeed so ... then it is evidently impossible to regard the referents of ordinary 
terms as states of which a S-F theory might be true or false." (Wilkes, 1981, 
p.153). 
The teleological homunctionalist view also counters Searle's (1980, 1984) 
monistic 'emergentism', in which the mental is a set of "surface properties" (the 
macrostructure) arising from the operations or "causal powers" of the brain (the 
microstructure). Searle offers this view in opposition to the non-Cartesian 
dualist view of there being some 'gap' to fill between the brain and the mind 
(Searle's stalking horse being "strong AI"). From the perspective of the 
multiple-level view, Searle is certainly on the right track when he speaks of 
micro- and macrostructure, but he is wrong in limiting its scope or application. 
Micro- and macrostructure are not levels of description set in concrete, but are 
relative terms. Moreover, from the perspective of the multiple-level view, the 
only 'gap' between the mind and the brain is that between the world as we 
know it from our own experience and the world as it is independent of any one 
particular viewpoint; there is no gap in the way the world is (say, between the 
physical and the mental). Computational psychology may have been devised as 
a 'gap-filler' or bridge between what we know of the brain from the third-
person perspective of science and what we 'know' of the mind from the first-
person perspective of experience, but it is not presumed to identify a distinct 
ontological level on a par with the neuroscientific brain and the first-person 
mind. For as the multiple-level view of nature reminds us, there is no single 
ontological level of the brain; rather, structural and computational-functional 
properties of the brain exist at all manner of levels. Furthermore, it is possible 
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that these descriptions of the structural and computational-functional 
properties of the brain may encroach on the provenance of the first-person 
mind- i.e., it is possible that S-F theory may eventually explain the first-
person perspective. (Chapters 4 and 5 will further discuss the gap in our 
understanding of how the third-person brain relates to the first-person mind.) 
If computational psychology is open to attack, it must be on different 
grounds than those of any 'gap-filling' interpretations.6 Connectionist 
theories have so far provided the most concerted of such attacks, i.e., 
connectionism is seen by some to refute many of the claims made in the service 
of traditional computational psychology. Nevertheless, there is now a growing 
body of support for the position that connectionism is not necessarily a 
mutually exclusive alternative to more traditional computational theories. (For 
discussion of this issue, see e.g., Clark, 1989; Sterelny, 1990.) 
One notable line of attack on computational functionalism are the non-
standard counter-example critiques. Let us see why Lycan does not consider 
these objections to be a threat to teleological homunctionalism. Take, for 
example, "Hinckfuss' pail": the molecular activity in a pail of water could 
conceivably briefly instantiate a human program. Lycan's (1981a) reply to this 
unusual counter-example objection to functionalism is twofold. Firstly, the 
sense in which "realize" is used in the pail of water example is not the same as a 
revised (i.e., homuncular) functionalist construal of the term. The pail of water 
can be said to "realize" a functionalist program in some basic "mathematical 
sense, in which 'function' is synonymous with 'mapping'" (Lycan, 1981a, p.27). 
6 Indeed Searle (e.g., 1980, 1984) provides some valiant attempts at such 
arguments - most notably his famous "Chinese Room" parable - although again these 
can be shown to be faulty; see e.g., Block ( 1990); Copeland (unpublished); Hofstadter 
and Dennett ( 1981 ); Sterelny ( 1990). 
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However, this sense of functional realization is too impoverished, for such 
realization is too easily achieved, leading to ascriptions of mentality that are too 
liberal. The mathematical realization of a human program by a physical system 
such as a collection of H2O molecules is merely fortuitous. 
The second prong of Lycan's reply to the pail of water counter-example is 
that the mathematical notion of functional realization needs to be replaced by 
some more robust account that incorporates the notion of "functional 
organization, or organic integrity and autonomy" (Lycan, 1987, p.33). The 
notion of 'function' in functionalist theory will then be seen not simply as a 
mathematical 'mapping', but rather as a description of how an entity functions 
as an entity with a purpose or function within and for a system, relative to 
what that system is doing. Moreover - and this is a point which Lycan is not 
too clear in making, as Millikan (1989) points out- the notion of function 
should be understood within an historical context, i.e., as "proper function". 
Thus functionalism, properly construed, is teleological; the pail of water 
characterization of functionalism is not teleological. The appeal to functional 
organization indicates that the inputs, internal states, and outputs of a system 
worthy of consideration as a species of mental being are organized, related, and 
structured according to a 'prearranged plan'. That is, the internal processors of 
such a system must be of the right type and structure such that they are capable 
of fulfilling the function or purpose for which they were 'designed', and they 
must be "organized in the relevant way" (Lycan, 1981a, p.41). Hinckfuss' pail of 
water does not meet these requirements "precisely because it is not organized in 
the relevant way, even if the de facto motions of some of the molecules in the 
pail happen to ape the motions that would be made by an organism that was 
functionally organized on the human model." (Lycan, 1981a, p.41). 
Churchland and Churchland (1981) make essentially the same point in 
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discussing Block's (1978) "Chinese Nation" non-standard realization counter-
example. The problem with this and other similar counter-examples to 
computational functionalism is that they only indict the view that mentality is 
dependent purely on the preservation of identical input-output relations (i.e., 
"Turing equivalence"). But that is not an indictment of computational 
functionalism tout court, for all the computational functionalist needs to assert 
is that what is minimally required for a system to be ascribed mental states is 
for it to be "computationally equivalent to us" (Churchland and Churchland, 
1981, p.134). In other words, the internal structural-functional organization 
must be equivalent to ours at the (as yet unspecified) relevant level(s); "it must 
have a system of inner states whose causal interconnections mirror those in our 
own case." (Churchland and Churchland, 1981, p.134). Churchland and 
Churchland's (1981) reasoning for this conclusion is based on the incredible 
computational complexity of the human brain. Because an extraordinarily large 
number of computational states can occur in the brain, due to the enormous 
number of neurons and an even greater number of possible interconnections, it 
would simply be impossible to construct a Turing machine (or a Turing-
equivalent machine like the "Chinese Nation") that could even approach 
computational equivalence; "no brute-force one-device/ one-square realization 
of a Turing machine constructible in this universe could even begin to simulate 
your input-output organization." (p.135). 
In conclusion, functionalism properly construed is not restricted to purely 
formal, mathematical descriptions of a system, for such an interpretation of 
functionalism ignores all notion of teleology and "proper function". But more 
importantly, as the multiple-level theory reminds us, function and structure 
exist together, and thus a purely abstract, formal (mathematical-functional) 
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account of a system is not sufficient for explaining the behaviour of that system 
at any level; not even at the level of primitive processors - a point that many 
functionalists have failed to grasp (especially the machine functionalists). 
3. In defence of formal, abstract accounts of mind: the continuing search. 
Functionalism can be seen as a search for the 'essence' of the mental. 
Homunctionalism in particular stays true to the realist's quest for "the 'nature', 
'essence', or 'inner constitution' " (Keat & Urry, 1975, p.30) of the entities or 
properties in question -by describing the nature and operation of the 
underlying mechanisms. Yet it is not clear whether this or any other type of 
psychological explanation currently on offer "is identical with the project of 
seeking the essence of the mental" (Clark, 1989, p.22); where the latter is 
understood "as the search for the necessary and sufficient conditions for being 
in some mental state" (Clark, 1989, p.22). Or more correctly, given the points 
made in this and the previous chapter, the problem is that the formal 
descriptions of any version of functionalism may "never isolate a class of 
physical mechanisms capable of supporting the rich, flexible actual and 
counte1'[actual behavior that warrants ascribing mental states to the system 
instantiating such mechanisms." (Clark, 1989, p.178, original emphasis). 
I believe that the above defence of S-F theory against the non-standard 
counter-example objections to be on the right track.,Furthermore, in line with 
the points made in chapter 1, we could do well to recognize that the mental 
states we commonly ascribe are everyday social constructs of the linguistic 
community, i.e., they are 'everyday mental terms', and are not, or at least are 
not likely to remain, scientific constructs, as Wilkes (e.g., 1981) is at pains to 
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emphasize. Thus, the decision to ascribe the mental states of everyday folk 
psychology to non-standard cases lies only with the linguistic community. If, 
however, scientific theories establish the essence of the mental - which, to 
repeat, is understood as the isolation of "a class of physical mechanisms capable 
of supporting the rich, flexible actual and counter/actual behavior that warrants 
ascribing mental states to the system instantiating such mechanisms." (Clark, 
1989, p.178)- then we will have more rigorous grounds for accepting or 
rejecting the non-standard cases from the realm of the mental; i.e., here the 
decision will rest with the scientific community. And the sceptic has no 
legitimate right to claim that the non-standard cases provide good a priori 
reasons for the inadequacy or vacuousness of S-F theory in establishing the 
essence of the mental, for that is an empirical question. Furthermore, at present 
a major part of S-F theory rests on the theory of computation (the notion of 
primitive processors and what they do), and as Block (1990) points out, "[i]t is 
an open empirical question whether or not the computer model of the mind is 
correct." (p.261). 
Thus we can say that the explanatory value of posited functional and 
computational kinds will save them from the criticism of vacuousness supplied 
by non-standard counter-examples. Objections to functionalism such as 
Hinckfuss' pail will hold water only if the posited functional and computational 
kinds do not have any significant explanatory value, in which case we would 
indeed "get hyperinflation of computational theory" (Sterelny, 1990, p.206); but 
that is simply poor S-F theory, and not a criticism of the doctrine with any bite. 
Thus I agree with Kitcher (1985) when she argues that 
"[i]n general, Psychofunctionalisms will be vulnerable to the 
charge of chauvinism only if they make falling within the purview of 
a particular theory or a particular type of theory a necessary and 
sufficient condition for being a psychological entity. Then the 
genuine possibility of unexpected cases and indeterminate cases 
makes the enterprise look dubious. However, there is no reason for a 
Psychofunctionalist to buy into this project. It is perfectly reasonable 
for a Wide Functionalist, for example, to develop and use his 
classifications of psychological states without haboring the belief that 
he has hit upon the one and only true mark of the mental" (p.94). 
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Kitcher's argument rests on the claim that cognitive psychology has been 
held "to taxonomic standards that other sciences routinely rise above" (1985, 
p.78); namely, that the robust theoretical constructs of a science need not be, and 
indeed most often are not, precisely defined in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. ("It is a bad day for 'realism' when only phenomena with hard-
edged necessary and sufficient conditions can be considered real." Dennett and 
Kinsbourne, 1992, p.239.) Thus, even though it may be impossible to define 
'mental' or 'psychological', we cannot as a consequence rightly claim, as Block 
(1978) does, that functionalism paints itself into a dead-end corner from which it 
may never successfully emerge (viz. 'the problem of inputs and outputs' or the 
chauvinism-liberalism problem, as illustrated by Block's non-standard or 
indeterminate cases). 
The above point not withstanding, Kitcher (1985) admits that there are 
likely to be many insurmountable problems with bad versions of functionalist 
computational psychology. Nevertheless, it cannot be shown to be so for the 
reasons that Block (1978) puts forward. "The point I have been urging against 
Block is that computational psychology can offer theories of great scope and 
power without denying the actual or potential diversity of nature. For an 
approach can be the great unifying idea for a large range of phenomena, 
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without claiming absolutely exclusive dominion. Computational psychology 
has nothing to fear from unexpected or indeterminate cases." (Kitcher, 1985, 
p.96). 
Now that we have cleared the way for some form of S-F theory to 
proceed, unhindered by indeterminate counter-examples, it is time to come 
clean on my defence of formal accounts of mind (if it is not already obvious -
see chapter 1). While being an advocate of the formal approach to studying the 
mind (viz. structural-functional and/ or microfunctional theory), I reject the 
traditional computational and functional accounts. For these traditional 
accounts, exemplified by "GOFAI" (good old-fashioned AI: Haugeland, 1985), 
attempt to model or create intelligent, mental beings by putting descriptions of 
the folk psychological states back into their heads. As we have established, 
however (chapter 1), the states posited by folk psychology are not precise 
descriptions of the actual goings-on inside the heads of intelligent creatures. 
The everyday mental terms constitute a level of description of persons or 
systems as a whole, as Dennett (e.g., 1978a, 1987) often reminds us. EMTs are 
not likely to be accurate pointers to what is actually going on in the head. 
Consequently, a proper science of the mind will need to abandon the approach 
of "putting tokens of ordinary contentful talk back into the head (classical 
cognitivism)" and should instead seek "an account of how what is in the head 
enables the holistic ascription of such contents to the subject in the setting of the 
external world." (Clark, 1989, p.59). 
Thus a new way of viewing functionalism (S-F theory) is beginning to 
emerge: functionalism should be considered not as the attempt to identify 
functional state types with mental state types (i.e., the functional state identity 
theory), but rather as the attempt to map the structural-functional (cognitive) 
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architecture of the brain. S-F theory thus encompasses what Dennett (e.g., 
1978a, 1987) calls the design and physical stances, as opposed to the "intentional 
stance", which embodies the ascription of mental states. 
Abandoning the more traditional interpretations of computational 
functionalism does not obligate one to forsake the conception of the mind-brain 
as a computational device, however. It certainly should be possible, and indeed 
desirable, to retain some formal account of what is actually going on in the 
head; and given the discussion of the preceding sections, there are likely to be a 
number of different possible types of such accounts, collected together under 
the general title of S-F theory. We turn now to one such candidate which, as 
one of its main proponents claims (Clark, 1989), may have proprietary rights 
over the territory: microfunctionalism. 
4. Microfunctionalism. 
' 
4.1 What is microfunctionalism? 
Connectionism or PDP theory is, for the most part, seen as an alternative 
to the traditional sentential-computational theories. These new theories of 
cognitive functioning can be interpreted as complete alternatives to the 
traditional accounts, but more recently some authors have given serious 
consideration to some possible non-mutually exclusive accounts; still, the 
debate continues. (For general discussions of connectionism, see e.g., P. M. 
Churchland, 1988; Clark, 1989; McClelland and Rumelhart, 1986; Smolensky, 
1988; Sterelny, 1990, amongst others.) 
A substantial part of Clark's (1989) book is an exploration of the kind of 
formal description (i.e., abstracted as much as is possible from particular 
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physical realization) that he sees to be the best on offer - a "microfunctional" 
description, based on the general PDP/ connectionist approach. Adding 
support to Clark's (1989) claim that connectionism can rightly be branded a 
species of functionalism, is Ramsey's (1989) argument, pace Thagard (1986), 
that functionalism is not necessarily tied to traditional computational accounts 
of cognition (or at least the serial architecture that it is based on). Functionalism 
has nothing to fear from connectionism. Connectionism and functionalism will 
appear incompatible only when the notion of structure or hardware is 
misconstrued as referring to the actual physical stuff rather than the 
"computational architecture or causal arrangement of such stuff" (Ramsey, 1989, 
p.143, original emphasis). This is not to say, however, that as good 
functionalists we should completely ignore neuroscience, as Ramsey (1989), 
Thagard (1986), and others are quick to point out. Neuroscience is likely to 
provide useful insights into the functional nature of cognitive states. 
Connectionist models tend to posit explanations of the emergence of 
higher levels of a phenomenon from lower levels in terms of statistical or 
probabilistic functions, whereas homunctionalism takes a more mechanistic 
approach, decomposing a complex system into simple, interacting parts. 
Connectionist theory suggests that the discrete, 'digital' primitive processors 
posited by traditional computational functionalism (exemplified in Turing 
machine states) may not be the underlying mode of cognitive operation. 
Instead, connectionism suggests what is claimed to be a more neurally plausible 
alternative: the primitive processors of the brain are more 'analogue' or 
continuously variable in their operation. Nevertheless, connectionism does not 
preclude discrete input-output functions at higher levels of description. 
Thus the basis of computational functionalism is undercut by 
connectionism, hence connectionism appears to threaten the analytical strategy 
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of homunctionalism (Bechtel, 1991). Indeed it is at this point where Clark (1989) 
diverges from Lycan' s account of functionalism, i.e.,homuncular 
functionalism? Functionalism as a general doctrine may not be under threat 
from connectionism, as Clark (1989) and Ramsey (1989) claim, but the analytical 
strategy might be; homuncular functionalism may be better replaced by 
microfunctionalism. 
Clark seems to regard Lycan's (1981a) position as still too chauvinist. 
Instead, Clark opts for a microfunctional account that retains a larger degree of 
abstraction from physical implementation and "contentful, purposive 
characterizations" (1989, p.35), i.e., he apparently rejects versions of 
functionalism that are highly teleological (without denying the enormous 
influence of natural selection). However, if the foregoing discussion of S-F 
theory and its status in science is mostly correct, then to reject Lycan's thesis of 
teleological homuncular functionalism as readily as Clark appears to is to throw 
one of at least two babies out with the bath water. 
4.2 Microfunctionalism and psychological explanation. 
According to Clark (1989), the success of formal descriptions of mind 
depend on "where you locate the grain of the input, internal state transitions, 
and output" (p.35). He pushes for some intermediary level between the very 
fine-grained, purely abstract mathematical (e.g., Turing machine table states) 
and the grossly detailed levels of a "semantically transparent system" (pp. 2, 
18-19, 35). Neither of these two levels will provide a suitably abstracted, formal 
account of the necessary and sufficient conditions for ascriptions of mental 
7 Nevertheless, Clark ( 1989, p.35) does acknowledge the influence of Lycan's 
( 1981 a) defence of functionalism against Block ( 1978) on his own account of 
m icrofunctional ism. 
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states to systems, according to Clark; microfunctionalism provides our best 
chance of succeeding in this task. It is only through some microfunctional 
account that our mental state ascriptions will avoid being overly chauvinistic or 
liberal. 
In expressing worries about necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
ascriptions of mental states, Clark (1989) is primarily concerned with the 
problems of "the project of instantiation" (p.178). As he points out, there are 
some very good reasons to suggest the crucial importance of distinguishing the 
project of instantiation from psychological explanation (Clark, 1989, pp.180-
182). Most obviously, the project of instantiation is concerned with delimiting 
and defining the general "class of mechanisms capable of providing the causal 
substructure to ground rich and varied behavior of the kind warranting the 
ascription of mental states" (1989, p.180); whereas psychological explanation 
must begin by restricting its specification of this substructure to that of the 
brain. 
Traditionally, the functionalist view has been that of the project of 
instantiation, with its concomitant notion of the multiple realizability of abstract 
functional states. On this view, the abstract functional states are the central 
focus of study, and the human brain is seen as one possible instantiator of these 
states. On the other hand, when one's approach is that of psychological 
explanation in and for itself, the central focus of study is some formal 
description of the operation of the mind-brain itself. This distinction is where I 
see the most fundamental difference between microfunctionalism 
(connectionism) and traditional computational functionalism to lie. 
Connectionism starts by looking at the operation of the working units of the 
brain (neurons), and extracts a number of operating principles and concepts 
63 
from which to build simulations and working models of the human cognitive 
system. Traditional computational functionalism has worked the other way 
round: first it specifies the computational principles, then it considers how the 
human cognitive system may be organized so as to operate according to these 
principles. 
I have no doubt that Clark is right when he says that the failure to attend 
to this distinction between the two projects has caused a great deal of confusion 
in cognitive science. Indeed, I suspect that many writers on the nature of 
functionalism and its problems have made just this confusion. Even if 
connectionism, as it stands today, has serious flaws, and even if connectionist 
networks are not to be understood as cognitive theories (as e.g., McCloskey, 
1991, argues), the microfunctionalist approach may well be pointing us in a 
more fruitful direction: if we want to obtain formal accounts of mind, then we 
may do best to abstract them from the one mind-brain that we know exists. 
5. The status of neo-functionalism. r , 
Despite Clark's (1989) admirable project, it is still far from certain that a 
system's mere satisfaction of some appropriate formal description will warrant 
ascriptions of mental states to that system (as Clark acknowledges). A 
microfunctional description based on some connectionist approach will likely 
be only one of "a set of conditions jointly sufficient for instantiating mental 
states" (Clark, 1989, p.178, original emphasis). However, even this may not be 
the whole story, for it is unlikely, as Clark again points out, that internal 
structure alone, as specified by these formal conditions, is sufficient for a system 
to instantiate mental states. It is entirely plausible, and I think highly likely, that 
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environmental, social and other semantically or intentionally characterized 
issues will play some part in determining the requisite conditions for mental 
states. Psychological explanation must include accounts of both function and 
structure, including any relevant factors of the physical implementation (as 
specified by connectionist theory, for example), relevant to the human case. 
Now the human case is inextricably embedded in a social context, and for many 
complex reasons this will certainly have some profound effects on the 
dispositions or capacities of humans and their patterns or types of behaviour 
(together, pragmatically picked out by our EMTs - also an inextricable part of 
the social context), and therefore on their internal brain states. Moreover, it is 
the operations of specific functions implemented in particular structures that 
allow the great variety of social contexts and activity to arise. 
The social contexts of the human case may be important for full 
psychological explanation. But at what point does S-F theory depart from the 
specification of brain states and start dealing with interpersonal, social 
structures and functions? Although this is not an easy question (indeed, I 
believe the boundaries implicit in the question will remain largely 'fuzzy'), 
chapter 5 goes on to discuss in more detail how we might best conceive the 
interaction of social and brain structures and functions. 
Some concluding remarks are now in order. Functional analysis takes us 
far in our quest for good (and preferably the best) psychological explanations, 
but not far enough. Lest we forget, functional analysis, at least as Cummins 
(1975, 1983) and others characterize it, is not the end of the line for full 
psychological explanation; a claim which Cummins (1983) himself makes, and 
indeed expounds on: compositional or componential analysis must also feature 
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in psychological explanation. However, I think Cummins, along with many 
others taken by the general functionalist approach, fails to give enough 
emphasis to the flip-side of analysis - synthesis - in our quest for 
psychological explanation. Both 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' approaches qualify 
as explanatory strategies, for, as I have already discussed, when our project is 
explanation of phenomena of the natural world, the structure of the 
implementing machinery (mechanisms of the brain, in the case of psychological 
explanation) must impose some limits on the postulated functions; "meringues 
can't carve joints" (Wilkes, 1981, p.147). The top-down strategies have been 
assiduously advanced in favour and ignorance of the bottom-up strategies. 
What these people have failed to recognize is that both types of strategy can and 
should exist in mutual advancement and containment (see e.g., P. S. 
Churchland, 1986.) 
The new-and-improved versions of functionalism - homuncular 
functionalism and microfunctionalism - properly conceived, i.e., teleologically, 
within the multiple-level view of nature, are likely to be essential parts of 
scientific psychological explanation. Functionalism, broadly construed, is the 
chief and possibly only valid grand design open to cognitive psychology, and is 
an extremely productive and worthwhile one to boot. Nevertheless, 
homunctionalism and microfunctionalism are but two of the major strategies in 
the cooperative scientific enterprise that combines synthesis with analysis, 
structure with function, the personal with the sub-personal (etc.). Indeed, 
functionalism properly conceived leads inevitably to this conclusion. A 
conclusion that is no more applicable than for explanations of the phenomena 
collected together under folk psychology's 'consciousness'. 
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Moreover, functional analysis is an important part of the explanatory 
quest. Functionalist theories are the essence of "stage 1" of the instantiation 
project (Clark, 1989) and hence will help us delimit and describe, at some 
abstract, formal level(s), the class of mechanisms required in good psychological 
explanation. This is only part of the story, however. As Cummins, Lycan, and 
Wilkes remind us, functions and structures co-exist and are intimately related. 
Functions are implemented by physical stuff with certain structure, and the 
nature of each constrains the others. Consequently, functionalism may be better 
known as structural-functional theory (Wilkes, 1981). 
Chapter summary: 
Functionalism is the doctrine that seeks formal specifications of the causal 
interactions between the inputs, internal states, and outputs of a system; 
specifications that are abstracted as much as possible from the physical 'stuff' of 
implementation - Functionalism supposedly overcomes the major problems 
with behaviourism and the mind-brain identity theory -Turing machine 
functionalism is now widely discredited - Functionalist theories must not be 
too liberal or too chauvinist in their ascription of mental states. 
Homunctionalism sets functionalism back on track by staying true to the 
underlying motivations: to explain the functioning of an intelligent system 
without re-introducing the very thing one wishes to explain -
Homunctionalism is grounded in the analytical strategy - Homunctionalism 
does not flounder where earlier versions of functionalism ran aground-
Homunctionalism, teleologically construed, leads one to the view that nature is 
multi-levelled - From this multiple-level view of nature it is evident that 
function and structure go hand-in-hand; consequently, functionalism may be 
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better known as structural-functional theory-Homunctionalism (and other 
good forms of S-F theory) can survive the sustained attacks that rely on non-
standard counter-examples - S-F theory, like other scientific theories, is not 
required to explain the essence of its constructs in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. 
Microfunctionalism is another major contender for our best formal theory 
of the mental; one that is grounded in neurally-inspired connectionist theory -
Microfunctionalism and homunctionalism need not be mutually exclusive 
alternatives. 
Some traditional functional-computational accounts are mistaken in their 
attempt to put the states posited by folk psychology back into the cognitive 
system-Instead, S-F theory (homunctionalism and microfunctionalism 
included) should seek to explain the actual goings-on inside such systems -
S-F theory is not a functional state identity theory; it is the "design stance" in 
action - S-F theory is thus best seen as the attempt to explain the nature and 
interaction of "a class of physical mechanisms capable of supporting the rich, 
flexible ... behavior that warrants ascribing mental states to the system 
instantiating such mechanisms." (Clark, 1989, p.178, emphasis added). 
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CHAPTER 3. 
FUNCTIONALISM IN ACTION: COGNITIVE MODELS OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 
1. Psychology, consciousness, and functionalism. 
In the psychology of the past one hundred years or so, consciousness has 
gone through various stages of neglect and banishment (e.g., by the 
behaviourist tradition) and open embrace (e.g., by the phenomenological 
approaches), as well as various shades of grudging acceptance and/ or 
ignorance. Reporting of conscious experience - the introspective method -
was the mainstay of scientific psychological investigations in the field's 
formative years. Nevertheless, many of these early psychologists were uneasy 
about the concept (Hilgard, 1977, 1980). Problems with the introspective 
method soon became apparent, and an alternative approach, behaviourism, 
became the dominant doctrine. Behaviourism essentially banished the concept 
of consciousness from scientific psychology. (Although it did not disappear 
from the scene altogether: the methods employed in psychophysics relied on an 
implicit acceptance of introspective report; Baddeley, unpublished; Hilgard, 
1977, 1980.) 
It took a considerable time after the demise of behaviourism for 
psychology to treat consciousness as a legitimate and respectable subject for 
scientific inquiry. Indeed it wasn't until the 1970s that this occurred, and the 
burgeoning field of cognitive science was a major player (some say the major 
player) in this resurgence of scientific interest in consciousness. Although as 
Hilgard (1992) remarks, "[c]ognitive psychology was not in itself a 
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consciousness psychology, but it opened the door for the return of an interest in 
conscious processes." (p.18). As a result, consciousness became a "respectable, 
useful and probably necessary" topic for scientific discussion and investigation 
(:Mandler, 1975). 
Underlying the increased interest of cognitive or information processing 
psychologists in consciousness are two primary assumptions (Shallice, 1991): 
(1) the (implicit or explicit) allegiance to the philosophical doctrine of 
functionalism; and (2) the mapping of consciousness "onto the operation, input 
to, or output from one component within the system viewed from an 
information-processing perspective." (p.215). It is the primary task of the 
present chapter to discuss the second of these assumptions. But first some more 
needs to be said about cognitive psychology's adherence to functionalism. 
Despite the gradually increasing interest in consciousness, it did seem that 
much of cognitive psychology could proceed quite happily with the task of 
mapping the mind without the need to posit any property or capacity of 
consciousness (e.g., Flanagan, 1990; Marcel, 1988). To be sure, it was generally 
assumed that the conscious processing or experience of the experimental 
participants often played an important role in the phenomena under study. Yet 
the resultant models of the cognitive system seemed not to require the 
postulation of any special property of consciousness other than various levels of 
basic awareness and control; the sort of awareness and control that suitably 
programmed digital computers can routinely perform. Thus "[i]t was widely 
noticed in many domains that the project of mapping out the complex , 
information flows, caches, and networks constituting the mind ... could be done 
without bringing consciousness into the story." Computational functionalism 
implies "conscious inessentialism" (Flanagan, 1990, p.309). 
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Conscious inessentialism is an unpalatable position for many philosophers 
and psychologists. Flanagan (1990) does not want to advocate such a position, 
and neither does Baars (1988): ''Whether cognitive psychology will succeed 
where others have not depends in part on its success in understanding 
conscious experience - not just because 'it is there', but because consciousness, 
if it is of any scientific interest at all, must play a major functional role in the 
human nervous system." (p.xv). If one wants to retain some form of 
functionalism and not be a conscious inessentialist, then the only conceivable 
option appears to be some form of teleological functionalism (a position that 
Flanagan defends). The properties, states, or events shown by science to 
underlie the folk-psychological notion of consciousness are likely to be 
functional; i.e., many, but not likely all, will be shown to have (or to have had) 
some biological purpose or adaptiveness. Consciousness, on this view, is not 
likely to be inessential, nor an epiphenomenon. 
As it is used here, an 'epiphenomenon' is a property or entity that has no 
functional or design role - it may have many effects on the world, but it has no 
functional or causal role in the operation of the system of which it is part. So, 
consciousness (awareness) is an epiphenomenon, in this sense, if it exists in the 
physical world, and is, or is caused by, e.g., certain information processes, but 
does not enter into or causally influence subsequent processing. Conscious 
epiphenomenalism, on this view, is therefore a stronger claim than that of 
conscious inessentialism (Flanagan, 1990): not only is consciousness not 
necessary (inessential) for intelligent and purposeful behaviour characteristic of 
humans, it simply does not enter into it. 
This version of epiphenomenalism should be clearly distinguished from 
the more traditional philosophical interpretation, which is that "mental 
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phenomena are not a part of the physical phenomena in the brain that 
ultimately determine our actions and behavior, but rather ride 'above the fray'" 
(P. M. Churchland, 1988, p.10). Mental phenomena, on this view, are caused by 
physical events in the brain, but have no causal effects on the world 
whatsoever. Computational functionalists do not (on the whole) claim to 
advocate this stronger, dualist position. (For more on the important distinctions 
between the two interpretations of epiphenomenalism, see Block, 1991; Dennett, 
1978c, 1991a. Velmans', 1991, treatise on cognitive psychological studies of 
focal-attentive processing is the latest incarnation of such inessentialist and 
epiphenomenalist worries about consciousness; see chapter 4, below.) 
I will have more to say about the troubles posed by conscious 
inessentialism and epiphenomenalism in the next chapter. The task of the 
remainder of the present chapter is to discuss some typical cognitive 
psychological (computational functionalist) models of consciousness. 
2. Consciousness in cognitive psychology: the 'consciousness module' and 
working memory. 
2.1 Introduction. 
Cognitive theories that have explicitly attempted to account for 
consciousness in their models can be divided into four broad positions (Shallice, 
1991): (i) consciousness corresponds to the operation of a single, limited 
capacity system, typically with control and monitoring functions; (ii) the 
contents of consciousness are identified with the contents of a short-term 
memory store; (iii) the differences between nonconscious processing and 
conscious processing can be accounted for by their different modes of 
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operation: the former is generally a parallel, primary-process, whereas the latter 
is generally a serial, secondary-process; (iv) the contents of consciousness 
correspond to the 'selector input' determining which of the parallel-acting 
'action-systems' is currently most active or dominant. (It is important to note 
that these four positions are not all mutually exclusive. Indeed, some cognitive 
theories of consciousness incorporate elements from two or more of these 
positions.) 
2.2 The 'consciousness module' as central executive and internal monitor. 
The topic of consciousness was not dealt with directly by cognitive 
psychologists from the.word go, but rather rode in on the back of investigations 
of selective attention and short-term or working memory. Some psychologists 
have assumed that the apparently close relationship between attention and 
consciousness is as good an indication as any that conscious processing can be 
identified with 'focal-attentive processing'. This makes the explanation of 
conscious processing relatively easy, for focal-attentive processing is explicable 
in the terms of information processing theories. This idea is centred on a 'two-
process' theory of information processing: pre-attentive, and hence 
preconscious processing occurs in parallel, and is automatic, involuntary, and 
inflexible; whereas focal-attentive, and hence conscious processing is serial, and 
is voluntary and flexible (Velmans, 1991). 
According to this general view, information processes that are 
accompanied by consciousness are at the focus of attention. Or more 
specifically, it is generally the results of such processes that are at the focus of 
attention and which one is aware of. Of course, as Velmans (1991) reminds us, 
this does not imply that all input and other information allocated attentional 
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resources will 'enter consciousness'8. For instance, Velmans (1991) cites the 
dichotic listening experiments of Triesman (e.g., 1964a, 1964b) as having 
demonstrated that attentional resources are utilized for some sophisticated 
processing (e.g., input analysis), yet nothing is available to consciousness. 
Certainly it is unlikely that focal-attentive processing can be identified with 
consciousness (see e.g., Allport, 1988; Dennett, 1978b; Jackendoff, 1987; 
Velmans, 1991). Even if one is not paying attention to something, one may 
nevertheless be faintly or vaguely aware of it (Dennett, 1978b). Furthermore, it 
does not seem possible for one to attend to something without first being aware 
of it (Jackendoff, 1987). 
Focal-attentive processing is considered to be limited in its processing 
capacity. This has led many advocates of the view that consciousness is closely 
associated with focal-attentive processing to propose the operation of a limited 
capacity central processor. This proposed internal monitor allows us to be aware 
of some of our perceptual, cognitive, and bodily action processes. Only 
information dealt with by this processor can be available for consciousness. For 
instance, in the discussion of their experimental report on the components of 
attention, Posner and Boies (1971) suggest a link between what we can attend 
to, and hence what we can be conscious of, and some limited, central processing 
capacity. Posner and Klein (1973) also consider the possibility that 
consciousness is related to the operation of a limited capacity mechanism. They 
hypothesize that as a result of its serial operation and limited capacity, the 
information processes are relatively slow and are susceptible to interference 
8 For reasons that will become apparent, I use scare quotes here to disassociate 
myself from the prevalent "Cartesian materialist" view that there is some final 
'theatre' of the mind to which conscious events 'enter', to be 'presented' or 'projected' 
onto the 'screen', thus forming the single 'stream of consciousness' (Dennett, 1991 a; 
Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992). 
from other, competing tasks. Posner and Warren (1972) consider conscious 
processes to depend on the operation of the central processor. 
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A more recent version of the theory that consciousness is associated with 
the operation of a limited capacity processing mechanism is that of Johnson-
Laird (1983, 1988a, 1988b). Johnson-Laird's theory of the conscious and 
unconscious mind is based on a computational framework. He postulates that 
'simple consciousness' (bare awareness) can be explained by way of a high-level 
monitor that arises from the complex parallel processing of the brain. This 
monitor, or operating system, is at the top of the hierarchy of processors. The 
processors below the level of the operating system in the hierarchy operate in 
parallel, and may operate in some distributed representational manner, such as 
that postulated by the connectionist theories. In contrast to the processors lower 
in the hierarchy, the internal monitor operates serially, receiving and 
transmitting messages to and from these lower processors. Usually these 
'messages' consist of explicitly structured symbols with a propositional content 
(emotional signals may be an exception; refer e.g., Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 
1987). 
An important distinction to be made here is that between process and 
product: information structures are input to and output from cognitive 
processes, and one cannot exist without the other. What distinguishes Johnson-
Laird's theory from many earlier models is that he identifies consciousness with 
information structures (the information being represented), not processes. "The 
contents of consciousness are the current values of parameters governing the 
high-level computations of the operating system." (Johnson-Laird, 1983, p.465; 
see Jackendoff, 1987). 
There is a great deal of processing that goes on of which we are not aware. 
Indeed it would be a ridiculous situation if we could be aware of even a small 
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part of the immensely complicated parallel processing at any one time; our 
conscious minds would be so overwhelmed that we would never get anything 
done. To operate effectively in real time in the real world, an organism must 
process a great deal of information in a very short time; hence the advantage of 
parallel processing. Yet action in the world, especially when it is planned action, 
for a particular purpose, is likely to require sustained effort and allocation of 
cognitive resources. A serial, limited capacity system, preferably with some 
control and monitoring function, is one possible solution to this engineering or 
design problem: The operating system's serial operation and control functions 
are analogous to those of the CPU in a computer; and the amounts and types of 
information structures of which we can be aware are restricted by the limited 
processing capacity of the operating system. Moreover, it is a significant 
operative and evolutionary advantage to have a limited capacity processor 
monitoring the activity of the complex parallel processing. For example, it offers 
a means of dealing with any information processing 'dead-locks' or 'deadly 
embraces' (Johnson-Laird, 1983). But a single limited capacity monitoring 
mechanism is not the only possible way of avoiding such computational 
breakdowns. It is unlikely that inside our heads is a single, limited capacity 
processor with control and monitoring functions. Nevertheless, it will be 
instructive to continue with the outline of Johnson-Laird's theory, for it is the 
most acceptable of all 'executive theories'. 
In addition to its monitoring and control functions, Johnson-Laird's 
operating system constructs models of the external and 'internal' worlds. (The 
analogy here is with computer models; for example: models of weather 
systems.) Self-awareness depends on a particular mode of processing, one that 
has access to a partial model of itself. Self-reflection also requires access to 
mental models of itself, i.e., of its own operations; and these self-reflective 
models can be embedded within each other. That is, self-reflective model 
construction is recursive- they can be constructed from the outputs of a 
previous model. (The significance for the present thesis of this notion of 
cognitive models of the self will become evident in chapter 5.) 
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Johnson-Laird concludes that a cognitive architecture with this type of 
operating system - with its separate mode of processing and recursive model 
construction - can account for all that we mean by consciousness (including 
the subjective experience of awareness, self-awareness and self-reflection). 
The idea of a central processor with monitoring and control functions has 
not been limited to information processing theories. For instance, in 
Armstrong's (1968) materialist theory, consciousness is hypothesized to be "a 
process in which one part of the brain scans another part of the brain." (p.94). 
What distinguishes conscious mental states is that they are 'directed' inwards, 
to other mental states. Armstrong suggests that "consciousness is no more than 
awareness (perception) of inner mental states by the person whose states they 
are" (p.94). 
Humphrey (1986) likens the internal monitor or metaphorical "inner eye" 
to other sense organs; but it is one that gives a view of the operations of the 
brain itself, rather than of the external world. It provides the organism with a 
useful, "user-friendly description" (p.70) of its own mental/ brain states. 
Both Armstrong and Humphrey's theories presume some form of 
modularity of brain function. Gazzaniga (1988), a proponent of the internal 
monitor thesis, outlines a theory of brain function that suggests a modular 
organization. Gazzaniga states that the functional modules are grounded in the 
physiology of the brain, although it is presently beyond the capabilities of the 
77 
brain sciences to specify exactly how. The modules mediate the inputs from 
internal and external events received by the sensory and other input systems. 
The modules operate in parallel, outside of conscious awareness. Their outputs 
are 'considered' by an 'interpreter', which 'constructs hypotheses' as to the 
possible reasons for the various module responses. This hypothesis construction 
is centred on fitting the outputs into the overall current and "ongoing mental 
schema (belief system)" (p.219). 
In sum, the internal monitor thesis proposes that all the major facets of 
consciousness can be explained by the operation of a limited capacity serial 
processor, sitting at the top of a highly interconnected hierarchy of parallel 
processors. Its primary functions are: monitoring the results of some of the 
parallel processing (essentially, receiving output messages from certain 
processors, and acting upon this information), and controlling or directing some 
of this complex processing (e.g., assigning certain systems of processors to do a 
certain job). As such, the monitor system can be likened to the general manager 
or central executive of the corporate cognitive system. 
This view of the human cognitive system as a corporation is a common 
and useful interpretation of the functionalist perspective, and the internal 
monitor thesis of consciousness is a natural extension of the analogy. On this 
corporate view, a person is viewed as an organized conglomerate of interacting 
departments or subsystems, and, in turn, sub-departments or sub-subsystems, 
and so on down the hierarchy (chapter 2). Thus, as Lycan (1987) says of 
Dennett's characterization of homuncular functionalism: 
"I take it to suggest that we view a person as a corporate entity 
that corporately performs many immensely complex functions -
functions of the sort usually called mental or psychological. A 
psychologist who adopts Fodor's and Dennett's AI-inspired 
methodology will describe this person by means of a flow chart, 
which depicts the person's immediately sub-personal agencies and 
their many and varied routes of access to each other that enable them 
to cooperate in carrying out the purposes of the containing 
'institution' or organism that that person is." (p.40). 
From the perspective of this analogy it seems a valid step to posit an 
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executive or general manager in the 'penthouse suite' of the mind. This central 
executive sends out orders to the departments and sub-departments of the 
corporate mind, and receives reports on the results of their operations. On the 
basis of these reports and the short-term and long-term goals of the corporation, 
the central executive also sends out orders to the motor systems and the other 
departments responsible for producing behaviour, including the department for 
speech production (the 'public relations department'). 
A nice illustration of this analogy is Dennett's (1978b) model of 
consciousness. His first approximation of a possible high-level architecture of 
the cognitive system proposes a Control system or higher executive, which is 
responsible for a variety of control functions. For example, it allocates cognitive 
resources; sends directions to the PR system - the centre responsible for 
speech output; directs questions to M- the short-term memory buffer system; 
and executes a number of executive subroutines based on the answers received 
from M, e.g., 'interpreting' and 'censoring' the answer, and 'drawing 
inferences' from it. 
Dennett' s Control system is somewhat different from the central 
executives of alternative models, however. Dennett (1978b) regards the various 
facets of conscious awareness as resulting from the interaction of the control 
subsystems, i.e., the Control system, the buffer memory Mand the PR system; 
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and not from the operation of the Control system alone. Moreover, "[t]he 
content of one's experience includes whatever enters (by normal routes) the 
buffer memory M." (p.169). And the two most important sources of input to 
Mare from various stages of perceptual analysis (the contents of one's 
experience can be the results of various stages of perceptual processing), and 
from the PR system (we can experience what we say). Furthermore, the 
contents of Mare output to the PR system or speech centre; thus we are able 
to report on what we experience (even if we sometimes may be at a loss to 
adequately express these experiences). 
Dennett' s emphasis on the important role of a short-term or working 
memory in conscious processing is an example of a prevalent view in many 
early cognitive theories of consciousness, and it remains at the centre of some 
more recent theories. It is to the discussion of working memory and 
consciousness that we now turn. 
2.3 Consciousness and working memory. 
The notion of a short-term or working memory, as distinguished from a 
more permanent or long-term memory system, has played a significant part in 
the history of cognitive psychology (e.g., Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1971; Baddeley, 
1986). One early account of short-term memory, that of Atkinson and Shiffrin 
(1971), equates the proposed short-term store with consciousness; "that is, the 
thoughts and information of which we are currently aware can be considered 
part of the contents of the short-term store." (p.83). Such early theories 
considered short-term memory (STM) to be a unitary system: a short-term store 
(STS). This system was also considered to be a working memory: a 'work sheet' 
used to temporarily store the intermediate results of computations performed in 
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a wide range of cognitive tasks (see e.g., Baddeley, 1986, 1990). 
More recent accounts of short-term memory propose instead a multi-
component working memory. Baddeley (e.g., 1986, 1990), for example, submits 
that working memory consists of "a controlling central executive system and a 
number of subsidiary slave systems" (1990, p.95). Two likely candidates for the 
slave systems are a 'phonological loop' and a 'visuo-spatial sketchpad'. 
A vast array of evidence has been accrued in support of such an analysis 
of working memory, from performance on tests of digit span, and serial recall of 
lists of numbers, words, and non-words, to experiments on mental imagery and 
rotation, to neuropsychological evidence from patients with memory 
impairments (see e.g., Baddeley, 1986, 1990). The idea of the phonological loop 
and visuo-spatial sketchpad, and their crucial role in determining the contents 
of conscious experience, is also at least intuitively plausible: visual images, 
those in our 'mind's eye', are by definition conscious; likewise, any material that 
is verbally rehearsed is conscious. So why not posit single, unitary systems that 
are responsible for the production of such phenomena? It appears that some 
controlling mechanism needs to be introduced into models of this type -
something that "supervises and coordinates" (Baddeley, 1990, p.71) the slave 
systems - so why not posit a central executive with such control functions? 
Baddeley (1986, 1990, 1992, unpublished) cites numerous experiments that 
supposedly offer support for a central executive; although, as he readily admits, 
very little is yet known about the nature of such a mechanism. These data 
cannot be explained solely by the operation of the slave systems, so the 
reasonable assumption to make is that they might be accounted for by the 
operation of the central executive. For example, Baddeley (1990) says of one 
investigation: "The authors conclude that the crucial difference between the two 
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groups is in working memory capacity, and since it is clearly not in the capacity 
of the articulatory loop, and presumably not in sketchpad capacity, the 
assumption is that the two groups [in the experiment] differ in the attentional 
capacity of the central executive." (p.139). 
Baddeley (1992, unpublished) also offers some teleological or evolutionary 
reasons in support of the existence and functions of consciousness, and argues 
that these functions depend on the operation of a central executive component 
of working memory. For instance, sensory integration seems to be an important 
function that is ideally suited for consciousness, especially since conscious 
awareness allows for reflection upon the integrated information (allowing past 
experience to be used to understand present situations and to model the future). 
Baddeley suggests that this integration and reflection is achieved through 
working memory, and offers some experimental results supporting this 
conclusion.9 These experimental results cannot be adequately accounted for 
by the articulatory loop or visuo-spatial sketchpad slave systems, so Baddeley 
argues that conscious awareness is one of the functions of the central executive 
component of working memory. 
Such appeals to a central executive are, for the most part, based on the 
intuition that there should be something in there that accounts for (takes the 
place of) the will. Hence we get the postulation of control systems, like the 
'Supervisory Attentional System' of Norman and Shallice (1980), partly because, 
as Baddeley (1990) says, not putting it in "leaves no place for the will, a concept 
that has been conspicuously missing from cognitive psychology for most of this 
century." (p.127). Jackendoff (1987) makes the same observation: To assign 
9 Although some more recent research has indicated that explanations of sensory 
integration may be more forthcoming from neuroscience. See Crick and Koch ( 1992) 
and The New York Times, Oct. 27, 1992, p.C 1 o. 
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privilege to a part of the active mind, be it a central executive or some other 
high-level representation or process, "corresponds to the traditional intuition 
that the conscious mind is connected with the will, with the initiation and 
coordination of action, with the ability to make rational choices, and ultimately 
with one's sense of personhood." (pp.17-18). 
The picture painted so far is a compelling view of mind as a neatly 
structured and organized system of processors going about their business with 
a certain amount of autonomy, but nevertheless under the watchful guidance of 
some 'higher' or central processor. But is it the right picture? The weight of 
argument and evidence tends to favour a homunctionalist-inspired modular 
analysis of mind. But to postulate a 'consciousness module' is pushing the 
corporation and computer metaphors too far, as I hope to show. 
I contend that it is not necessary to posit a central executive with such 
important and powerful controlling and monitoring functions; it is possible that 
there is nothing at all like a central executive anywhere in the brain. The thesis 
of a central executive can be shown to be a hang-over from the Cartesial} view 
of a locatable centre of conscious experience, a place where 'it all comes 
together' (e.g., Dennett, 1991a; see section 3, below). Nevertheless, some of the 
central executive theories are indeed detailed and significant scientific theories, 
not merely dressed-up intuition. My claim is that the intuitions motivating such 
accounts are misguided. We should prefer theories that do not acquiesce to such 
intuitions. 
There is an additional task for these alternative theories: they must be able 
to explain the experimental data that make the executive model attractive, viz. 
focal-attention, conscious awareness (of e.g., sensory stimuli), the control of 
cognitive function (allocation of cognitive resources), and the like. These very 
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different accounts are taking shape in the theories of cognitive scientists like 
Baars (1988), Cam (1988, 1989), Dennett (1991a, Dennett and Kinsbourne, 1992), 
Jackendoff (1987), and Kinsbourne (1988). Nevertheless, it is not necessary for 
these new theories to entirely abandon the very useful and productive 
theoretical concepts like working memory and selective attention (see e.g., 
Jackendoff's, 1987, theory). Rather, if the concepts are retained, then the 
traditional ways of interpreting them will likely be remodelled. 
3. Possible problems with the central executive/ internal monitor view. 
The internal monitor thesis is in danger of re-introducing an intelligent, 
omnipotent homunculus. I don't presume that any of the internal monitor 
theorists would consider their version of the monitoring system to be such an 
undischarged homunculus, however. After all, the computer systems from 
which many of these models draw their inspiration carry out many complex 
and apparently intelligent tasks, all governed by a central processing unit that 
by no stretch of the imagination can be considered an undischarged 
homunculus. 
But are the monitoring and control functions borrowed from computer 
technology the right sort for the brain? Is their implementation in computers 
('von Neumann architecture') a suitable analogy for the implementation of 
control and monitoring functions in the brain? The remainder of this chapter 
will be devoted to exploring these questions, and to a discussion of some 
alternative views on more appropriate architectures of mind. 
One way of avoiding a regress of intelligent homunculi is to offer an 
explanation of how the control system operates to achieve its proposed 
functions. That is, the homunculus is discharged by way of functional analysis. 
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The operation of the executive system is explained in terms of what it does with 
the information that it receives and processes: the results of computations are 
used in the service of further computations. This idea is central to Johnson-
Laird's operating system, the Supervisory Attentional System of Norman and 
Shallice (1980), most working memory systems (e.g., Baddeley, 1992; 
unpublished), and the 'workspace' systems (e.g., Baars, 1988). The most 
important facet of these theories is not what the executive does, but the way 
that it does it. 
Most modern computational-functional models of mind regard their 
executive system in this way, i.e., as an information processing system. 
Information structures have some use or function in the cognitive-behavioural 
economy; they are functional items. As Dennett (1991a) acknowledges, the 
central executive of these theories is not a "Cartesian Theater ", the place 
"where 'it all comes together ' " (p.107); information structures are not 
'projected' on to the 'screen' of the conscious mind for us to see. Rather, the 
central executive receives and outputs various information structures, and in so 
doing performs certain processes that are deemed to be directly responsible for, 
or indeed just are the various facets of consciousness. Thus these central 
executive theories cannot rightly be accused of tacitly advocating "Cartesian 
materialism", which is the "view that there is a crucial finish line or boundary 
somewhere in the brain, marking a place where the order of arrival equals the 
order of 'presentation' in experience because what happens there is what you are 
conscious of." (Dennett, 1991a, p.107; see also Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992). 
The executive systems of computational-functionalist theories are not Cartesian 
Theatres, for they do not propose an end-point for cognitive and perceptual 
information, no final editing and projection room. 
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Even if these computational-functional models do not imply a Cartesian 
Theatre, they nevertheless retain a single, functionally identifiable processing 
mechanism by means of which the various facets of consciousness are made 
possible. 
4. The way forward: The cognitive system as multiple faculties with a 
global workspace. 
4.1 Overview. 
Our original question about the utility and status of functionalism was, Is 
functionalism the right paradigm for scientific psychological explanations of 
consciousness? My answer is a resounding "yes", but only if we limit 
functionalist ''boxology" (Dennett, 1991a) to a mapping of the cognitive systems 
responsible for the functions that allow us to ascribe 'first-order' mental 
predicates (Wilkes, 1984; see chapter 1, above). My answer is a resounding "no" 
if functionalist boxology is taken to the extent that some 'consciousness box' or 
other identifiable functional mechanism is postulated to account for the various 
facets of consciousness. This is the lesson learnt from the unshackling of one's 
theoretical approach from the vestiges of Cartesian materialism, with its 
concomitant notion of a Cartesian Theatre of the mind, and, relatedly, from the 
folk-psychological intuition that there must be something in there that 
corresponds to the concepts of the self and the will. We might be warranted in 
talking of the functions of consciousness, or at least of the functions of the 
properties underlying the multifarious states, events, and processes that we call 
conscious, but we are not warranted to speak of consciousness as arising from 
the operation of some identifiable, fixed, and precisely defined central executive 
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or module in the cognitive system. It may be useful to retain the notion of a 
central executive or operating system because it has heuristic and illustrative 
value, but this is not to assume some actual in-the-head control box and 
monitoring system. 
Traditional cognitive models - those steeped in functionalist "boxology " 
- are being superseded by models proposing distributed collections of 
specialist processors, acting in parallel, all contesting for privileged 
computational status, with no hint of a presidential or executive processor to 
supervise and control this cacophony of activity. The agents (processors, 
modules, specialists, demons, homunculi, ... ) comprising this "society of mind" 
(Minsky, 1985) are equipped with a working memory- a "global workspace" 
(Baars, 1988) - that is best viewed not in the traditional sense, as a functionally 
or spatially isolated system, but as a function of certain processors and the 
means by which they communicate. 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of some examples 
of this 'new wave' of cognitive theory. It is interesting (and heartening) to note 
that many of these new theories have been advanced at least partly because of 
an uneasiness or dissatisfaction with the way traditional cognitive models have 
dealt with consciousness. Nevertheless, the computational and design problems 
these traditional models were devised in an attempt to solve still remain: How 
is the activity of many independent and specialized processors coordinated and 
controlled so as to bring about effective perception of, and behaviour in, the 
world? What structures, processes, or mechanisms in the computational mind 
could be responsible for conscious awareness, and how could they achieve this? 
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4.2 Modules and Faculties: Fodor and Cam. 
A modular view of mind is the canonical form of homuncular 
functionalism, i.e., the explanatory decomposition of minds into relatively 
discrete, special purpose components or modules. As Fodor (1983) remarks, 
viewing the mind in this way marks a return to faculty psychology, which had 
its roots in the ruminations of Aristotle, and reached its apotheosis in the work 
of Gall in the early nineteenth century. The modern day cognitive view is 
considerably different from Gall's phrenology, but still adheres to its basic 
premise: to explain the rich and varied range of mental activity, we must 
postulate a range of relatively distinct cognitive and perceptual faculties. The 
mind-brain is a heterogenous organization of psychological mechanisms. 
Unfortunately there is as yet no general consensus on the nature and 
function of the specialized cognitive processors (modules, faculties). Fodor 
(1983) considers the cognitive apparatus to be functionally subdivided into four 
major systems: sensory transducers, modular input systems, output systems, 
and a central system. The modules in Fodor's theory are the relatively 
peripheral input systems that receive information from the transducers, i.e., the 
sensory organs. These modules are defined by a number of properties, the most 
important being "information encapsulation", i.e., each module can use only 
limited types of information in its computations, and consequently there is 
little or no 'crosstalk' or sharing of information between the modules; and 
"domain specificity", i.e., each module is tied to a specific and limited set of 
tasks - the subject matter they deal with is restricted. 
Fodor's central system ('cognition central') is responsible for all higher 
cognitive processes: it evaluates the outputs of the input systems in light of 
other relevant information such as expectations, beliefs, and goals, and is 
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responsible for such tasks as belief fixation, problem-solving, and thought. 
Unlike the input systems, and because of the functions it must perform, 
cognition central will not be amenable to modular decomposition (see Fodor, 
1983; and e.g., Cam, 1988, 1989). Thus, on Fodor's view, the prospects for any 
detailed and worthwhile explanation of central cognitive processes, including 
consciousness, are slim. Although motivated by different initial concerns, Fodor 
shares the new mysterians' pessimism for the prospect of explaining 
consciousness (see chapter 1). 
Despite Fodor's arguments to the contrary, there are some good a priori 
and empirical reasons for the modularity of central or higher cognition, albeit 
not in his strict sense of modularity (see e.g., Cam, 1988, 1989; Dennett, 1978b; 
Gazzaniga, 1988; Jackendoff, 1987). Although the evidence tends to favour a 
modular view of higher cognition, it remains equivocal. Nevertheless, I side 
with the modular view of higher cognition, not only because more evidence has 
been accumulated in support of it, but also because it is more optimistic in its 
outlook. If our goal is to uncover the mysteries of consciousness and other 
'higher' cognitive phenomena - if we do not want to join the new mysterian 
camp, or their brethren- then an extended modular view of mind may be our 
best starting point. 
More palatable views of higher cognition are illustrated by Cam's (1988, 
1989) faculty theory, Jackendoff's (1987) "Intermediate Level Theory", and 
Baars' (1988) "global workspace" theory. Although these theories all have their 
inadequacies (a detailed discussion of which is beyond the scope of this thesis), 
I outline their central claims so as to provide an illustration of the directions 
computational-functional theory is now taking: in particular, that these theories 
do not promote one specific processor or collection of processors as the central 
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executive of consciousness. 
A faculty in Cam's terms "is a storage and production facility which can 
be characterized by its representational modality or format, the kinds of 
operations it typically carries out over representations in that format, and its 
processing connections to transducer systems, effector systems, and other 
faculties, in the production of behaviour." (Cam, 1989, p.167). The modules that 
constitute Cam's faculties are largely similar to Fodor's modules: they are 
informationally encapsulated and domain specific. The major difference with 
Cam's model is that it does not propose a strict boundary separating input 
analysis from cognition central; perception and cognition are not clearly 
segregated. (Jackendoff, 1987, takes a similar position - see pp.271-272.) 
Modules are more integral to the system as a whole. They are organized into 
clusters, or faculties, according to the perceptual or cognitive modality in which 
they play a part, and, therefore, according to their common representational 
formats, operating capacities, and roles in behaviour. These clusters are formed 
by selective linkages between the modules; that is, natural selection has had a 
hand in determining what modules are recruited for what jobs. Different 
faculties are responsible for different domains of experience. Moreover, 
"phenomenology ... can be identified with the results of operations carried out 
in each of these systems [faculties], and ... it is at least largely via these results 
that the systems achieve their cooperative efforts, so that these conscious states 
provide the connecting elements in the conjoint production under analysis." 
(Cam, 1989, p.175). 
In other words, the selective linkages between faculties are formed by the 
conveying of information structures; i.e., the results or outputs of various 
faculties form the inputs of other faculties. It is this system of communication 
that gives rise to consciousness (although Cam has not yet fully explained 
exactly how it might do so). 
4.3 Jackendoff s "Intermediate Level Theory." 
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Jackendoff (1987), like Cam, proposes that the modality specificity of 
phenomenology is preserved ("experience is on the whole sharply 
differentiated by modality", p.277), but his theory is somewhat more detailed 
than Cam's. Jackendoff propoSE;!S that there are multiple levels of representation 
within each modality, with some levels of representation being common to two 
or more modalities (i.e., there are 'points of intersection' along the chains of 
levels of representation). Interaction amongst the faculties is obtained by way of 
the structure of the information at the common levels of representation. Here 
Jackendoff is referring to the observation that it is the information structures 
that are present to awareness, not the processes that produce those structures -
we cannot be aware of any actual computational activity, but only of the results 
of that activity. He calls this "Lashley' s Observation": that "No activity of mind 
is ever conscious " (p.45). 
Jackendoff's (1987) theory of the computational architecture of mind 
comprises: (1) two primary sorts of processors or modules: translation 
processors and integrative processors; (2) attentional processing that is highly 
intensive, and engages a "selection function" and a mechanism that directs 
attention; and (3) multiple levels of representation, of which an intermediate, 
rather than central, level of representational structure is responsible for 
supporting awareness. 
Translation processors automatically translate information from one level 
of representation into information at another level. Moreover, this translation 
"processing is bidirectional: in perception top-down evidence refines and fills in 
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lower-level representations; in production bottom-up evidence guides choices 
in subsequent realization of the intended product ([e.g.,] speech or imagery)" 
(p.258). Integrative processors are required if this bidirectionality of translation 
is to take place, for the representations at each level within a faculty must be 
maintained in registration with each other. This registration requires a single, 
coherent structure to be produced, at each level of representation, from the 
information received from the translation processors at those levels. 
Each faculty contains a selection function - an intrinsic function of the 
short-term memory for each faculty that restricts the number of structures to be 
considered for the privileged level of representation: awareness. The limited set 
of representations present in awareness at any one moment comprises those 
chosen by the selection function as being the most coherent. 
This notion of a selection function differs considerably from the more 
traditional notions of selective attention (focal-attentive processing) and 
executive control functions of short-term memory. It is also a preferable view of 
the relationship between attention and awareness, given the problems with 
these traditional views (sections 2.1 and 2.2). Most obviously, the selection of 
the single most coherent or salient structure at any one moment is accomplished 
within or between the processing mechanisms themselves, rather than by an 
additional executive processor. So, for example, "perception does not send a 
multitude of half-baked analyses [of ambiguous stimuli] on to a higher capacity 
for adjudication" (Jackendoff, 1987, p.279). Rather, "[i]t is the selection function 
... that is responsible for the fact that only one interpretation of an ambiguous 
field presents itself to consciousness at a time." (Jackendoff, 1987, p.259). 
Furthermore, the other component of attentional processing, the direction 
of attention, is, in Jackendoff's theory, a computational process performed 
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within the systems of modules themselves, rather than by some higher control 
mechanism. Although Jackendoff has little to say about the details of the 
direction of attention, he sees its function as that of choosing which portions of 
the set of representations selected by the selection function are to undergo 
further intensive processing. 
The attentional processes of Jackendoff's theory- the selection and 
direction functions - are particularly detailed and concentrated forms of 
processing: attentional processing will produce "more highly articulated 
representations, which in turn project into richer awareness" (Jackendoff, 1987, 
p.283). Hence the limited capacity of attention is not the result of a limited 
capacity central processing mechanism, but rather is the result of the 
computationally and physically expensive nature of this attentional processing. 
Jackendoff's (1987) theory culminates in the claim that "[t]he distinctions 
of form present in each modality of awareness are caused by/ supported by/ 
projected from a structure of intermediate level for that modality ... " (p.298, 
emphasis added). He claims that most cognitive theories assume that the levels 
of representational structure available to the central level system (STM/ 
operating system/ etc.) do not directly support, or are not responsible for, 
consciousness. Rather, these theories, either tacitly or explicitly, propose some 
further level of representational structure - usually conceptual structure -
that directly supports awareness. The levels of structure received by the central 
level system are presumably translated into this qualitatively different form of 
representation. For example, in Dennett's (1978b) model, the contents of the 
buffer memory M, i.e., the structures that are proposed to support awareness, 
appear to be of a conceptual structure (Jackendoff, 1987, p.287). This translation 
of faculty-produced representational structures appears to be what Cam (1989) 
is trying to avoid when he claims that wholesale translation of the results 
output from the faculties is not required. 
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Jackendoff also proposes that such translation is not required: there are 
already some representational structures capable of supporting awareness -
those at an intermediate level, somewhere between 'higher level' conceptual 
structure and 'lower level' peripheral (e.g., lower level perceptual) structure. 
For example, he argues that the levels of representational structure most closely 
corresponding to linguistic, musical, and visual awareness, are, respectively, 
phonological structure, the musical surface, and the 2112 D sketch (see Marr, 
1982). Just as we are not aware of the mechanics of computational processing, 
we cannot be aware of the syntactic structure of language (or of the basic low-
level structures of music, vision, etc.). Although we can be aware of its 
conceptual structure, conceptual structure alone cannot support linguistic 
awareness, for "[t]his would leave no way of accounting for the fact that 
linguistic awareness is so sharply distinguished from visual awareness, since 
conceptual structure is common to the two faculties." (Jackendoff, 1987, p.290). 
Thus we see how Jackendoff accounts for the modality specificity of 
awareness. Compare this with the likes of Cam's proposal: we can see that they 
have both hit on a similar idea - the modality specificity of awareness (that 
you are having something described to you, rather than actually seeing it, for 
example) is maintained by the outputs of the relevant faculties of that modality, 
and not by some further representational structures. These higher levels of 
representational structure may have a variety of important roles to play (e.g., in 
long-term memory), but they do not directly support awareness. Although 
conceptual structure may often be present in awareness (we can be aware of the 
meaning of an utterance, for example), Jackendoff argues that it is neither 
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necessary nor sufficient for awareness. Conceptual structure is not necessary for 
awareness, as illustrated by our ability to be aware of nonsense syllables as 
having phonological form, but not meaning; and it is not sufficient, as 
illustrated by the tip-of-the-tongue situation, where we are aware of having 
some conceptual structure about a person, place, event, etc., yet we are not 
directly aware of just what this conceptual structure is (we know what we want 
to say, yet we are missing the phonological structure - we cannot articulate the 
correct names and concepts). Although, as Billman and Peterson (1989) remark, 
this claim about the phenomenology of the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon is 
contrary to one's intuition: their impression is that one can be aware of the 
conceptual structure in these cases. 
I have spent a good deal of space establishing how theories proposing 
societies of specialist processors might account for the modality specific nature 
of consciousness, but what about the apparent unified nature of much 
experience (as when, for example, I experience this keyboard as the same object 
when I am both touching and looking at it)? Jackendoff's suggestion is that the 
unity of awareness is brought about by the central or conceptual structures -
when, for example, the haptic and visual structures are "in registration with the 
same 3D model and conceptual structure, then the two modalities will be 
understood and experienced as simultaneous manifestations of the same 
object." (Jackendoff, 1987, pp.300-301). 
Jackendoff's theory of the computational mind, and how it could be linked 
to the phenomenal mind, is very detailed and informative. Whether it is on the 
right track in terms of its major emphases and claims is of course a matter for 
empirical investigation. However, as Billman and Peterson (1989) argue, it is 
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likely that Jackendoff has sold himself short by arguing for a solely structural 
analysis of cognition - structural analysis should proceed hand-in-hand with a 
process analysis. Nevertheless, for the purposes of the present thesis, 
Jackendoff's model is a clear example of the new developments in theorizing 
about the cognitive underpinnings of consciousness. 
4.4 The gathering consensus: working memory as a global workspace. 
Both Jackendoff's and Cam's cognitive theories of consciousness may best 
be viewed in the light of a new metaphor for the mechanism responsible for 
awareness: the "global workspace" (Baars, 1988). The global workspace is a 
working memory, or information exchange, "analogous to a blackboard in a 
classroom, or to a television broadcasting station" (p.74). It provides the means 
for communication between the modules or faculties. 
According to Baars' (1988) model, the cognitive system consists of three 
primary components: the global workspace, systems of specialized 
nonconscious processors, and "contexts" (stable, unified groups of specialized 
processors that have developed a privileged access to the global workspace). 
The specialized processors are able to broadcast messages to the global 
workspace, making the information available to the system as a whole. 
This feature of Baars' model appears to contradict Cam's claim that 
communication between the faculties is limited. However, if Cam is right in 
claiming this, then the proposal that the global workspace makes information 
available to the system as a whole may still be correct- the information may 
be available to many faculties, but only a few of them may actually make use of 
it. 
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In making the information available to the system as a whole, many 
specialized processors previously unconnected to each other are able to 
cooperate to carry out a task that could not be completed otherwise. This 
broadcasting system is especially useful in ambiguous situations and 
circumstances involving novel or degraded input - circumstances where no 
one 'pre-wired' system of processors capable of bringing about a solution exists. 
The workspace is global in two senses: the messages that are output to the 
workspace are broadcast globally; and the workspace is distributed globally, 
i.e., there is no one central broadcasting station, monitoring system, or central 
executive. Yet the central tenet of homuncular functionalism lives on: the 
cognitive system is composed of nested systems of processors. "The global 
workspace is the publicity organ of the nervous system; its contents, which 
correspond roughly to conscious experience, are distributed widely throughout 
the system. This makes sense if we think of the brain as a vast collection of 
specialized automatic processors, so1:rle nested and organized within other 
processors." (Baars, 1988, p.xx). Thus the global workspace theory turns the 
traditional central executive and monitoring theories on their heads, without 
giving up the spirit and principles of analytical and computational 
functionalism. There is no central executive with control and monitoring 
functions. Instead, any control and monitoring functions are carried out by the 
nonconscious processors themselves. Information broadcast to the global 
workspace can be monitored, edited and changed by these processors. Contrary 
to most traditional cognitive theories, control of thought and action is achieved 
not by an omniscient executive, but by various nonconscious processors and 
their access relations to the global workspace. "While the global broadcasting 
system is not an executive mechanism, it can be used by goal systems in an 
attempt to control thought and action." (Baars, 1988, p.353). · 
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5. Conclusions and future directions. 
' 
Conventional cognitive models of consciousness have been contrasted 
with a 'new wave' of cognitive theories that do not acquiesce to the folk-
psychological intuition of an inner centre of the will or of the self. Instead of the 
mind as a highly organized hierarchy of acutely specialized processors, with a 
boss system managing the show, the picture that is now emerging is one more 
akin to a "Pandemonium-style architecture" (Dennett, 1991a)- "swift 
generations of 'wasteful' parallel processing, with hordes of anonymous 
demons" (p.238) contesting for roles in 'higher order' cognitive functioning 
(e.g., speech production). Although the activity characteristic of Pandemonium 
architectures is mostly "undesigned and opportunistic" (p.241), patterns of 
organization and control do emerge. (Indeed, this has to be the case, at least for 
the brain, otherwise our percepts, thoughts, and behaviours would likely be as 
chaotic as the activity that produces them!) Just what these patterns of 
organization and control are, and how they are achieved, are tough but 
empirically determinable questions. 
As Minsky (1985) has suggested, it may appear that cognitive functioning 
is organized and controlled by a central processor, and that there is a unity of 
consciousness and behaviour, but this may all be an illusion. In Minsky's 
theory, myriads of networks and subroutines, or "agents", compete and 
cooperate to achieve various cognitive tasks, with the dominant subroutine at 
any one time serving to unify behaviour. Other candidates for computational-
functional architectures that do not posit a central executive include 'production 
systems' (see e.g., Anderson, 1983; Newell, 1973; and the discussion in Dennett, 
1991a, chapter 9), and connectionist networks. Of course all such 
computational-functional systems must eventually be presumed to be 
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compatible with (implementable in) the extensively interconnected system of 
neurons that is the brain. We cannot, therefore, completely ignore the 
organizational and processing structure of the brain, and it will be instructive to 
look to see what neuroscientists have to say about how it is organized and how 
it might control the highly complex information processing it accomplishes. The 
brain does seem to contain some control structures - for example, it is widely 
recognized that the reticular formation and the thalamus play important roles in 
the control or mediation of the sleep-wake cycle and the arousal of the relevant 
perceptual and action systems in response to novel or emergency situations 
(Dennett, 1991a, p.274; see e.g., P. S. Churchland, 1988). Yet these brain 
structures show no hint of being an omnipotent homunculus: the control 
functions are fractured or widely distributed, and together they do not form a 
unitary boss system. 
Further support for this new perspective on the architecture of the mind-
brain has come from work in cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary biology 
(see e.g., Dennett, 1991a, chap. 7; Kinsbourne, 1988). For example, Dennett 
(1991a) considers that a certain amount of plasticity of brain organization must 
be allowed for - it is likely that the brain is able to reorganize "itself adaptively 
in response to the particular novelties encountered in the organism's 
environment" (p.184). Moreover, it is unlikely that the brain is entirely 
constructed of fixed or hard-wired, distinct modules. As Kinsbourne (1988) 
points out, there are no obvious "circumscribed (anatomically 'encapsulated') 
modules in cortex" (p.239); rather, if there are at least functionally 
circumscribed modules, then many of them are likely to have multiple 
functional roles - "multiple, superimposed functionality" (Dennett, 1991a). 
Hence it might be the case that various modules, at different neurological and 
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functional levels, are recruited sometimes as specialists and sometimes as 
generalists (Dennett, 1991a, chap. 7). Of course this will make the task of 
mapping the computational-functional architecture of the brain incredibly 
difficult and complex an undertaking- much more so than the comparatively 
simplistic conventional models of cognition would indicate. Certainly it would 
be extremely difficult to precisely characterize the 'contents' of conscious 
experience if they are taken to correspond to the information flow between 
certain collections of control subsystems, rather than the contents of a single 
processing mechanism (Shallice, 1988). Cognitive psychology needs all the help 
it can get - from neuroscience, computer science, and evolutionary biology, to 
name just a few. 
While this new wave of cognitive theory shows some promise, some have 
expressed their doubts: Donald (1991), for instance, is worried that theories like 
Minsky's (1985) offer no explanation of how there still appears, from the first-
person perspective, to be a central homunculus, a centre of consciousness, the 
will, and the self. "The homunculus is synonymous with the reflective, 
conscious mind, and somehow, somewhere in the protean parenchyma of mind, 
it must reside. It cannot be explained away as an epiphenomenon, 'reduced' to 
algorithms or neuronal nets, or simply denied existence." (Donald, 1991, p.365, 
original emphasis). Despite Donald's apprehensions, however, plausible 
explanations of the first-person homunculus are on the horizon. Dennett 
(1991a), for instance, suggests that what often appears to be the functioning of a 
central executive system (the CPU of the von Neumann architecture of 
computers) is really the result of a 'virtual machine' implemented on the 
parallel processing of the brain. "The seriality of this machine (its 'von 
Neumannesque' character) is not a 'hard-wired' design feature, but rather the 
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upshot of a succession of coalitions of [the brain's processing] specialists." 
(p.254). Thus the computer analogy is still proving useful in theories of 
cognition, but it is becoming apparent that many theorists have been looking at 
the wrong features of this analogy. 
I will explore this aspect of Dennett's theory in chapter 5, along with some 
other future directions for theories of consciousness. But first we must try to 
clear a path through the thickets of a sticky 'in principle' problem still 
confronting scientific explanations of consciousness. Central to this discussion 
will be the nature and status of the first-person perspective that Donald (1991) 
appeals to in the above quoted passage. 
CHAPTER 4. 
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS: QUALIA AND 
EPIPHENOMENA LI SM. 
1. Introduction: phenomenal consciousness and causality. 
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As was mentioned in chapter 1, one of the two major characteristics of 
conscious mental states are their phenomenal qualities. The point of discussing 
the phenomenal characteristics of consciousness here is to determine, as far as 
possible, whether such properties pose insurmountable problems for 
physicalist-functionalist science (S-F theory). 
The objections discussed below are aimed primarily at physicalist 
functionalism. What of objections aimed specifically at functionalist 
explanations of consciousness? The two classic cases are the 'inverted qualia' 
and 'absent qualia' objections, for they trade on the apparent weakness of that 
doctrine's central explanatory posits - relational properties - to explain 
consciousness, viz. the supposed intrinsic properties of conscious experience 
(Block's, 1991, consciousnessp 10). 
The typical absent qualia objection to functionalism runs like this: It 
follows from functionalism that although systems S1 and S2 behave in similar 
ways to, for example, harmful stimuli (they both writhe in agony when 
10 I use 'consciousnessp' as a generic term, to ref er to the gamut of (whatever it is 
we mean by) 'awareness' or 'phenomenal experience'. Therefore the notion of 'qualia' 
may best be construed as a possible interpretation of consciousnessp; the 
interpretation that says: to experience X ls to directly apprehend some intrinsic, 
ineffable quality (-les) of that experience of X, from one's own subjective point of 
view (see discussion of qualia, below). As such, I may be using 'consciousnessp' 
somewhat more loosely than does Block ( 1991 ). Other interpretations of 
consciousnessp may be possible - some w111 become evident in later sections. 
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subjected to torture, both say they are in pain, etc.), S2 may nevertheless not 
actually feel (experience) pain. All the relevant subsystems in S1 and S2 are 
functionally identical, and yet the qualia of pain is absent for S2 (i.e., 
consciousnessp is inessential). 
The typical inverted qualia objection to functionalism runs like this: 
Suppose that person Pis born with a neurological defect such that when a 
normal person sees a red fire engine, say, P sees a green fire engine; i.e., all P's 
colour sensations are inverted relative to everyone else's. Still, P's behaviour 
would be indistinguishable from a normal person's, for P would have grown up 
learning all the colour words and appropriate behaviours others had learnt; for 
example, P would say (and believe) that the fire engine was red, even though 
his colour qualia would be what everybody else would consider to be green. It 
follows from this that functionalism could not distinguish between P and any 
normal person (all P's cognitive-behavioural systems are functionally identical 
to somebody with a non-inverted spectrum), and therefore functionalism leaves 
something out- to wit, the phenomenal qualities of experience. (For more 
detailed discussions of these arguments, see e.g., Block, 1980a; Davis, 1982; 
Dennett, 1988, 1991a; Kitcher, 1979; Lycan, 1987; Shoemaker, 1975, 1982, 1991.) 
Whether these objections seriously impede physicalism as a whole is a 
matter of some debate, but this issue need not concern us here, for these 
arguments were aimed specifically at certain versions of computational 
functionalism, and I have already affirmed: (1) some good reasons to be 
sceptical about those versions of the doctrine, independently of the absent and 
inverted qualia objections, and (2) my subsequent allegiance to teleological 
structural-functional theory. (See chapter 2.) Additionally, in what follows, the 
primary method that these anti-physicalist, anti-functionalist arguments 
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employ - thought experiments - will be called into question. 
Functionalism implies causality: for an entity to be functional it must have 
some causal status - not just having some effect in the world, but having some 
effect on the operations of the system of which it is a functional part. Now it is 
certainly the case that the typical functionalist equivalents of consciousness -
be they the monitoring and control functions of a central executive, or of a 
variety of specialized processors - when suitably implemented, will have 
causal status. But what of phenomenal experience? At least four positions on 
the nature and causal status of consciousnessp can be discerned: 
(a) Phenomenal experience exists and it has a functional (causal) role in the 
cognitive-behavioural economy, and it can be captured (at least in principle) by 
physicalist-functionalist theory (e.g., Baars, 1988; Davis, 1982; Flanagan, 1990; 
Marcel, 1988; Shoemaker, 1975, 1982, 1991; Van Gulick, 1985, 1990, 1991). 
(b) Phenomenal experience exists in some systems (viz. sentient humans), 
in which it will have a functional (causal) role in the cognitive-behavioural 
economy. But phenomenal experience cannot be entirely captured by 
functionalist theory, because functionalism is concerned only with causal roles; 
that is, there is more to qualia than their causal roles, and therefore 
functionalism is inadequate. Consequently, functionalism allows the possibility 
of absent qualia, and it may not stand up to the inverted qualia objection (e.g., 
Block, 1980a); functionalism leaves something out. 
(c) Physicalist-functionalist theory can explain the existence of 
phenomenal experience; but from this third-person perspective phenomenal 
experience is an epiphenomenon, i.e., it has no causal role in the cognitive-
behavioural economy. However, from the first-person perspective phenomenal 
experience is not epiphenomena!, and therefore the first-person and third-
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person perspectives need to be given equal ontological footing (Velmans, 1991, 
1992). 
(d) Phenomenal experience exists but it cannot be explained or captured 
by physicalist-functionalist theory, and it is an epiphenomenon (the new 
mysterian's stance: e.g., Jackson, 1982, 1986; McGinn, 1991; Nagel, 1974/ 1979, 
1986). 
(e) There is no such thing as phenomenal experience over and above that 
captured in physicalist-functionalist theory. 
In what follows, I contend that only options (a) and (e) are tenable theories 
of mind. By the end of chapter 5 I hope it will have become clear that I favour 
option (e), when interpreted in a certain way, as the most promising path for 
our theories of mind to take. Option (e) is open to a number of possible 
interpretations, from the outright rejection of phenomenal experience (of 
whatever sort), to the substantial claim that physicalist-functionalist theory can 
explain what conscious experience consists in, while nevertheless denying that 
there is anything at all corresponding to the conventional notion of 
'phenomenal experience' (consciousnessp/ qualia/ 'what it is like to be X'). It is 
the latter rendering of option (e) that will be supported here. 
A problem for explanations of the causal role of phenomenal experience 
(whatever it is we mean by the term), i.e., for option (a), and, in some cases (e), 
is: just how does this causal power manifest itself? On the one hand there is the 
sub-personal scientific account: All facets of consciousness are presumed to be 
explicable entirely in terms of the cognitive roles of brain states and events (we 
have rejected dualism). Therefore the causal potency of all brain states and 
events, and the causal origins of outward behaviour, will be explicable in terms 
of other brain states and events: highly complex and varied systems of 
interconnected neurons, patterns of spreading activation between these neurons 
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and neuron systems, and the 'information processing' and 'information 
structures' - in general, the structural-functional analysis of the brain's 
architecture, as promoted in the preceding chapters. On the other hand, 
however, we have the 'view from the inside', bolstered by the shared view of 
folk at large (or is it the other way round?): it is we, the feeling, thinking, 
believing, acting, persons, that are the causal agents of our behaviour, and it is 
the content of our conscious thoughts, beliefs, desires, emotions, etc., that are 
the reasons for our actions, and for our further thoughts, beliefs, desires, 
emotions, and the like. The first-person and folk views are manifestly accounts 
of the structure or content of mental states, rather than process accounts (see 
e.g., Marcel, 1988). 
Which of the two accounts is correct? Can we say for sure? Can the folk-
psychological and first-person accounts be explained (analyzed) from the 
scientific viewpoint? Or will the folk-psychological and first-person accounts be 
explained away? These are profound and formidable questions; questions that 
any science of mind must do justice to. As we shall see (initially in the present 
chapter, and then in more detail in chapter 5), there are some theories afoot that 
proffer answers to most or all these questions. 
Of central import to the present chapter is the apparent gulf between the 
folk-psychological view of whole persons, and the structural-functional 
scientific view of humans as conglomerates of sub-personal machinery. One 
major difference is that the folk-psychological and first-personal perspectives 
assume a unique 'point of view', whereas the structural-functional perspective 
is characterized by a 'view from nowhere'. Will the scientific view always be 
incomplete because it appears to leave out the first-personal point of view, the 
'what it is like to be X'; i.e., the uniquely private, intrinsic characteristics of 
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conscious experience? Or is the first-person perspective (as it is characterized in 
subjective reports, and in general folk-psychological beliefs) partly or 
completely mistaken, and therefore waiting to be assigned to the scrap heap, to 
be replaced by a developed science? Or indeed can some compromise be 
obtained, some integrative or complimentary account of the first-personal and 
scientific views of consciousness? 
2. Physicalism and the phenomenal mind: of bats, neuroscientists, 
and ineffable .feels. 
2.1 Introduction. 
Even if the global workspace models of consciousness are more on the 
right track than the conventional models they replace (chapter 3), it appears, at 
least from the first-person point of view, that something has nevertheless been 
left out of these attempts to explain consciousness. As Dennett (1991a) 
comments, "these models ... are so concerned with the work being done in that 
workspace that there is no time for 'play' - no sign of the sort of delectation of 
phenomenology that seems such an important feature of human 
consciousness." (p.256). 
There have been some rather colourful and ingenious arguments put 
forward to suggest that physicalism is incomplete; that it cannot account for the 
subjective nature of experience. Nagel's (1974/1979) "What is it like to be a 
bat?" and Jackson's (1982, 1986) ''What Mary didn't know'' are prime examples 
of these arguments against physicalism, and both accept the notion that qualia 
exist as irreducible and essential properties of consciousness. Thus Nagel and 
Jackson are proponents of property dualism, which is essentially the position 
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that there are special properties of mental states that are inexplicable in terms of 
brain states. An implication from these arguments against physicalism is that if 
we are to have a scientific study of consciousness then we need not, indeed 
cannot, restrict ourselves to physical science. These arguments will be 
explicated below. 
Dennett (1988, 1991a), in agreement with the physicalist position, wants to 
overthrow the idea of the existence of qualia. However, Dennett (1982, 1991a) 
also suggests that it is possible to study human consciousness empirically, albeit 
in a limited sense, and only by studying the linguistic behaviour of persons. 
While not wanting to deny that conscious experience is real, and has certain 
properties, Dennett argues that these properties are nothing like the special 
properties commonly ascribed to qualia. The proper business of cognitive 
psychology is, Dennett (1982) suggests, the internal processes, and not qualia, or 
beliefs, desires, and the like. In what follows, I hope to show that something 
along the lines of Dennett' s position is the more tenable stance for the type of 
scientific account of mind encouraged in the preceding chapters. Indeed, not 
taking up this stance on qualia leads one into the dark hinterlands of science, 
populated by many mysterious vestiges of dualism. 
2.2 Does physicalism leave something out? 
(1). Nagel's (1974/ 1979) : 'What is it like to be a bat?" 
A key aspect of consciousness, according to Nagel (1979), is "that there is 
something it is like to be that organism" (p.166). Subjective experience is, by 
definition, unique to a particular organism. Different species of organisms, 
particularly those that differ considerably in their perceptual apparatus and 
abilities, will have different subjective experiences. Nagel's thought experiment 
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(originally put forward by Farrell, 1950) considers the human ability to imagine 
the subjective experience of a bat. He selected bats because being mammals, 
relatively high up the phylogenetic tree, they are likely to have some sort of 
experience; and because this bat experience is likely to be sufficiently different 
from our own (human) experience as to make the thought experiment 
particularly vivid. 
The primary mode of perception for a bat is by sonar - echo-location. 
They do not, as we humans do, have vision as their primary mode of perceiving 
the world in order to judge distance, shape, motion, size, etc. They do so by 
correlating the outgoing sound impulses with the subsequent echoes. Because 
of this radical difference between humans and bats, Nagel suggests that there is 
a fundamental difficulty for us to imagine what it is like to be a bat. We might 
be able to imagine what it is like for us to be a bat, and to have 'bat 
experiences', but we are nevertheless restricted by our own point of view, such 
that no feat of imagination will allow us "to know what it is like for a bat to be 
a bat." (1979, p.169). 
Thus Nagel's thought experiment supposedly demonstrates the 
uniqueness of the first-person point of view. The main thrust of Nagel's ensuing 
argument is that we cannot hope to explain subjective experience with 
objective, physical theories, because subjective experience is necessarily 
connected with a unique point of view. Objective explanations are, for Nagel, 
those that 'externalize' knowledge; i.e., those that strive for the abandonment of 
any particular, partial point of view. Ultimately, an objective theory is "The 
view from nowhere" (Nagel, 1986). Thus contrary to the claims of physicalism, 
it will be impossible for an objective neuroscience to account for qualia. Further, 
Nagel (1986) asserts that the "subjectivity of consciousness is an irreducible 
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feature of reality ... and it must occupy as fundamental a place in any credible 
world view as matter, energy, space, time and numbers." (pp.7-8). 
Nagel's argument is an attack on reductionist versions of physicalism. 
(Note that his conception of reductionism here is fairly broad-it includes, for 
example, all those attempts to explain consciousness in terms of nonconscious 
mechanisms, events, or properties.) Reductionism relies on an analysis of what 
is to be reduced, according to Nagel: every phenomenon held to be a feature of 
the concept th~t is to be analyzed (viz. the subjective nature of consciousness) 
must be accounted for in this analysis. If something is left out, then the 
reduction will be unsatisfactory or inadequate - it will not fully explain the 
concept in question. 
As Armstrong (1981) points out, qualia (the "secondary qualities" of 
sensory experience) appear to be unanalyzable. As we experience them, 
secondary qualities - the blueness of an object, for example, or its felt texture 
- strike one as elementary, indivisible properties. If qualia are elementary 
properties, then they cannot be analyzed (explained), for this would merely 
reintroduce the very thing one is trying to explain (the subjective nature of 
experience), resulting in a circular explanation. 
So what are we to make of Nagel's argument? Three significant flaws have 
been noted: that a failure of our imaginations cannot prove physicalism is 
inadequate; that Nagel misrepresents the nature of scientific explanation; and 
that the argument depends upon an equivocation on the meaning of 
'knowledge'. I now turn to a review of the first two faults, and will consider the 
third as it applies to the next thought experiment, Jackson's (1982, 1986) "What 
Mary didn't know". 
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As has been observed by Copeland (unpublished), for example, the "What 
is it like to be a bat?" thought experiment is misguided in its line of attack on 
physicalism. All that the thought experiment proves is that our imagination will 
not be able to give us the true essence of 'bat experience', and that subjective 
experience means experience from the 'subject's' point of view. It does not 
prove that bats qua bats are not purely bio-physical entities, and that therefore 
physicalism might be leaving something out. "We should be interested in what 
we can know about the bat's consciousness (if any), not whether we can turn 
our minds temporarily into bat minds .... There is at least a lot that we can know 
about what it is like to be a bat, and neither Nagel nor anyone else has given us 
good reason to believe there is anything interesting or theoretically important 
that is inaccessible to us." (Dennett, 1991a, p.442). 
What Nagel's thought experiment does have is a certain amount of 
intuitive appeal: that the third-person view of science cannot capture just what 
it is like to be a bat, a person, or other suitably advanced cognitive system, 
because what it is like to be a bat, a person, etc., is unique to any one particular 
individual of that species (although there will surely be similarities, due to e.g., 
similar perceptual apparatus). To put it another way, 'one has to be there' to 
know what it is like; no mere statement of what it is like will suffice. 
If physicalism is to survive this challenge, we must attempt to undermine 
this intuitive appeal with some sound, empirically supported, theoretical 
alternatives. Some such attempts have been embarked on, and these will be 
introduced in section 2.4. In the meantime, there is a further problem with 
Nagel's argument that deserves attention. This will then be followed by a 
consideration of a possible way of avoiding Nagel's conclusion. 
Rosenthal (1986) claims that Nagel misrepresents the nature of scientific 
explanation. Nagel (1974/1979) holds that reductionism requires an analysis of 
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everything that is to be reduced. If something is left out of the analysis, then the 
reduction cannot go ahead- the concept in question cannot be fully explained. 
As stated above, all attempts to explain consciousness in terms of nonconscious 
states (including the structural-functionalist accounts discussed in the present 
thesis) qualify as reductionist analyses, in Nagel's view. Nagel's argument fails 
to impugn these attempts at explaining consciousness, however, for that is not 
how scientific explanation proceeds. "Explanation, in science and everyday 
context alike, must generally proceed without benefit of complete conceptual 
analysis." (Rosenthal, 1986, p.352). 
As discussed in chapter 1, some form of analysis is often the primary 
mode of scientific explanation, especially psychological explanation. Relatively 
comprehensive conceptual analysis may eventually be achieved by the process 
of scientific explanation, via a variety of other forms of analysis (e.g., property 
analysis, compositional analysis; see Cummins, 1983), but thorough conceptual 
analysis does not precede scientific explanation. Conceptual analysis may need 
to be carried out to some relatively minor extent prior to scientific explanation: 
namely, analyzing the general concept one is investigating - consciousness, for 
example - so as to delimit the phenomena to be explained, and to avoid 
ascribing predicates applicable only to whole persons to parts of persons 
(brains, functional modules, etc.). (See e.g., Kenny, 1984, p.134). But this limited 
scope of prior conceptual analysis does not require us, as Nagel claims, to 
precisely circumscribe the meaning of 'what it is like to be X' without 
undermining our intuitive thoughts about such matters (that phenomenal 
experience, 'what it is like to be X', cannot be fully explained in the languages of 
the physical sciences). Nagel claims that "[w]ithout some idea ... of what the 
subjective character of experience is, we cannot know what is required of 
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physicalist theory." (1979, p.167). I agree, up to a point: pace Nagel, physicalist 
theory is not restricted to accounting for only those concepts that have been 
exhaustively analyzed. As Dennett (1991a) says, "It is premature to argue about 
what can and can't be accounted for by a theory until we see what the theory 
actually says." (p.71). 
The intuitive impossibility of explaining the subjective nature of 
experience in the terms of physicalist science should not blind us to the prospect 
of it actually being possible. As was pointed out in chapter 1, we are permitted 
to draw explanatory links (inferences) between conscious experience (viz. 
sensory awareness) and brain properties, when we can establish they are 
reliably linked, because in such cases we have a prior commitment to the 
existence of conscious experience (the subject has reported it). That is not to say 
that we should attempt to reduce (identify) the introspectively reported 
contents of consciousness to properties of the brain. But, pace Paul M. 
Churchland (1985), this is not exactly what Nagel is advocating (McCulloch, 
1988, p.7). Nevertheless, this characterization of Nagel's position is not entirely 
off-track: Nagel claims that all attempts at reductively explaining consciousness 
(i.e., those that attempt to explain it entirely in terms of nonconscious entities) 
cannot succeed; "there is no reason to suppose that a reduction which seems 
plausible when no attempt is made to account for consciousness can be 
extended to include consciousness." (Nagel, 1979, p.167). But attempts are 
made by some physicalist theories to account for consciousness, and this does 
not, contra Nagel, require a prior analysis of the subjective nature of experience, 
of 'what it is like to be X'. 
In reply to Nagel's pessimistic conclusion about the success of 
physicalism, this is what a physicalist might say: But what if this apparent 
113 
simplicity or unanalyzability of phenomenology is epistemological, not 
ontological? (Armstrong, 1981). What if, in other words, the apparently 
unanalyzable, elementary nature of secondary qualities is merely apparent, 
merely a matter of our awareness of them, and not of the way they are? But 
what exactly does Armstrong mean when he says this? Presumably he means 
that the way things are in the world is not always evident as such to perceiving 
individuals; and, as Armstrong is a materialist, I assume that he would say that 
it is the task of science to reveal just what the true natures of things in the world 
are. If science is any good at its job, then it should eventually uncover the 
ontological nature of secondary qualities of experience. (Armstrong is not a new 
mysterian, by the way, as is Nagel.) But this is precisely the sort of explanation 
Nagel takes exception to: no third-person account will be able to explain exactly 
how things appear to us, exactly what it is like to be a sensing, perceiving, 
feeling organism. 
As we have seen, Nagel does not present a very secure case against 
physicalism (his argument is faulty, and he misconstrues the nature of scientific 
explanation). As a number of Nagel's critics have tried to show, no amount of a 
priori argument of the likes of his thought experiment will establish that 
physicalism cannot explain the first-person nature of experience. We will just 
have to wait and see whether physicalism comes up with the goods. Still, the 
new mysterians have not given up the fight (see e.g, Jackson, 1982, 1986; 
McGinn, 1991). 
To recapitulate: In one corner are the friends of qualia (of whom the most 
conspicuous are Nagel and the other new mysterians), while in the other corner 
sit the optimists - those attached to some version of physicalism. Nagel claims 
that the subjective 'feels' of experience- the way things appear to us - are 
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elementary, irreducible features of the ontology of experience. Any account that 
leaves out the first-person perspective (viz. physicalist science) will not fully 
explain consciousness. That is, there are facts about experience that no objective 
theory can describe. The optimistic physicalists are holding out for some future 
time when the brain and cognitive sciences will be near enough complete, at 
which point all facets of consciousness will be explicable. Or will they? Let us 
look at Jackson's (1982, 1986) thought experiment, which illustrates an 
argument with a conclusion similar to Nagel's. 
(2). Jackson's (1982, 1986) "What Mary didn't know". 
Jackson argues that the thesis of physicalism is incomplete because it 
cannot account for certain features of the subjective experience of sensations; 
there are facts about experience that physicalism cannot describe. He presents 
this argument in the form of a thought experiment concerning a fictional 
character of the future named Mary. Since birth, Mary has been confined to a 
totally black-and-white room. Her primary source of communication with the 
outside world is via a black-and-white television. Everything she has seen all 
her life has been devoid of colour. She receives an extraordinarily advanced 
education via the television, such that at the end of the course she knows all 
there is to know about the nature of the physical world. As Jackson (1986) says, 
"If physicalism is true, she knows all there is to know." (p.291). 
Then one day Mary leaves the room (or is given a colour television). She is 
now able to experience what it is like to perceive colour. Jackson views this new 
type of experience in Mary's life as the learning of something new; the gaining 
of some further knowledge of the world. Prior to the introduction of the colour 
television, Mary knew all there was to know about the physical world, including 
the neurophysiology of colour vision. Yet on perceiving colour Mary gains 
some extra knowledge. 
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Jackson concludes from this that physicalism is false, because it cannot 
account for this extra knowledge that Mary has gained. However, in the latter 
version of this argument (1986), he adds that the problem for physicalism is not 
the additional knowledge that Mary gains about her own experiences, but it is 
"the knowledge about the experiences of others." (p.292, original emphasis). 
Jackson's objection to physicalism is not that Mary learns something on 
perceiving colour for the first time, but that "she will realize how impoverished 
her conception of the mental life of others has been all along." (p.292). She 
knew all the physical facts of colour vision and other people's experiences, and 
so according to physicalism, that is all there is to know. If there was something 
to know prior to receiving the colour television then it is not a physical fact. But 
the claim of physicalism is that all things are physical. This is the contradiction 
that Jackson believes is an insurmountable problem for physicalism. 
The major criticism levelled at Jackson's argument (see e.g., P. M. 
Churchland, 1985, 1988; Levin, 1986) is that it depends on an equivocation 
between theoretical knowledge (knowledge of the facts) and experiential 
knowledge or ability (to know what it is like to see red). (As it turns out, 
Nagel's "What is it like to be a bat?" also depends on this equivocation.) The 
extra knowledge that Mary gains is simply knowledge in the sense of personal 
acquaintance. This is true for both the knowledge that Mary gains about her 
own new colour experiences and for the knowledge she gains about the 
experiences of others. Jackson argues that the knowledge that Mary gains by 
her acquaintance with coloured objects is not knowledge of the physical facts 
about those experiences (rather, it is an 'acquaintance' with the qualia of those 
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experiences); and because physicalism requires this knowledge to consist of 
physical facts, Mary couldn't have known all the physical facts about colour 
vision prior to her seeing colours for the first time: therein lies the trouble for 
physicalism. However, pace Jackson, physicalism does not require that 
knowledge consists entirely in the learning of a series of physical facts. We can 
maintain that 'knowledge by acquaintance' exists, and is an entirely physical 
state or event, while rejecting the stipulation that to acquire this sort of 
knowledge is to learn one or more facts about the physical world. The 
physicalist is not committed to the claim that having complete factual 
knowledge about the brain may allow one to have experiential knowledge (the 
experience of seeing red, for example), as Jackson alleges. "In sum, there are 
pretty clearly more ways of 'having knowledge' than just having mastered a set 
of sentences, and the materialist can freely admit that one has 'knowledge' of 
one's sensations in a way that is independent of the neuroscience one may have 
learned." (P. M. Churchland, 1988, p.34). 
Moreover, as Paul M. Churchland (1985) and Dennett (1991a) rightly 
comment, we cannot readily imagine, as Jackson's thought experiment asks us, 
just what it would mean to have all the physical facts about the brain. How can 
we be so sure that a 'complete' scientific understanding of the brain will not 
allow us to have experiential knowledge of the sort Jackson alludes to? We have 
little or no idea just what a 'completed' neuroscience or S-F theory would look 
like, let alone what we would and would not be able to come to 'know'. It is 
simply too early to tell. Jackson's thought experiment, like Nagel's "What is it 
like to be a bat?", relies on the failure of our imaginations to provoke the 
intuition that the subjective nature of consciousness cannot be explained by 
physicalist science - that what does not seem to be the case is not the case. 
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While the above rebuttal of Jackson's argument for the incompleteness of 
physicalism appears to be sound, it fails to show that knowledge by 
acquaintance does not involve some form of acquaintance with the appropriate 
qualia. Section 2.3 summarizes some attempts to quash qualia. 
We have seen that some of the major arguments of the new mysterians 
and other friends of qualia against physicalism are ill-founded. If we are to be 
good physicalists, then we must suppress any remaining worries raised by 
these objections based on appeals to 'phenomenal qualities' or 'qualia'. To do 
this, we must accomplish two tasks: 
(1) Eliminate qualia - that is, show that the qualities of experience do not 
have the putative special properties that constitute 'what it is like to be X'; that 
there really are no such things as qualia. (We don't need to deny that we have 
subjective experiences - consciousnessp - however; all we need to do is 
redefine their properties in entirely physical terms.) (Section 2.3.) 
(2a) Show how it is possible to correlate these redefined properties of 
experience with facts about the brain; or, what amounts to a stronger position, 
(2b), show how neurophysiological facts about the brain can account for these 
properties. (Section 2.4.) 
2.3 Qualia: phenomenal qualities or chimera? 
What follows is a summary of some of the main points raised by those 
who wish to refute scepticism about an adequate science of mind based on 
appeals to unassailable, mysterious phenomenal qualities. Points (i) to (iii) are 
made in Kitcher (1979), and points (iv) to (vii) are gleaned from Kitcher (1979), 
Dennett (1988)11, Levin (1986), and Wilkes (1988b): 
11 Dennett (especially 1988, 1991 a) and Kitcher ( 1979) provide two of the most 
sustained and detailed attacks on qualia. Other notable onslaughts include P. M. 
Church land ( 1985, 1988), and Wilkes ( 1981, 1984, 1988a, 1988b). Arguments 
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(i) Questions of the sort, 'What is it like to perceive X (e.g., see red)?' refer 
to perceptual states, not the perceived objects. (Although this distinction 
between qualities of experience and qualities of experienced objects is not of ten 
made; the confusion of the two interpretations leads to many of the problems 
with the notion of qualia; see Harman, 1989; Wilkes, 1988b.) 
(ii) Questions of the sort, 'What is it like to perceive X?' can be given two 
readings: what it is like to perceive Xis similar to what it is like to perceive A, B, 
C ... "in indefinite and unknown ways" (Kitcher, 1979, p.124); or, what it is like 
to perceive X is the result of a definite quality of the perception of X. But the 
former, relational or "comparative" interpretation of the question is no 
challenge to physicalist theories of mind; so those who question the capacity of 
science to account for phenomenal qualities must be referring to the latter, 
"positive" interpretation. 
(iii) Therefore, phenomenal qualities (qualia) are definite qualities of 
perceptual states. 
(iv) Defenders of phenomenal qualities regard these qualities as ineffable, 
intrinsic, private, and directly knowable; in short, mysterious. "The infallibilist 
line on qualia treats them as properties of one's experience one cannot in 
principle misdiscover, and this is a mysterious doctrine ... " (Dennett, 1988, 
p.55). 
(v) The standard objections to scientific accounts of what it is like to 
perceive X assume that when we are in the state of perceiving X we can be 
aware of that state and therefore directly note its distinctive, definite qualities 
("reflectionism"; Kitcher, 1979). However, there are problems with this notion 
for and against qualia are presented in e.g., Block ( 1980a, 1991 ); McCulloch ( 1988); 
and Shoemaker ( 1975, 1982, 1991 ), who all come out in support of some form of 
qualia or phenomenal experience. 
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of 'directness', where 'direct knowledge' is usually taken to mean that it is 'non-
inferential' and 'immediate'. Shoemaker (1975), for example, argues that all 
awareness or knowledge is the result of a (not necessarily conscious) 
description or inferential process. Moreover, "[b]oth the notion of 'immediacy' 
and that of 'without inference' become dubious when we allow ... for the 
existence of tacit knowledge and non-conscious, subdoxastic statesl121: not all 
that counts as inference need be conscious, so we may be unaware of many of 
the inferential steps in our thought processes." (Wilkes, 1988b, p.175). Other 
worries with this notion of 'directness' include Levin's (1986) complaint that 
'direct knowledge or acquaintance' ("direct recognitional capacity") is 
ambiguous: it can refer to either the possession of a concept, or to "having the 
wherewithal to apply it." (p.248); and the vagueness and incoherency of the 
notion as illustrated by Dennett's (1988) intuition pumps (see below). Thus we 
should at least be wary of appeals to the 'directness' of knowledge by 
acquaintance; further, it seems that the 'directness' referred to can be nothing 
like what the friends of qualia assume it to be. 
(vi) 'Directness' or 'immediacy' are not the only vague and ambiguous 
characteristics of qualia. There are a number of different interpretations of 
'privacy', all of which seem fairly innocuous (e.g., Wilkes, 1988b, p.175), and nor 
do they indicate the 'specialness' or unassailability of qualia. We are not in any 
important sense 'privileged' about, or 'incorrigible' with respect to, our sensory 
experience, as revealed by, for example, cases of subliminal perception and 
'blindsight' (Wilkes, 1988b, p.177). Moreover, it seems that the qualities of 
experience are only "practically ineffable" (Dennett, 1988, p.68); 'ineffability' 
does not signify the 'specialness' or unassailability of qualia either. 
12 Subdoxastic states are psychological states that causally contribute to belief states, 
but which are not themselves beliefs; see Stich, 1978. 
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(vii) If the characteristics of phenomenal qualities, whatever they are, are 
not as special and unassailable as the friends of qualia make out, then it is 
unlikely that they need remain mysterious. Thus we should prefer theories that 
purport to explain the way we detect perceptual states and their qualities over 
theories that merely state that we do and then refer to these qualities as 
mysterious. That is, we should prefer a relational or comparative interpretation 
over reflectionism (see point (ii) above); and therefore we should be distrustful 
of appeals to the 'intrinsicality' of phenomenal qualities (where 'intrinsic' is 
taken to mean 'non-relational'). ''Why not give up intrinsicality as a second-
order property altogether, at least pending resolution of the disarray of 
philosophical opinion about what intrinsicality might be? Until such time the 
insistence that qualia are the intrinsic properties of experience is an empty 
gesture at best; no one could claim that it provides a clear, coherent, understood 
prerequisite for theory." (Dennett, 1988, p.68). 
If reflectionism- the pro-qualia, pro-'what it is like to perceive X' 
standpoint - is an unsound and inaccurate examination of conscious 
perception, then why is it such an attractive position? Primarily because, 
according to Dennett (1991a), Kitcher (1979), and Wilkes (1981, 1988b), the 
thought experiments upon which the qualia lobby rely dupe us into accepting 
the intuitive gulf between the subjective qualities of perceptual states and the 
objective explanations of those states and their qualities. We should thus be 
sceptical of the success of such thought experiments: "I suggest that we become 
puzzled about phenomenal qualities by engaging in thought experiments." 
(Kitcher, 1979, p.127). "Our ability to tell when we are in perceptual states and 
when we are aware of sensations, and our capacity for imagining being in those 
states are always available to mislead our theorizing about sentience." (Kitcher, 
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1979, p.129, emphasis added). 
Nagel's "What is it like to be a bat?", and Jackson's "What Mary didn't 
know" thought experiments, for example, deceive the unsuspecting reader by 
pandering to their intuitive feel about the case in question without fully 
clarifying just what it is that physicalism supposedly leaves out. However, as 
Wilkes (1981) comments, ''The onus is surely upon the objector [to S-F theory's 
capacity to deal with phenomenal properties] to try to spell out more precisely 
just what he feels has been left out; until he does, the objection cannot be 
decisive." (p.165).13 
Dennett's (1988) attempt to show that there are no such properties as 
qualia relies on a series of thought experiments. Yet one could object that the 
criticisms Kitcher, Wilkes, and Dennett himself raise about thought experiments 
are equally applicable to Dennett's case against qualia. However, as Dennett 
(1991a) is quick to point out, his thought experiments (he calls them "intuition 
pumps") are not, for the most part, designed to convince the reader that 
something is in principle impossible, but rather to open one's eyes to the realms 
of the possible. Dennett seeks to expel the common conception that the so-called 
qualia of subjective experience are "ineffable, intrinsic, private, directly or 
immediately apprehensible" (p.47)14. By describing a series of thought 
experiments, he attempts to 'pump' the reader's intuitions about subjective 
experience towards the view that its properties or characteristics are really 
nothing like qualia; in effect, "there simply are no qualia at all." (Dennett, 1988, 
p.74). Their purpose is to rid the reader of many of her preconceived notions of 
the special nature of qualia. Unlike the thought experiments of the pro-qualia 
13 A more sustained and detailed examination of the efficacy and validity of thought 
experiments is given in Wilkes ( 1988b). 
14 Dennett ( 1988, pp.47-48) is quick to allay any suspicion that he might be setting 
up and knocking down a straw person here. 
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lobby, Dennett's thought experiments do not rely on the nuances and failures of 
our imaginations to persuade us that something is in principle impossible: that 
the apparent hidden, elusive nature of our minds will forever lie beyond the 
reaches of a physicalist science. 
The "Brainstorm machine", for example, is an extension of the inverted 
spectrum thought experiment. The Brainstorm machine is a hypothetical device 
that transfers person A's visual experience into person B's brain, such that if A 
has a colour spectrum that is inverted relative to person B's, B, with eyes closed, 
will experience the colours of the things which A is looking at as opposite to 
what B is accustomed to. (A might be looking at a fire engine, saying it is red, 
when this same experience appears green to B.) But what if, Dennett asks, the 
cable connecting A's and B's brains is inverted 180 degrees such that B now 
experiences A's visual sensations with the 'correct' colour qualia? We would be 
confronted with a dilemma: we would not be able to decide which is the 'right' 
orientation of the connecting cable. Whatever way you conceive the 
'experiment', in the end it would still require some relative normalization of the 
two people's reports of their subjective experience. But this simply takes the 
argument full circle back to the original starting point: the experimenters would 
not be able to tell whether A's qualia are inverted relative to B's. 
Thus the Brainstorm machine intuition pump is an attempt to show that 
the inverted qualia thought experiment, even if we allow for extremely 
advanced technology, is inadequate. Nobody can come to know just what 
qualia result from what perceptual encounters, including the person whose qualia 
are in question, as Dennett (1988, p.50) demonstrates by presenting the 
"alternative neurosurgery" intuition pump - his own version of 'the 
intrapersonal inverted spectrum'. Dennett asserts that these thought 
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experiments serve to demonstrate that if qualia exist, then they are certainly 
less directly accessible than many believe. Both intersubjective and 
intrasubjective comparisons would not be able to tell us whether our own 
qualia have been inverted. 
Still, intuition pumps, if they are used wisely, are only the preliminary 
steps in a long journey of scientific understanding. "If they help us conceive of 
new possibilities, which we can then confirm by more systematic methods, that 
is an achievement; if they lure us down the primrose path, that is a pity." 
(Dennett, 1991a, p.440). 
So what are we left with if there really are no such properties of experience 
as qualia? Dennett's (1988) intuition pumps lead him to propose that the 
properties of conscious experience are extrinsic, relational properties. (See also 
Marcel, 1988.) Relational properties are, or can become, matters for public 
scrutiny; they are amenable to third-person analysis. Contrary to what a 
number of people have seemed to assume, extrinsic (public), relational 
properties do not need to be grounded in some more fundamental 'intrinsic' 
(especially 'in-the-head') properties. Despite many attempts to ascertain 
otherwise, the notion of intrinsic properties (of whatever sort) remains 
mysterious and incoherent (see point (vii) above). 
2.4 Bridging the gulf between phenomenology and physicalism. 
The new mysterians' stance, as exemplified by Nagel's and Jackson's 
thought experiments, is not only pessimistic about the prospects of physicalism, 
but unduly so. Even if there are something like qualia as they are customarily 
conceived - even if 'what it is like to be X' is a unique property of conscious 
beings - it is certainly not 'obvious', pace Nagel and Jackson, that no third-
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person scientific account can explain all there is to know about them. Similarly, 
pace Velmans (1991; see section 3 below), we have no good reason to assert that 
no third-person scientific account can explain all there is to know about 
consciousnessp, whatever its nature. To be sure, deciding whether a physicalist 
theory can explain the properties of subjective experience is likely be a difficult 
task, especially if we are to convince the sceptics. But one striking hallmark of 
scientific theory is that it is able to show (and indeed, has shown) that what may 
appear to be impossible is instead possible. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that "if we are to give a fair hearing to a theory, in 
the face of such scepticism, we will need to have a neutral way of describing the 
data - a way that does not prejudge the issue." (Dennett, 1991a, p.71). 
Dennett's (1982, 1991a) suggestion for such a neutral method for bridging the 
gap between first-person phenomenology and third-person science is 
"heterophenomenology": an impartial transcription and interpretation of the 
subject's verbal reports about what they experience, and of any other 
behaviours designated as suitable substitutes for, or adjuncts to, verbal reports 
(e.g., button-pushing in an experiment). The interpretation in this method is 
analogous to a reader's interpretation of a work of fiction: the 
heterophenomenologist interprets a 'work of fiction', of sorts - a picture of the 
world as described by the subject. Once this interpretation is complete - once a 
set of "intentional objects" in the subject's "heterophenomenological world" has 
been extracted ("mental images, pains, perceptual experiences, and all the rest") 
- "theorists can then turn to the question of what might explain the existence 
of this heterophenomenology in all its details." (Dennett, 1991a, p.98). Any 
scientific theory of the mind must account for these experiential states, and a 
person's beliefs about these states, for "[t]he heterophenomenology exists -
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just as uncontroversially as novels and other fictions exist." (Dennett, 1991a, 
p.98). 
Flanagan (1990), in criticising the new mysterians' position, alludes to the 
same method: Because both facts about the brain and facts about consciousness 
(including those facts as seen from the subject's point of view) require 
explanation, we must eventually "infer that the constellation of a certain set of 
autophenomenological reports of restricted range ('tastes sweet') correlate with 
certain sorts of brain activity ... and we infer, because of an overall commitment 
to naturalism, that the latter explain the former." (p.338). 
What could these certain sorts of brain activity be? That is, how does the 
brain represent features of the world as picked up by our sense organs such that 
they 'correlate' or 'translate' to 'tastes sweet', 'looks purple', 'smells stale'? One 
plausible neuroscientific model, as summarized by Paul M. Churchland (1988, 
1990), suggests that the brain represents features of the world in an appropriate 
"state space", and performs computations on these representations. Each sense 
modality can be partitioned into the different levels of neural stimulation that 
go to make up the overall neural 'fingerprint' of a particular item as represented 
in that sense modality. So for example, there are four levels of neural 
stimulation for taste, corresponding to the four distinct types of receptor cells; 
and there are three levels of neural stimulation for colour, corresponding to the 
three kinds of receptor cells in the retina. These levels of stimulation can be 
expressed as the dimensions or axes of a state space (the dimensions for colour, 
for example, would form the three axes of a cube); and the individual values of 
each of these levels for any one distinct item (the red-orange light of the setting 
sun, for example) will be expressed as magnitudes along these axes, together 
forming a unique "sensory coding vector" for that item.15 (As such, state 
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spaces are excellent examples of abstract functional items; P. M. Churchland, 
1988, 1990 provides a plausible outline of how they might be neurally 
instantiated.) 
The patterns of neural stimulation that identify a unique coding vector in a 
given sense modality are essentially patterns of "spiking frequencies" across the 
relevant neural channels. Churchland (1990) believes that this neural vector 
model therefore lends support to a reductionist position on qualia, such that: 
"[t]he 'ineffable' pink of one's current visual sensation may be richly and 
precisely expressible as a '95Hz/80 Hz/ 80 Hz chord' in the relevant triune 
cortical system"; or that "[t]he 'unconveyable' taste sensation produced by the 
fabled Australian health tonic, Vegamite [sic], might be quite poignantly 
conveyed as a '85/80/90/15 chord' in one's four-channelled gustatory system" 
(p.361). However, as Flanagan (1990) makes clear, "[t]he thesis is not that for 
each different vector there is a distinct quale" (p.330); rather, the thesis holds 
that only if there is a difference in the magnitudes of neural vectors will there 
be a difference in "experiential sensitivity", not 'if and only if'. Thus 
"informational sensitivity'' is necessary, but may not be sufficient for, 
experiential sensitivity. 
While this account of the neural representation of the physically 
specifiable qualities of sensory and perceptual states seems plausible, I'm sure 
the friends of qualia will not be satisfied, for it does not seem to show how the 
patterns of spiking frequencies can give rise to the 'intrinsic phenomenological 
qualities' of an experiential state. As Dennett (1991a) says, talk of colours, 
sounds, smells, and the like, being 'coded' by the brain by way of vectors of 
15 Note that it may be possible to extend this neural vector model to face recognition 
and motor output, amongst other representational tasks; see P. M. Churchland ( 1988, 
1990). 
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magnitudes can lead one to suppose (mistakenly) that there must be some 
subsequent 'decoding' back into the appropriate colours, sounds, and smells. 
But this supposition cannot be right for who would the recoded colours, 
sounds, and smells be for, except for a 'ghost in the machine', undischarged 
homunculus? Although the neural vector account of sensory and perceptual 
qualities remains neutral about the so-called intrinsic qualities of experiential 
states, this may nevertheless be to its advantage, given the doubts raised about 
any such 'intrinsicality' (see above). Moreover, the neural vector account has the 
added advantage of preserving the structural relationships between the 
physical magnitudes of the sensory stimulations (Dennett, 1991a, p.350). 
Whether or not the sensory coding vector account is an accurate picture of 
how the brain represents the physical properties of stimuli relevant to the 
qualities of experiential states is yet to be confirmed beyond reasonable doubt. 
Nevertheless, it appears to be at least on the right track, and there is a growing 
body of neuroscientific research backing it up. Although, as Churchland and 
Sejnowski (1989), and Dennett (1991a) remind us, theories of how nervous 
systems represent the world need to be informed and validated by an 
evolutionary and developmental account of nervous systems, so a 'purely' 
neuroscientific account will not be able to give us the one true picture of how 
we are to 'quine' 16 qualia (or, in Paul M. Churchland's, 1985, 1988, 1990 view, 
how we are to 'reduce' qualia). 
Moreover, even if the theory of neural representation as described by 
Churchland is the most promising account of how sensory properties are 
represented in the brain, it is not yet a principled account of neural 
representation, even if it is more than likely a significant step along the road to 
such a principled account. For one thing, it is not clear why a '85/80/90/15 
16 See Dennett ( 1988, p.42). 
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chord' is the taste of Vegemite, rather than, say, coffee, or indeed why it is even 
a taste at all. 
Does the sensory coding vector theory show how the qualities of sensory 
and perceptual experience are realized in the brain? On one level - the third-
person perspective of science - it shows some promise, for it may be able to 
explain how the putative physical features of a stimulus (those relevant to our 
sensory and perceptual experiences of an item) can be represented in the brain. 
But on another level - the first-person perspective, when infected by notions of 
'intrinsic' properties - the sensory coding vector theory does not appear to 
show how the qualities of experience are identical to certain activities of the 
nervous system; the first-person perspective on the explanatory gap between 
neuroscience and introspection looms large. 
3. Epiphenomenal phenomenal experience? 
Some have argued (e.g., Velmans, 1991) that whatever exactly 
consciousnessp is, it looks increasingly likely, at least from the third-person 
perspective of science, that it plays no part in the causal scheme of the mind-
brain and behaviour. This section uses a critique of Velmans' argument for this 
conclusion to illustrate: (1) once again, the pitfalls of grounding one's theory in 
unsubstantiated intuitions; (2) the frequent misrepresentation of the notion of 
epiphenomenalism; and (3) the often implicit Cartesian materialist 
underpinnings of many theories of mind. 
Velmans' (1991) article is the latest detailed exposition of modern day 
epiphenomenalism as exemplified by conventional cognitivism. What is unique 
about Velmans' account is that he considers the first-person perspective - from 
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which epiphenomenalism is false - to have equal ontological footing as the 
third-person perspective- from which epiphenomenalism appears to be true. 
The apparent paradox that arises from this position is one "that any complete 
theory of the mind must offer to resolve." (Velmans, 1991, p.713). Velmans 
considers neither the third-person or first-person accounts as privileged. 
To demonstrate the epiphenomenalism of the third-person perspective, 
Velmans surveys many cognitive psychological studies on focal-attentive 
processing (e.g., divided attention studies, such as dichotic listening tests). 
Various experimental findings indicate that some sophisticated processing can 
occur without reportable consciousness 17 (e.g., the processing of the meaning 
of familiar stimuli), or without conscious control (e.g., perceptual analysis of 
well-known stimuli, adaptive responses to the environment), or without prior 
consciousness (e.g., the learning of novel stimulus patterns). What these results 
suggest is that consciousnessp is not necessary or required for any information 
processing; rather, awareness appears to follow (result from) sophisticated, 
preconscious analysis. 
In sum, Velmans (1991) distinguishes three senses in which information 
processing can be considered 'conscious': (a) when one is conscious of the 
process (e.g., the introspective aspects of planning and thinking); (b) when one 
is conscious of the results of the process, i.e., focal-attentive processing 
accompanied by consciousness (e.g., input analysis); and (c) when 
consciousness in some sense causally influences or enters into the process. 
Velmans' article is an attempt to show there is no human information 
processing that counts as type (c). 
17 Velmans is concerned with consciousnessp here: "In the analysis that follows, it is 
'consciousness' in the sense of 'awareness' that is of primary concern." (Velmans, 
1991, p.651). 
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If Velmans' thesis is correct, there are serious repercussions for 
information processing models that propose a functional role for 
consciousnessp· Take, for example, one such proposed general function: the 
information that 'enters' consciousness (becomes conscious) is that which is 
made available to the cognitive system as a whole (e.g., Baars', 1988, global 
workspace model; see chapter 3). On Velmans' view, however, this function 
cannot be a function of consciousnessp, for awareness results from focal-
attentive processing, and does not enter into it. If anything is going to function 
so as to make certain information available to other systems, it will be the focal-
attentive processes themselves, not consciousnessp. 
All cognitive or information-processing models appear to exclude 
phenomenal experience from their workings, even those that propose a 
functional role for it (for that functional role can be equally filled by some 
nonconsciousp process). These models are concerned solely with the 
transformations of input to behavioural output, and therefore consciousnessp 
seems inessential. Despite his attachment to this overall approach to studying 
the mind, Velmans sees a place for consciousnessp in our accounts of human 
cognition. On his view, consciousnessp can be seen from the third-person 
perspective to feature prominently alongside much information processing. For 
example, the contents of consciousness can often be regarded as 'output' 
accompanying certain information processing (as demonstrated in countless 
psychological experiments), and there seem to be significant functional 
differences between the processes that are accompanied by consciousness and 
the processes that are not. But from such a third-person perspective, awareness 
is dissociated from cerebral processing, and therefore appears 'epiphenomena!'. 
From the first-person perspective, however, consciousnessp is not 
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epiphenomena!. 
Velmans regards the first-person perspective as "how things appear from 
the subject's point of view" (1991, p.715, original emphasis). In other words, 
Velmans' reading of the first-person perspective closely resembles Nagel's 
'what it is like to be X'. Although it is unclear whether Velmans would come 
out in support of properties of experience like qualia, he nevertheless considers 
there to be a point of view of experience that no third-person perspective of 
science can capture. Like Nagel and Jackson, he argues "that information 
processing models that view humans only from a third-person perspective are 
incomplete." (Velmans, 1991, p.716, original emphasis); and like Nagel's and 
Jackson's conclusion, Velmans' verdict is susceptible to the criticism that it is 
simply too early to tell for sure whether third-person science is or is not able to 
fully explain the first-person perspective. Still, unlike Nagel and Jackson, 
Velmans is not, strictly speaking, a new mysterian-he does not come to the 
pessimistic conclusion that no complete account of consciousness can be arrived 
at. Velmans remains optimistic about the prospects for explanations of 
consciousness, but he maintains that this cannot be achieved from the third-
person perspectives alone. Furthermore, Velmans considers his article as 
showing "that first-person accounts can be translated into third-person 
accounts, but they cannot be reduced to them." (1991, p.717, original emphasis). 
What reasons does Velmans offer for claiming that third-person science is 
incomplete, and for promoting the "complementary" principle - a marriage of 
the first-person and third-person accounts? A primary reason underpinning his 
view appears to be the intuitive implausibility of consciousnessp being 
epiphenomena!. Relatedly, it seems that Velmans' insistence on the 
"complementary" principle is motivated by the apparent gap between scientific 
accounts of mind on the one hand, and first-personal and folk-psychological 
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accounts of mind on the other, leading to the intuition that the former will never 
be able to account for the latter. In line with what I have argued in previous 
sections, I will argue that unsupported intuitions do not provide a sound 
structure upon which to build one's theory of mind- one's intuitions can be 
wrong, or may lead us away from the real heart of the matter. 
Velmans concludes from his survey of the third-person information-
processing accounts that consciousnessp appears epiphenomena!. However, 
this conclusion is not decisive, and his argument for it is unsound. As Block 
(1991) points out, Velmans' argument is faulty: just because consciousnessp is 
not required for information processing does not logically entail that it does not 
actually enter into it. If one supposes that consciousness is dependent on the 
activity of a central executive system, then it could just as easily be argued that 
all the cases of information processing without consciousnessp that Velmans 
surveys are not central executive functions, but rather functions of specialized 
modules. (A point with which Velmans would seem to agree, according to 
Block, 1991, p.670). If this is the case, then Velmans is right in claiming that the 
processes he surveys do not require consciousnessp, for they appear to proceed 
without any input from the central executive. Given this, however, Velmans is 
therefore wrong to claim that consciousnessp does not have an effect on all 
information reaching the central executive. Maybe there are other cases of 
information processing whose execution does depend on certain information 
'entering awareness'. Indeed, Block argues that Velmans actually provides 
evidence against his conclusion that consciousnes5p is, or appears to be, 
epiphenomena!. 
There are further problems with Velmans' conclusion, however -
criticisms that are not tied to explanations of consciousness that presuppose a 
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central executive system. (For as was argued in the previous chapter, there are 
some good reasons to distrust such explanations.) 
Velmans is forced to say that from one perspective, consciousnessp 
appears to be an epiphenomenon, and from another, it appears not to be an 
epiphenomenon. He then claims that it is the task of any complete theory of 
mind to resolve this paradox. But a complete theory of mind, for Velmans, is 
one that includes both third-person and first-person accounts. So just how is the 
matter to be adjudicated? Surely there must be a fact of the matter: either 
consciousnessp (of whatever form) is epiphenomena! (in some sense of the 
term), or it is not. If consciousnessp has causal status from the first-person 
perspective, then this fact can be explained, at least in principle, from the third-
person perspective. Even if it turned out that this apparent causality, or at least 
its exact nature, is an illusion, that would not negate the importance or status of 
first-person accounts. As Velmans says, first-person accounts cannot be reduced 
to (explained away by) third-person accounts. However, pace Velmans, the 
third-person perspective does hold greater currency if its theories explain just 
why it is that the first-person perspective provides the sort of view that it does 
(viz. consciousnessp having causal efficacy). 
It appears that Velmans fails to distinguish between explanations of 
general psychological properties, capacities, states, or events, and explanations 
of specific (individual) psychological properties, capacities, states, or events. 
The former are concerned with questions like: how does the brain represents the 
world?; what are emotions?; and, of course, what is consciousness? The latter, 
on the other hand, are concerned with questions about individual thoughts, 
emotions, intentions, intuitions, actions, and the like. The proper business of 
psychology is answering questions of the general type, not the specific 
questions, applicable only to particular individuals at specific times and in 
specific circumstances (see e.g., Wilkes, 1978). 
134 
In light of this distinction, then, we can see that it is not possible to 
'translate' individual first-person accounts into third-person accounts, for as 
Velmans acknowledges, neither perspective can be subsumed under the other. 
But this is no challenge to third-person science, for science is not in the business 
of explaining the complete nature of mental phenomena as they appear to any 
one individual. If there is any 'translation' of first-person perspectives into 
third-person science, it will be of some general explanatory nature - for 
example, that epiphenomenalism appears not to be true from the first-person 
perspective because this is what usually occurs in the brain, and this is how 
the brain-world interaction operates, and this is how humans function as social 
beings, and so forth. Such a third-person account explains why things seem as 
they do, in a broad sense, but it does not explain away that first-person view, as 
Velmans seems to imply. 
Velmans wants the third-person and first-person accounts to be given 
equal consideration, saying that "[a] complete psychology requires both." (1991, 
p.667). Moreover, he says that "[w]hether first-person or third-person accounts 
are more useful, depends entirely on the explanatory context." (1991, p.715). I 
couldn't agree more: folk-psychological explanations and predictions of 
everyday actions (in terms of first-person perspectives, and third-person 
accounts of first-person perspectives) are extremely useful in everyday human 
interaction, and, pace Paul M. Churchland (e.g., 1985, 1990), there is little reason 
to suppose that they will one day be replaced by some scientific third-person 
account. Likewise, scientific-psychological explanations and predictions are 
very useful (nay, crucial) in scientific explanatory contexts. But if scientific 
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psychology is to hold any currency at all, it must be able to explain why folk 
explain and predict their own and others' dispositions and actions in the way 
that they do, and how they do so. 
These points are all in line with what has been argued in previous sections. 
Drawing explanatory links between the first-person perspective (viz. subjective 
reports of conscious experience) and brain properties is permissible, when we 
can establish they are reliably linked, because in such cases we have a prior 
commitment to the existence of conscious experience. Moreover, such 
inferences to the best explanation do not require us to reduce (identify) the 
introspective reports of the contents of consciousness to properties of the brain. 
Both consciousnessp and the neurophysiological and computational correlates 
of consciousness (consciousnessc) are on the table to be explained by science, 
and no a priori argument - especially one dependent upon intuition - will 
succeed in establishing that consciousnessp cannot be so explained. We will just 
have to wait and see what future scientific theories have to say, from which we 
will then have a better idea of how to judge ontological questions about 
consciousness. (And as will become evident in later sections of this and the 
following chapter, some theories are beginning to shed some light on this issue.) 
What then of the claim that consciousness is epiphenomena! from the 
third-person perspective of science? At one point Velmans says, "consciousness 
is a form of output (associated with focal-attentive processing) that does not 
enter into cerebral processing." (1991, p.667, original emphasis). In the very next 
sentence he claims that this conclusion "appears to support epiphenomenalism 
(the view that brain events have causal effects both on other brain events and 
conscious experiences, but conscious experiences have no causal effects on the 
brain ... )" (p.667). The two interpretations of his conclusion do not amount to 
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the same thing. The latter claim is much stronger: not only does consciousnessp 
not enter into (causally influence) info~mation processing, it has no causal effects 
on the brain whatsoever. Clearly this form of epiphenomenalism is too strong (to 
the point of being untenable) for a physicalist to accept, as Dennett (1991a) has 
ably demonstrated (see chapter 3, above). If consciousnessp exists, then it must 
have some effect in the physical world. There are two possibilities: either 
consciousnessp consists in some form of neural activity; or it is the by product 
of some neural activity. If the second possibility is the case, then consciousnessp 
would show itself as an epiphenomenon in some relatively innocuous (but hard 
to believe) way- maybe in terms of brain colour, or the heat generated by 
cerebral activity, as Dennett (1991a, p.405) humorously suggests. This may be a 
defendable (if not slightly outlandish) position, and it is certainly no challenge 
to physicalism. However, this can't be the sense of epiphenomenalism that 
Velmans has in mind, for he states that his conclusion is not "consistent with 
physicalism (the view that consciousness is ontologically identical to a physical 
state of the brain) - unless one is willing to accept that some cerebral states 
exist that neither have a function in themselves nor influence the development 
of subsequent, functional, cerebral states or processes." (Velmans, 1991, p.666). 
Velmans appears not to want to accept the possibility of functionally and 
causally inert neural activity, however (although he is not entirely clear on this 
point), and therefore he must concede that the first possibility- that 
consciousnessp could consist in some form of neural activity- is false. So 
where does this leave Velmans? He insists that consciousness exists as "a form 
of output accompanying certain forms of information processing" (Velmans, 
1991, p.666, original emphasis). But what exactly does he mean by 'output'? 
What form does it take, and how and why are these brain states, or their 
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physical properties, epiphenomenal? As has just been ascertained, neither 
possible interpretation of the physical form that this output could take is 
tenable from Velmans' position. Moreover, echoing the worries over Cartesian 
materialism discussed in the previous chapter, output to where? 
Even if consciousnessp could be regarded as 'output' of some sort, why 
would it exist if it does, or did not, have any causal role to play in the cognitive-
behavioural economy? If consciousnessp is neither necessary for cerebral 
processing, nor actually enters into it (as Velmans would have it), then couldn't 
we just as easily get along without it? That is, would there be no noticeable 
behavioural differences without consciousnessp? Velmans cannot claim that 
there would be a difference if we did not have consciousnessp, for then he 
would have to give up his conclusion that consciousnessp has no causal effect in 
the cognitive-behavioural economy. Therefore, Velmans is left in the unenviable 
position of having to proclaim that 'zombies' (nonconsciousp persons 
behaviourally indistinguishable from consciousp persons) are possible; and as 
Dennett (1991a) has cogently argued, either zombies are impossible, or we are 
all 'zombies'! 
In sum, if science proclaims consciousness (of whatever form) to be 
epiphenomenal, then so be it. But there better be some very good reasons for 
making such claims, for they are contrary to our first-personal intuitions. This is 
not to say that our first-personal intuitions will hold sway no matter what, 
however, for if scientific theories do proclaim consciousness to be 
epiphenomena!, then they must also eventually explain why it appears not to be 
epiphenomenal from the first-person perspective. 
138 
4. Conclusion. 
There are no such properties as qualia. Therefore 'in principle' or a priori 
objections centred on qualia do not stand in the way of S-F theory and other 
forms of physicalism in their attempts to explain (whatever it is we mean by) 
consciousness. Of course this does not rule out the possibility that 
consciousnessp exists in some form or other. Indeed because phenomenal 
consciousness certainly exists from the first-person perspective, as good 
scientists we are compelled to seek explanations of just what consciousnessp is, 
as well as explanations of consciousnessc· There appear to be no significant 
impediments to explaining the various facets of consciousnessc, but 
consciousnessp poses some more serious problems. Some inroads into our 
understanding of consciousnessp and its possible neural implementation have 
been made, but these theories are still in their infancy. Consequently the gap 
between the first-person and third-person perspectives on consciousness 
remains open. One vexing facet of this gap between the perspectives is the issue 
of the apparent epiphenomenalism of consciousnessp. Although this issue 
remains unresolved, no a priori argument grounded in intuitions can hope to 
settle the matter once and for all. Scientific theory holds our only real hope of 
resolving the debate. 
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CHAPTER 5. 
ORA WING THE THREADS TOGETHER: THE NEED FOR 
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH. 
1. Consciousness and natural kinds. 
'Consciousness' is a folk-psychological, 'second order' concept and an 
everyday mental term (chapter 1). The EMTs are a heuristic overlay upon the 
behaviour of an embodied being acting in various environmental and social 
contexts. We use mental terms to describe and explain the states and behaviours 
of ourselves and others (Dennett's, 1978a, 1987, "intentional stance"). But do 
some EMTs refer to (even roughly) specific types of physiological or structural-
functional states of the brain? If so, is 'consciousness' one of these terms? 
The general folk-psychological concept of consciousness is not a suitable 
term for adoption and adaption by science (chapter 1). But are there any 
features or properties inherent in the use of the term that are suitable candidates 
for scientific constructs? Science is making reasonable progress in constructing 
theories of consciousnessc - the information processing and 
neurophysiological mechanisms and processes responsible for the various 
phenomena of consciousness. But there are problems with the notion of 
consciousnessp - it just seems as if there is no place for such a concept in 
physicalist science. Is consciousnessp a suitable concept for adoption and 
adaption by science? Does consciousnessp approximate a natural kind, or is it a 
concept of the folk-psychological, first-personal world, with no place in a 
scientific taxonomy? 
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Qualia do not exist, and therefore appeals to such properties do not erect 
impassable barriers to science explaining (or explaining away) consciousnessp. 
No amount of a priori argument will establish that physicalism cannot explain 
the first-person nature of experience. Dennett (1978d) puts this point rather 
nicely when he says: 
"If an empirical psychological theory develops that is both 
strongly confirmed and predictive of the rich variety of phenomena 
of consciousness, we can inspect it for an answer to the question 
['Does functionalism/ physicalism leave something out?']. If it 
contains a theoretical role for something like qualia, we shall 
'countenance' qualia in our ontology, but as theoretical entities, not 
epiphenomena; if no such role appears to be filled, then the very 
power of the theory will undermine the intuitions that now make the 
denial of qualia so counterintuitive." (p.256). 
Questions of the existence and nature of consciousnessp are empirical 
issues, to be decided by our best physicalist theories. We will just have to wait 
and see whether science comes up with the goods. What then is the best way for 
science to proceed so as to achieve this goal of explaining consciousnessp? 
2. Levels of nature and levels of explanation. 
In chapter 2 I introduced the idea that nature is multi-levelled, and that 
our theories of complex natural-world phenomena, especially the mind-brain, 
must reflect this multi-levelled structure. Multiple levels of nature require 
multiple levels of description and explanation. Some theorists claim that full-
blooded theories of mind-brain and psychological phenomena must themselves 
be constructed in a multi-levelled fashion (e.g., Dennett, e.g., 1978a, 1987; Marr, 
1982; Sterelny, 1990). These theorists, using different terminologies, claim that 
there are three principle theoretical domains or levels in psychology. Sterelny 
(1990) calls these levels the ecological, the computational, and the level of 
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physical implementation. (I adopt Sterelny's terminology here, because I find it 
the most informative and least confusing, especially with respect to the 
ecological level. As Sterelny points out, the other theorists' characterizations of 
this 'uppermost' level are sometimes misleading.) 
The ecological level is the level at which cognitive capacities are broadly 
characterized in terms of what a system can do, while remaining neutral on 
mechanism. An ecological characterization of a cognitive capacity specifies a 
system's overall information processing competence, and therefore "provides a 
precise understanding of the information extraction problem the system 
solves." (Sterelny, 1990, p.45). A computational level theory details a method by 
which the system of interest might perform the informational function 
described at the ecological level. Theories of this type specify how a cognitive 
mechanism performs a task in precise computational-functional terms, 
ultimately in the form of algorithms. Computational processes must be 
physically realized; the task of theories at the level of physical implementation 
is to detail the relevant physical structures and processes of particular systems, 
showing how they perform the said computational processes. 
The individual structures and processes that constitute psychological 
phenomena are likely to be members of many natural kinds. The above division 
of explanatory levels appears to be an effective and reasonably well agreed 
upon demarcation of the domains in which the multiple natural kind categories 
of psychological phenomena are to be found. However, notice how Lycan's 
exposition of the multiple-level view (chapter 2) blurs the distinction between 
the computational level and the level of physical implementation; we can talk of 
both computational function and physical implementation at (virtually) all 
levels of analysis. Hence there is no sharp distinction between cognitive 
psychology and neuroscience; a view with which I concur. 
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Note also that applying the three levels of analysis to 'consciousness' is a 
"risky oversimplification", as Dennett (1991a, p.277) warns, for doing so may 
blind us to the possibility that some features of consciousness may have 
multiple functions, or may be rather poor at achieving these functions, or may 
have no functions at all. Indeed, given that 'consciousness' denotes a disparate 
and heterogenous assortment of cognitive, experiential, and behavioural 
phenomena, it would be a mistake to restrict the construction of one's theory of 
consciousness to the design specified by this hierarchy of theoretical domains. 
Not all psychological phenomena lend themselves to this three-tiered 
analysis. Even if all the individual cognitive functions and processes associated 
with consciousness can be formulated by way of the three levels, 
consciousnessp cannot be so analyzed; we are still left with the question of 
whether consciousnessp is a natural kind. Phenomenal experience - what it is 
like to perceive X, be a bat, etc. - is seen not as a capacity, function, or process, 
but as a property or set of properties, about which we have no idea how (or 
even whether) cognitive or brain processes give rise to them. 
If there is no sharp distinction between cognitive psychology and 
neuroscience, between function and implementing structure, then theories of 
mind-brain are structural-functional (S-F) theories (chapter 2). 5-F theory is 
paradigmatically multidisciplinary: Patricia S. Churchland (1986), for example, 
characterizes neuroscience as including clinical neurology, neuropsychology, 
and cognitive neurobiology, and she advocates "unified" theories of mind-
brain, the development of which will see the theories of "the assorted 
psychological sciences" (p.9) and ethology "co-evolve" with neurobiological 
theories. 
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Of particular importance to interdisciplinary approaches to explaining the 
mind-brain and mental phenomena is the issue of intertheoretic reduction. Will 
psychological theories be reduced to neuroscientific theories, therefore 
eventually eliminating the need for psychology? Or are one or more of the 
psychological sciences autonomous? While lack of space precludes a detailed 
examination of intertheoretic reduction, my adherence to the multiple level 
view, with its implications for theories explaining the phenomena of 
consciousness, leads me to the threshold of this thorny polemic. 
3. The craft of.folk psychology. 
If, as was put forward in chapter 1, folk psychology is understood 
primarily as a craft rather than as a primitive version of a systematic theory of 
behaviour and mental life, then the study of the craft is not a candidate for 
intertheoretic reduction. (Although if one wishes to take up the 'theory' theory 
of folk psychology, in addition to the craft theory, then it is possible that this 
'theory' theory is a candidate for reduction or replacement, as the Churchlands 
argue.) Even if an advanced neuroscience replaces or eliminates all folk-
psychological concepts, there will be a place for a theory of the craft of folk 
psychology. A theory of the craft of folk psychology, in contrast to the 'theory' 
theory, is in the business of explaining how and why people use this system 
(any system) of explanatory and ascriptive concepts, and how and why their 
use evolved; it is not in the business of unearthing the real or tangible referents 
(states, events, processes) of these terms. Folk psychology, understood as a 
craft, is not a crude attempt at explaining the structures and processes of the 
mind-brain, but an attempt at explaining the social actions and interactions of 
people. 
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Notice that the craft theory of folk psychology fits rather nicely with 
Dennett's (e.g., 1978a, 1987) instrumentalist stance on intentionality. The craft 
view of folk psychology is a perfect bedfellow for the view that our common 
sense practice of explaining behaviour is merely a fortuitous non-factual 
overlay or level of description, i.e., the view that "all there is to being a true 
believer is being a system whose behavior is reliably predictable via the 
intentional strategy" (Dennett, 1987, p.29). However, in accepting the legitimacy 
and relative autonomy of the study of the craft of folk psychology, one is not 
required to take up such a strong instrumentalist stance. Lyons (1990), for 
instance, argues that the intentional stance is "a factual overlay about our 
internal psychological economy yet not an overlay of facts about our 
neurophysiology." (p.263). He suggests that it is unlikely folk psychology as we 
know it would have evolved if it were just a pragmatic, non-factual overlay 
upon the behaviour of an embodied being acting in the world. Folk psychology 
proposes a host of intervening variables between perceptual input and 
behavioural output, and therefore presupposes that humans are information 
processing systems. Lyons argues that folk psychology is right in considering 
humans as information-processing devices, even if it is wrong about how we 
operate as such devices. The intervening variables posited by folk psychology 
are supposed to be in-the-head states, but they are so only derivatively; the 
mental states of folk psychology are in the first instance linked to publically 
observable facts about the environment and behaviour. On this view, folk-
psychological talk is likely to pick out real, if inexact and incomplete, patterns in 
our behaviour, and derivatively, in our brain states. Thus the concepts supplied 
by folk psychology are not natural kinds, although they may point to them 
(sometimes very roughly), and are more likely to be replaced or eliminated than 
145 
reduced by an advanced neuroscience. Nevertheless, folk psychology may tell 
an approximate story- a story that needs to be examined for what it is: a craft 
or practice 18, predicated on the assumption that the content of mental states is 
supplied by the physical and social environment. 
Thus both the strong instrumentalist line and the position as advocated by 
Lyons (1990) are consistent with the claim that the study of folk psychology is a 
legitimate enterprise even when a mature neuroscience arrives on the scene. 
Viewing folk psychology as a craft reveals two important implications for our 
theories of consciousness: (1) S-F theory and the rest of natural science may not 
be able to offer comprehensive explanations of all that is implied by folk 
psychology's 'consciousness'. Comprehensive theories of the phenomena of 
consciousness will require a rapprochement of the natural and social sciences. 
(Section 4 below.) (2) Studying the craft of folk psychology is likely to contribute 
significantly to our theories of the phenomena of consciousness, for 
'consciousness' is a folk-psychological concept, bound up with the theory of 
mind implicit in the craft. (Section 5 below.) 
4. The missing component: social constructs. 
4.1 What is missing? 
Presumably there are brain mechanisms and processes responsible for our 
ability to perform the craft of folk psychology. So the cognitive and neuro-
sciences will have a large role to play in the study of this skill. I agree with the 
Churchlands (e.g., Churchland and Churchland, 1983; P. S. Churchland, 1986; P. 
M. Churchland, 1988) that neuroscience has a crucial role to play in 
18 Note that this claim is an extension of Lyons' ( 1990) position; I do not know if he 
would endorse it. 
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psychological explanation, especially in explaining how the brain can represent 
the world. However, I contend that folk psychology, understood as a craft, 
cannot be subsumed under some future neuroscientific theory, because a crucial 
element would be left out. This is not to concede defeat to the new mysterians, 
however, for what I see to be missing from many a physicalist's picture is not 
some unexplainable intrinsic feature of experience, but an examination of the 
fundamentally social nature of the 'human condition', and hence of social 
structures and other social constructs. 
Neuroscience is concerned with the sub-personal aspects of human 
functioning, and can be considered to incorporate the computational level in 
addition to the level of physical implementation (see section 2 of the present 
chapter). Social structures and the social milieu, on the other hand, are 
paradigmatically at the personal and collective levels of description. Is it not 
possible that both the subpersonal and the personal views, the natural and the 
social sciences, are required for full accounts of mind and behaviour? 
Certainly I do not believe that the personal level can be reduced to the 
sub-personal level, although some developed personal-level theory may be 
explained by some developed subpersonal-level theory (this is how, for 
example, Patricia S. Churchland, 1986, interprets 'intertheoretic reduction'). It 
may be, as Van Gulick (1980) trys to show, that a broadly conceived 
functionalist account of mind can be extended to accommodate the social 
dimension. But even if this is the case, we must bear in mind that this broadly 
conceived functionalist account should not be limited to any one particular 
explanatory level. For the major problem with restricting oneself to a limited 
number of levels of description and explanation is that useful and valid 
generalizations obtainable at other levels will be omitted. (A compelling 
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illustration of the loss of explanatory power by restriction to lower levels of 
. description and explanation is Putnam's, 1975, famous 'square peg in round 
hole' thought experiment. Given only a microstructural description of a square 
peg and a round hole, of equal cross-sectional area, one would not readily see, if 
at all, that the peg will not fit into the hole.) 
4.2 The self as a social construct. 
A look at some of Mead's (e.g., 1964; see Oatley, 1988) views on 
consciousness is somewhat revealing of the likely inadequacies of a purely 
neuroscientific, or analytical, structural-functional account. Mead held that the 
existence of the conscious mind cannot be explained simply as a higher order 
property emergent from complex brain functioning. He hypothesized that full 
human consciousness requires comparisons with a socially derived sense of 
self19. Consciousness, mind, and the self arise in relation to the close and often 
complex social interactions we partake in throughout our lives. (Others to make 
a case for the social construction of the sense of self and, therefore, for 
consciousness being socially derived, include Humphrey, 1983, 1986; and 
Marcel, 1988.) 
In the discussion of Johnson-Laird's (1983, 1988a, 1988b) theory of 
consciousness (chapter 3), I introduced the concept of mental models. The idea 
of mental models dates back to Craik's (1943) hypothesis that the human brain 
19 Note that this notion of the social self is to be distinguished from the 'biological 
self', which refers to an organism's sensitivity to the boundaries of itself as an 
organism in relation to the outside environment. This latter distinction between the 
self and nonself is served by a functional split in the nervous sy$tem - even the 
nervous systems of the simplest of organisms will be segregated into "equipment 
subserving, on the one hand, internal hedonic regulation and, on the other hand, 
information processing about the state of the external world." (Flanagan, 1990, 
p.325). See also e.g., Dennett ( 1991 a); Edelman ( 1989). 
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is capable of modelling aspects of the outside world, and of itself. The brain can 
be viewed as an "anticipation machine" (Dennett, 1991a) because it can track 
key features of the environment and anticipate future events by 'running 
simulations' of actual and possible events, including the effects of possible 
actions based on previous experience. Mead proposed that human 
consciousness requires a socially derived model of self, and Johnson-Laird 
formulates this proposal in the modern garb of cognitive science, in the form of 
Craikian models. (See also the discussion in Oatley, 1988.) 
Dennett (1991a) calls the socially derived self the "center of narrative 
gravity", for two reasons: he sees the construction of a model of the self as akin 
to telling a story or weaving a narrative, i.e., it is a process of representation (to 
ourselves and others) via language and gesture; and he regards the self not as a 
concrete entity, but as an artifact of social processes, and hence as one of a set of 
abstracta (logical constructs), analogous to the physicist's centre of gravity. 
(Incidentally, on Dennett's instrumentalist stance, beliefs are also abstracta.) 
4.3 But can this shed any light on consciousnessp? 
Oatley (1988) points out that theories of the likes of Johnson-Laird's -
those proposing recursive model construction of the self - tell us only about 
the mechanisms by which this modelling occurs, and not about phenomenology 
(consciousnessp). He claims that theories about the content of mind will also be 
required if we are to achieve anything approaching complete explanations of 
the phenomena of consciousness. What is needed, according to Oatley, is a 
rapprochement between natural science and social science, for "the 
phenomenology of explicitly knowing, and knowing that we know, derives 
from the socially derived experience of the sense of self as director and as part 
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of the comparison processes of consciousness." (p.378). 
While I have little doubt that some rapprochement between natural and 
social science will go a long way to explaining the intricacies of consciousnessp, 
it is not clear from Oatley's brief exposition that his proposal will rid 
consciousnessp of all its mystery. That is, without a more fully developed 
proposal, it is too early to tell whether the intuitive gulf between third-person 
explanations of the phenomena of consciousness and the first-person 'feel' of 
experience will be bridged, or even significantly diminished. Fortunately there 
is such a proposal in the offing: Dennett's (1991a) 'Multiple Drafts' model of 
consciousness. 
4.4. Dennett' s proposals. 
One important feature of the social dimension that, if it is to have any 
explanatory bite, cannot be captured at the microstructural level of 
neuroscientific theory, is the "meme" 20. While genes are the units of biological 
evolution, memes are the units of sociocultural evolution. Moreover, memetic 
evolution is a process which obeys the laws of natural selection, just as genetic 
evolution does. Memes can come in many forms, but are most generally known 
as ideas or units of knowledge. The notion of meme evolution plays an 
important part in Dennett's (1991a) theory. The infestation of the human brain 
by hordes of memes produces considerable change in the proficiency of that 
organ. "The haven all memes depend on reaching is the human mind, but a 
human mind is itself an artifact created when memes restructure a human brain 
in order to make it a better habitat for memes." (Dennett, 1991a, p.207). 
Furthermore, the functional differences created in brains by memes, and 
observable in behaviour, "though presumably all physically embodied in 
20 The term was coined by Dawkins ( 1976). 
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patterns of microscopic changes in the brain, are as good as invisible to 
neuroscientists, now and probably forever, so if we are going to get any grip on 
the functional architecture created by such meme infestations, we will have to 
find a higher level at which to describe it." (Dennett, 1991a, p.210). 
What is this level of description? Dennett suggests borrowing once again 
from the language of computer scientists: the level of description and 
explanation at which the effects of memes are evident is analogous to a 
'software level' of description. In particular, Dennett claims that consciousness 
can be understood in terms of the operation of a 'virtual machine' created by 
the effects of large numbers of memes in the brain. In computer science, a 
virtual machine is a higher--level programming language, i.e., a systematized set 
of rules and instructions. Programming languages allow a user to interact in a 
particular way with a computer, and determine what sort of functions or jobs 
that computer can perform. "So a virtual machine is a temporary set of highly 
structured regularities imposed on the underlying hardware by a program: a 
structured recipe of hundreds of thousands of instructions that give the 
hardware a huge, interlocking set of habits or dispositions-to-react." (Dennett, 
1991a, p.216). 
A 'user illusion' is created by a virtual machine: it gives the operation of 
the hardware upon which it is implemented a characteristic style and 
appearance to the user (e.g., my Macintosh may at one moment be operating as 
a Write Now word processor, and at another moment as a Hypercard filing 
system). The particular user illusion created by memes in the brain is "von 
Neumannesque", i.e., it is of a system operating serially, controlled by a central 
processing unit. "Conscious human minds are more-or-less serial virtual 
machines implemented - inefficiently - on the parallel hardware that 
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evolution has provided for us." (Dennett, 1991a, p.218). The 'user' in this case 
consists in the interacting systems that have some degree of access to the output 
of other systems (maybe via the global workspace), and that together form the 
neural basis of the centre of narrative gravity. 
In conclusion, social theory is quite compatible with physicalism. There 
are no physicalist strictures upon the general concerns of the social sciences 
(except when those sciences posit entities that are not based entirely within the 
physical world). However, the compatibility of levels of description and 
explanation need not imply a reduction or elimination of the higher levels by 
our best lower level theories. As Sterelny (1990) concludes, "[p]hysicalism does 
not require that every good theory be reducible, ultimately, to physical theory. 
So the fact that folk psychology, and much of cognitive psychology, is unlikely 
to reduce to the neurosciences does not commit us to their 'reconfiguration' or 
elimination." (pp.205-206). Major headway can be made in the development of 
theories of mind and consciousness if we retain a sociocultural level of 
description and explanation. (Hence the value of anthropology to cognitive 
science; see e.g., D' Andrade, 1981.) For example, the concepts of memetic 
evolution and the socially constructed self cannot be captured by neuroscience. 
I now turn to a discussion of another major advantage in retaining a 
sociocultural explanatory level: how a study of the development and practice of 
the craft of folk psychology can contribute to our theories of the phenomena of 
consciousness. 
5. The evolutionary development of consciousness, and the connection with 
our competence for the craft of folk psychology. 
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Recall that a close parallel can be drawn between folk physics and folk 
psychology. On this view, if the concepts and 'laws' of folk physics allow us to 
assess and predict the physical world, then the concepts and 'laws' of folk 
psychology constitute our ability to assess and predict our social world. Folk-
psychological principles are first and foremost items of the social realm; they 
may also, by implication, be about brain states and events, but that is not their 
raison d'etre. Just as a roughly accurate grasp of some basic physical principles 
of an organism's environment, relative to its needs and sensory and motor 
endowments, is vital for the survival of that organism, so too might a roughly 
accurate grasp of some basic psychological principles be vital to the survival of 
a social organism. 
Humphrey (1983) argues that it was sociocultural evolution, running 
parallel to, and parasitic on, biological evolution, that was primarily responsible 
for the extraordinary advances in the development of the human mind. 
Humphrey's 'just so' story of the development of consciousness runs like this: 
As our ancestors became increasingly dependent on social interactions and 
groupings, an advantage was accrued to those who had the capacity to explain 
and predict their conspecific's behaviour. Initially the explanatory system 
would have been rather crude: these early hominid ancestors lacked the 
capacity for 'introspection', but they could observe environmental conditions 
and behaviour, 'what went in and what went out' (i.e., they implicitly treated 
fellow humans as 'information processing devices'), and so could "have pieced 
together an external, objectively based explanatory model" (Humphrey, 1983, 
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p.50). Once social interactions became more complex, the possession of a more 
complex explanatory system would have proved a major advantage. Humphrey 
argues that a new method of psychological understanding was selected for, one 
that depends on the human ability to 'introspect'. By examining the contents of 
her own consciousness, an individual reasons by analogy to develop a model of 
the behaviour of others. 
But what does Humphrey mean by 'introspection' and 'the contents of 
one's own consciousness'? Introspection he sees as the capacity for 'reflexive 
consciousness', i.e., to be aware of being aware (conscious of being conscious). 
Humans have developed the capacity of being consciously aware of some of the 
results of the workings of their own brains. That is, the information processing 
of the brain produces certain motivational and dispositional states, which are 
accompanied by feelings (sensations, emotions, volitions, etc.) only when one is 
consciously aware that one's brain is in the relevant states. So our early 
ancestors' "brains would receive and process information from their sense-
organs without their minds being conscious of any accompanying sensation, 
their brains would be moved by, say, hunger or fear without their minds being 
conscious of any accompanying emotion, their brains would undertake 
voluntary actions without their minds being conscious of any accompanying 
volition" (Humphrey, 1983, pp.48-49). But once the higher-order capacity of 
reflexive consciousness evolved, voluntary actions could be accompanied by 
volitions, motivational states could be accompanied by feelings, and 
information received by the sense-organs could be accompanied by sensations. 
Marcel (1988) proposes a similar thesis, but is more explicit about the 
importance of a socially constructed model of the self. He claims that "it is the 
operation of reflexive consciousness which creates phenomenal experience from 
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otherwise non-conscious data. To the extent that reflexive monitoring can only 
be directed on the basis of a model of what is to be monitored, which is surely 
partly socially constructed, our phenomenal experience is the realization of a 
social construct." (p.150). 
The heart of Humphrey's theory is this: full human consciousness and the 
skill or craft of folk psychology (he calls it "natural psychology") are 
interdependent; reflexive consciousness, the capacity to gain a picture of the 
'psychological structure' underlying one's own behaviour (including a concept 
of the self), provides the means by which a conceptual framework can develop 
as a method for explaining the behaviour of one's fellows. "Nature's solution to 
the problem of doing psychology has been to give every member of the human 
species both the power and the inclination to use a privileged picture of his own 
self as a model for what it is like to be another person." (Humphrey, 1983, p.6, 
original emphasis). The conceptual frameworks that have developed are at a 
level of description that is the most pragmatic and useful for an explanatory 
system for human behaviour- not at the level of neurophysiology, but at what 
has proved to be an equally valid level: the psychological. Nevertheless, the 
extent to which folk psychology has proved to be successful "is presumably 
because the workings of my conscious mind do in reality correspond in some 
formal (if limited) way to the workings of my brain." (Humphrey, 1983, p.48; 
see also Lyons', 1990, similar point, mentioned in section 3, above). 
Humphrey (1986) uses the analogy of an 'inner eye' to explain our ability 
to introspect; however he is careful not to use the term in any way other than 
metaphorically. Via brain processes of some sort, individuals gain knowledge 
about the 'psychological structure' underlying their own behaviour by having 
the relevant experiences. 
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Dennett (1991a) is more explicit on the possible means by which we come 
to 'know' about our brain states. According to Dennett's theory, the thesis that 
individuals gain a picture of their 'psychological structure' is only partially 
correct: the picture they get is an illusion of psychological structure, not a 
roughly accurate account of what really goes on in the brain. Rather than adopt 
the folk-psychological practice of individuating contentful mental states (e.g., a 
state of being aware that one is seeing red, or a thought about that state of 
awareness), science should look to the processes that are responsible for the 
correlation between the information processing events of the brain and an 
individual's capacity to report on the information in those events (this is the 
basis of Dennett's method of "heterophenomenology", as discussed in chapter 
4). For on Dennett's view, it is the reporting of one's experience (e.g., 'I have the 
sensation of seeing red'), and not the lower-order states themselves (e.g., 
sensing red), that gives rise to there seeming to be contentful higher-order states. 
That there 'seems to be' contentful higher-order states, or recursive levels 
of reflexive consciousness (see especially Rosenthal, 1986), is an illusion, 
according to Dennett (for remember, he is an instrumentalist)- a user illusion 
created by the virtual machines of the brain. The process of reporting to 
ourselves and to others about our experience "is precisely what creates or fixes 
the content of the higher order thought expressed" (p.315)21 . Confabulation is 
the name of the game: we construct multiple 'narratives' or stories about our 
experiences (hence the 'Multiple Drafts' title to his theory). These reports about 
21 Karmiloff-Smith (e.g., 1986, 1991) provides intriguing accounts of the 
developmental stages children go through in constructing higher-level representations 
(e.g., in the context of problem solving), and how this is linked to linguistic 
competence. She argues that children are metatheoreticians: they discover how the 
physical and social worlds operate by constructing theories, not by simple 
observation of the facts. 
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experience do not originate from the outputs to the speech centre by an 
omniscient central homunculus or self, but from a Pandemonium-style process 
of (private and public) speech production (see chapter 3). 
Dennett (1991a) concludes: 
"To put the point tautologically, since it really does seem to 
people that they have both these beliefs about their experiences, and 
(in addition) the experiences themselves, these experiences and 
beliefs-about-experiences are both part of how it seems to them. And 
so we have to explain that fact - not the fact that our minds are 
organized into hierarchies of higher-ordered representational 'states' 
of belief, meta-belief, and so-forth, but that our minds tend to seem to 
us to be so ordered." (p.319).22 
And just what is this characteristic of 'seeming to be'? Why it would seem 
that it is our old friend, consciousnessp. But Dennett has sought to explain 
away phenomenology (especially when qualia are held to be its defining 
characteristics). He is a 'realist' about consciousnessp, but only in the sense that 
consciousnessp is an abstractum, a logical construct, like beliefs and the self. 
(See Dennett and Kinsbourne, 1992, p.235. Dennett, 1991b, provides a more 
detailed case for this form of attenuated realism.) Dennett (1991a) concludes 
that there is no such thing as phenomenology, rather there just "seems to be 
phenomenology" (p.366). But as Strawson (1992) points out, this claim must be 
false, for 'seeming to be' is phenomenology: "Such seemings are 
phenomenological goings-on, and phenomenological goings-on are such 
seemings." (p.5). 
In addition to this puzzle, there are further problems with the explanations 
of consciousness proposed by Dennett and Humphrey: namely, the reduction of 
22 It is this aspect of Dennett's theory that I think Block (forthcoming) misses when 
he claims that Dennett frequently appears to want a reduction of phenomenal 
consciousness to reflexive consciousness. Dennett ( 1991 a) does not, contra Block, 
treat reflexive consciousness as a good analys1s of consciousness for science; what he 
does claim is that it 1s a good analysis within folk psychology (see pp.306-320). 
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consciousnessp to reflexive consciousness (e.g., Block, forthcoming), and the 
supposed intimate and necessary relationship between language and 
consciousness (e.g., P. S. Churchland, 1983). What should we say about the 
consciousness of pre-linguistic children and animals, for example? Part of the 
solution may lie in distinguishing self-consciousness from 'mere' or 'simple' 
consciousness, as Dennett suggests; although there is still some warranted 
scepticism over such proposals (P. S. Churchland, 1983, for example, doubts 
whether this distinction carves nature at her joints). 
I do not have any ready solutions to these quandaries, except to say that 
Dennett' s sketch of a theory provides possibly the best means yet of showing 
how to bridge the notorious explanatory gap between scientific theories of 
consciousness and the first-personal 'feel' of experience. The following section 
summarizes the usefulness of Dennett's theory in this regard. 
6. Metaphors and analogies: Keys to unlock the mysteries of mind. 
Large chunks of this thesis could be considered as constituting a 
favourable review of Dennett's (1991a) Consciousness Explained. I do not think 
he has explained consciousness, however, at least in any widely accepted, 
strong sense of 'explained'. Although he has, as Dennett himself admits, 
provided a sketch of a theory, which is a start: "My explanation of 
consciousness is far from complete. One might even say that it was just a 
beginning, but it is a beginning, because it breaks the spell of the enchanted 
circle of ideas that made explaining consciousness seem impossible." (p.455). 
Dennett' s main concern in providing his theory sketch has therefore been to 
reduce many of the mysteries of consciousness and mind to puzzles; science 
cannot deal with mysteries, for they offer no clues as to how to begin solving 
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them (mysteries are, by definition, inexplicable). But once a mystery has been 
turned into a puzzle, it is possible for scientists to proceed in the directions 
stated or implied in the conversion (or indeed to change those directions, and 
hence the nature of the puzzle, should the weight of empirical evidence warrant 
it). (See Dennett's brief discussion of this point in Dennett, 1992.) 
Dennett' s primary tools for the task of turning mysteries into puzzles have 
been metaphors and analogies. In particular, he has found the software level of 
description to be the most productive source of metaphors for providing us 
with the blueprints of a bridge across the explanatory gap. "The concepts of 
computer science provide the crutches of imagination we need if we are to 
stumble across the terra incognita between our phenomenology as we know it 
by 'introspection' and our brains as science reveals them to us." (Dennett, 
1991a, p.433). 
The careful use of metaphors and analogies is an important initial step on 
the road to more complete and rigorous scientific theories. So how does this 
process reduce or bridge the explanatory gap? Or more generally, when does a 
mystery become a puzzle? A suggestion of the answers to these questions may 
be found in some proposals on the psychological nature of understanding. 
Although the concept of understanding is difficult to define, it undoubtedly 
involves knowledge, belief, and some degree of assumption on the part of the 
understander (Johnson-Laird, 1983). More specifically, individuals may be said 
to have a greater understanding of a phenomenon when the explanation they 
are offered achieves one or more of at least the following: (i) an increase in their 
knowledge of that phenomenon; (ii) a new way of thinking about that 
phenomenon, i.e., that provided by the explanation; (iii) an increase in the 
likelihood of their acceptance of (belief in) the explanation in question; 
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and (iv) the explanation places a minimal reliance on their intuitions, i.e., take 
little as possible for granted. 
Certainly conditions (i) and (ii) may be met by the careful use of 
metaphors and analogies within nascent theories of mind-brain. Condition (iii) 
may just as easily be met by dualist or other supernatural theories, but if the 
understander is at least sympathetic to physicalist concerns, then the thoughtful 
use of metaphors and analogies may increase that person's acceptance of the 
physicalist theory offered. With regard to condition (iv), Johnson-Laird (1983) 
suggests that those explanations which can be put in the form of an effective 
procedure (see chapter 2) will have most explanatory value, because this will 
place minimal, or as near as possible to nonexistent, reliance on our theoretical 
intuitions. Thus Johnson-Laird proposes a computational constraint on the 
content of psychological theories; psychological theories will "count as putative 
explanations only if it is possible to formulate them as effective procedures -
or at least those parts of them giving rise to empirical predictions." (1983, pp.7-
8). Many of our current psychological theories are not ready for such precise 
formulation, however, for some of the phenomena they pertain to are, in 
Dennett's words, very much a part of the terra incognita between the first-
person and third-person perspectives on the human condition. Although the 
use of metaphors and analogies tends to place a good deal of reliance on our 
intuitions, it is via these metaphors and analogies that scientists can point the 
way towards more rigorous formulations. Metaphors and analogies may be 
keys to unlock the doors labelled 'mysteries of mind', but behind those doors lie 
the labyrinthine corridors of puzzles. 
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7. Where to now? 
One underlying general concern to emerge from this thesis is that 
anything approaching consummate explanations of all the neuroscientific, 
experiential, and behavioural phenomena underlying our use of the terms 
'consciousness' and 'mind' will require a truly interdisciplinary approach. 
'Consciousness' is a term of the vernacular that picks out such a disparate or 
heterogeneous group of these phenomena (chapter 1) that nothing short of a full 
scale attack from all relevant disciplines will uncover much of the mystery and 
confusion surrounding it. Thus I agree with Thagard (1989) when he says ''I 
reject as methodological imperialism the opinion that other approaches are not 
worth pursuing as well [as the type of connectionist model he uses]. In the 
current neonatal state of cognitive science, restrictions on ways to study the 
mind are clearly premature." (pp.457-458). There is a place for all manner of 
descriptive levels in our explanatory quest. Our best general approach for most 
complex cases of psychological explanation will be integrative, without the 
requirement of strict intertheoretic reduction. Dennett (1991a), for instance, says 
of his integrative approach to a theory of consciousness: "The limited 
perspective of each enterprise [neuroscience and cognitive psychology/ AI] 
taken by itself just shows us the need for another enterprise - the one we are 
engaged in - that tries to put together as many as possible of the strengths of 
each." (p.256). 
Dennett (1991a) claims that philosophers like himself are in an ideal 
position to develop such interdisciplinary theories (or at least sketches of 
theories, to be "made honest by modeling at [the computational] level"; p.268). 
The philosopher's and philosophical psychologist's job is to tie together the best 
theoretical claims from all manner of disciplines, while keeping a watchful eye 
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out for logical inconsistencies, conceptual problems, misguided assumptions, 
and barren claims (see also Rust, 1992). Moreover, before anything approaching 
'complete' theories can be advanced, a detailed survey of the different sorts of 
questions that need answering, and how they might be answered, is required-
a job ideally suited to philosophers and philosophical psychologists, but one 
that may be beyond the ken and skills of any one theorist (Dennett, 1991a). 
If Dennett is right here, then we can see that the interdisciplinary approach 
is in dire need of systematic examination. Cognitive science is claimed to be 
interdisciplinary, yet it is not entirely clear exactly how the disciplines can and 
should relate to each other. Is there some formal progr~m or methodology of 
scientific explanation that incorporates, or indeed champions, the 
interdisciplinary approach? If so, what does this philosophy of science have to 
say about how one should go about using and combining the theories and 
results of multiple disciplines? Is there some best 'middle way' between 
creating interdisciplinary theories that are too stringent and 'focused' in their 
postulates and objectives, and creating those that are too much of a 'mish-mash' 
of possibly unrelated, contradictory, or unsystematic claims and results? These 
are some of the questions which need to be addressed in a critical examination 
of the interdisciplinary approach to theories of cognitive systems, and especially 
of consciousness. In effect, what I am asking is whether there is, or can be, a 
metatheory of interdisciplinary explanation. If so, what form does or should it 
take? What bearing will the answers to these questions have on present and 
future explanations of the phenomena of consciousness? But these are questions 
for another thesis. 
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